Effects in South Sudan
After five years of civil war in South Sudan, President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, belonging to the rival Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, respectively, signed a ceasefire and power-sharing agreement in August 2018. The United Nations mission statement of attendance in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) had set up camps in the territory to protect civilians from the violence being perpetrated against them during the war. However, since 2020, UNMISS began to reduce the number of staff dedicated to this work, leading to some insecurity.
Since the end of the civil war, the increase in inter-communal violence and attacks, the threat of the peace process collapsing and the severe humanitarian conditions in large parts of the country have generated an urgent need to improve the security and protection of South Sudanese civilians, whose status has worsened since the beginning of the war in Sudan in April 2023, with a displacement of refugees to the southern neighbor that has aggravated the problem of overcrowding in the camps; refugees are exposed to famine and violent clashes, and their humanitarian needs cannot be adequately addressed by aid organizations or by the government itself due to a lack of resources; as a result, South Sudan suffered the worst famine crisis the territory has ever faced in 2023.
In addition to the above, the instability and humanitarian status in South Sudan is compounded by the impact of the war on Juba's ability to continue exporting the oil it produces, which is the country's main source of revenue, Issue for an estimated 90% of its GDP. The main pipeline carrying oil from South Sudan to the terminal near Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast has been suffering from blockages in Sudan since February 2024. In March of the same year, Sudan's oil minister declared in a letter a "state of force majeure" in the submission crude oil, justifying the failure to meet its obligations to transport the fossil fuel by the unpredictability of pipeline ruptures in areas of military operations. The minister stated in the letter that the war conditions in the country obstructed the proper resolution of the matter. The Sudanese Armed Forces claimed that the ruptures took place in territory controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, attributing responsibility for what happened to them. For its part, the RSF denied these accusations.
The blockages have had an impact on the oil sector and GDP: since the conflict began in Sudan, the oil and gas sector has contracted by 70%, while GDP has declined by 5%. Prior to the disruptions, and as agreed when the country gained independence from Khartoum in 2011, South Sudan had been exporting about 150,000 barrels per day; the Petrodar pipeline outage reduced the Export Issue to about 58,000 barrels per day by the end of 2024.
These disruptions have seriously affected the country's Economics , which was already weakened by the war, leading to a currency crisis marked by inflation: the value of the dollar rose from 1,100 Sudanese pounds in February to 1,550