France rethinks its Sahel strategy: France's medium-term action forecast

At framework of its operations in the region, France is, together with the EU and the UN, one of the main supporters of the G5 Sahel, an initiative made up of five countries in the region - Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad - to which it provides financial support and training, and whose main objective is to ensure effective control of the territory by the states in the fight against terrorism, as well as to stop the flow of illegal trafficking in drugs, people, arms and animals. goal .

However, the death of President Déby in Chad in April 2021 at the hands of FACT rebels and the two consecutive coups in Mali that have put the army at the helm of the country have destabilised the region, threatening the viability of the international counterterrorism operation.

Last summer Macron announced the end of his main security operation in the region, 'Barkhane', while signalling a reorientation of France's priorities and mode of intervention. France's presence in the Sahel is not only costly in terms of resources and staff; it is not viewed very favourably by French public opinion, and Macron needs to improve his image in the run-up to the 2022 elections. 

area With regard to the Sahel, it should be taken into consideration that it is not only an area of conflict due to the terrorist insurgency, but also, due to various factors subject, a complex area in its own right. Not only does it suffer from extreme poverty and climate change, but it is also one of the richest areas in the world in terms of resources such as oil, gold and uranium, with a strong potential for renewable energy exploitation, and one of the main transit areas for drug trafficking to Europe (especially cocaine).

As for Chad, since its independence from France in 1960, it has been an unstable country, full of political replacements and revolts. Indeed, Idriss Déby, Chad's president until his death in 2021, who also suffered several coup attempts (2006,2008,2019), seized power in 1990 after overthrowing Hissene Habré. The country is one of the poorest in the world, ranking 187 out of 189 in the HDI; is highly dependent on oil; is affected by an Islamist insurgency from within and outside its borders; is destabilised internally by frequent protests; and is at a geopolitical crossroads, affected by conflicts in Lake Chad, Libya, Darfur (Sudan), the Central African Republic and the Sahel.

For its part, Mali is a country of great geopolitical relevance in the Sahel region, especially in terms of the fight against terrorism. Given its high level of interconnectedness with neighbouring countries, with seven of which it shares a border, Mali is greatly affected by what happens around it; in turn, what happens in Mali has an impact on its surroundings. In addition, the country is a popular crossing point for migrants from West Africa, whose routes often pass through Tessalit, an important hub, although it does not reach the importance of other Sahelian cities such as Agadez and Khartoum, Degree .

France-Mali relationship in the Sahel framework and coup d'état

The fall of Gaddafi's regime in Libya had major repercussions in the Sahelian environment, resulting in the uprising of Tuareg separatist groups in 2012 in the Azawad area, the proliferation of prominent jihadist groups, and the disintegration of the Malian army.

Operation 'Serval', launched by France in January 2013 to guarantee Mali's territorial unity and fight terrorist groups in the Azawad area, ended in 2014 without having succeeded in re-establishing state control of the area or eliminating the insurgency. Following "Serval", France launched Operation Barkhane with a view to the entire Sahel region and with objectives similar to those of "Serval", mainly to support the states in the area in the fight to effectively control their own territory. At the same time, the G5 Sahel was born as an initiative of the countries in the region to coordinate and support each other in the fight against terrorism.

Seven years after its launch, Operation Barkhane has also failed to achieve its objectives, and last summer Emmanuel Macron announced that the operation would cease to exist 'in its current form'. The decision was partly motivated by the enormous cost of the intervention for France, not only in terms of economic and military resources, but also in terms of public opinion.

However, the reorientation of French strategy in the Sahel will have to adapt to changing circumstances in Mali, as the second coup d'état in a year has put in power a military government that quickly announced a realignment of the country towards Russia, with the more than likely arrival of mercenaries from group Wagner to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of around 2,500 French troops, half of the contingent. This realignment seems to have been favoured by local public opinion, which did not look favourably on the large military presence of the former colonial power.

France's loss of influence in Mali could have many consequences, including the opening of negotiations between the Malian government and the insurgents and Islamist groups in Azawad, which the French government strongly opposed, but which local citizens supported to some extent. Some of the Tuareg groups were major players in the fight against terrorism, and were even considered more useful to France than the Malian army itself, achieving some success in recapturing strategic enclaves from jihadist control. As a result, the Tuareg groups reached a peace agreement with the Malian government in 2015, which granted them partial autonomy in the north of the country, agreement .

Wagner's presence could further hinder any negotiation process given the group mercenary's dismal reputation for war crimes and other atrocities. Indeed, some representatives of former Tuareg groups have indicated that Wagner's presence could jeopardise the agreement peace deal they signed in 2015 with the Bamako government. A new confrontation between Mali's central government and the Tuareg groups could be a debilitating factor in the fight against terrorism, not only in the country, but in the Sahel as a whole, since, if control of the northern part of the country is disputed, terrorist groups could once again set up operations there instructions from which to operate throughout the region.

The shift towards Russia in Mali's security policy could also affect the European mission statement in the country, EUTM-Mali, and the presence of other foreign actors such as Austria and Germany on the framework of international missions. Although several European countries have suggested that their presence is incompatible with Wagner's, a withdrawal of troops and financial aid would weaken the capacity to fight terrorism in the area to a dangerous degree, so these threats of withdrawal may not be realised, or at least not completely or without a strategic reorientation of the international presence in the Sahel to compensate for them.

Finally, other G5 Sahel members, such as Chad, have expressed their rejection of Wagner's involvement in Mali, given group 's connection to the FACT (Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad), manager of the death of President Déby. This could become another destabilising element for the alliance, as one of its instructions is internal cohesion and acceptance of other members' operations within their own territory (up to 100 km from the border), and member states are unlikely to want to allow Wagner mercenaries to operate within their borders.

The case of Chad: instability and governmental changes

The months leading up to Idriss Déby's death in April 2021 were characterised by growing unrest. On 6 February 2020, he announced his sixth presidential candidacy, sparking protests in the capital, N'Djamena, and in other cities such as Doba, Sarh, Abeche and Moundou, organised by civil service examination and human rights activist groups. Despite winning the elections with 79.3 percent of the vote, social discontent was evident, as shown by the publication in January 2021 of a manifesto drafted by civil service examination calling for the application of codes of conduct and transparency in the election of candidates. The civil service examination accused Déby of wanting to create a "monarchy" (a term also used later by FACT). This idea would also be supported by the constitutional reforms he introduced in 2005 and 2018 to guarantee his presidency until 2033 (adding the requirement of 45 years of age to be eligible for election).

On election day, 11 April, the rebel FACT group crossed the border to raid Tibetsi and Kanem, advancing into the territory until it was 300 km from N'Djamena by the end of the week. Idriss Déby therefore decided to postpone his electoral speech to visit his troops, and was assassinated on 20 April by group[1].

The president's death led to the closure of borders and the accession to power of his 37-year-old son Mahamat Idriss Déby. His appointment was irregular because he did not meet the constitutionally required age requirement for position, and because the Magna Carta established that, in the event of the president's death, it is up to the National Assembly to take power in order to organise a transition within 90 days.

After dissolving parliament through the army, annulling the constitution and appointing himself head of state, Mahamat Déby promised to hold new elections within 18 months, creating a National Transitionalcommittee (NTC ), which had 93 members as of September. There is no representation on this committee of civil society groups opposed to Déby's power, including Waki Tama.

From April until now, Mahamat Déby has been making small political moves, such as his meeting with Macron in May, or his intention to withdraw 600 men, half of his contingent deployed in the Sahel. meeting with Macron in May, or his intention to withdraw 600 men from the Sahel, half of his contingent deployed at area. However, perhaps the most noteworthy has been the repression of peaceful protests in May and October, as well as the opening in November of negotiations with the FACT and the UFR (Union des Forces de la Résistence) by Déby, who months earlier had refused to negotiate with these groups.

Both the FACT and the UFR have set conditions for entering into negotiations: amnesty for political prisoners (presented by both groups), an end to the repression of peaceful protests (FACT) and the return (UFR) of property seized by the government. Déby appears to have responded favourably, promising the release of prisoners, vocational reintegration programmes and the return of seized assets[2]. It should be recalled that the FACT is growing in support, including from the Goran tribe and the militia groups FNDJT (Front de la Nation pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad) and UFR (made up of Zaghawa and Tubu)[3].

On the other hand, it is worth mentioning the declarations of the current Chadian foreign minister on 23 September, accusing Wagner of being behind Déby's death, supporting the FACT, as well as mercenary groups in Libya, Central African Republic and Mali (however, the country's foreign minister, Mahamat Zene, denies that there is any subject relationship with Wagner).

Chad-France relations at framework in the fight against terrorism.

France's relationship with Chad is very important to ensure stability in the Sahel. Macron declared at Idriss Déby's funeral that Déby was a brave friend, stating that he would not let anyone undermine Chad's stability. However, he changed his position shortly afterwards to support an open and democratic transition and to punish the government's repression of demonstrations. Chadian society sees France as part of the problem.

Chad's importance for France lies in several factors that come together in the area of security and defence. Firstly, Chad is the bulwark for the "Barkhane" on which France relies. The Gauls have instructions in N'Danjema (1,000 soldiers), in the centre of the country (Faya-Largeau), and near the border with Sudan, the Central African Republic and Libya (Abeche). Managing and controlling the Sahara desert is very complex; this underlines Chad's value to France. Finally, its position on the map allows it to keep a close eye on the Islamic State, Boko Haram and status in Nigeria and Cameroon.

Chad is also considered the most important force in the Sahel.5 The country was of great financial aid importance in the fight against Al Qaeda in 2013, when 1,500 troops were stationed on the tripartite Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger border. Moreover, France is Chad's main international ally, providing it with frequent support and intelligence inthe fight against terrorism. Finally, it should be recalled that since 2013 France has been seeking to withdraw its troops and disengage from the region, with the idea that the countries in the region will be able to control the terrorist insurgency on their own. In this case, Chad will play a central role.

France and the Sahel, possible lines of action in the short/medium term deadline

Macron's statements in the summer, saying that it was the end of France's operations in the Sahel 'in their current form' may imply that France will seek to rethink its strategy in the region.

Given the unpopularity of operations in the Sahel among the French public and also in the host countries, it is safe to assume that the end of French military operations on the current scale has come. Until this summer, Operation Barkhane alone had around 5,000 troops, now reduced by half.

One of the possibilities for the future is for France to rethink its counter-terrorism operations, conducting them not through permanent missions, but through a series of small special operations, which require less staff and a much smaller logistical complex, but which also require more Degree intelligence cooperation with countries in the region.

This subject of special missions could be aimed at cutting off or hindering the financing of terrorist groups on the framework of missions against drug, animal and human trafficking, which are much more acceptable in the eyes of the public.

In terms of presence and cooperation with other Western countries, it is important to note that the democratic decline that the Sahel region has experienced in recent years could be an obstacle, not so much for military presence in missions such as EUTM Mali, but for cooperation in economic subject and the financing of such missions, as many Western countries are reluctant to provide funds to non-democratic countries.

Finally, the likely presence of group Wagner in Mali may lead to a deterioration of relations between G5 Sahel member states, especially with Chad, for the reasons mentioned above. A weakened G5 Sahel reduces the viability of any foreign mission statement on the ground, as effective control of the territory by the states may become an even more difficult task.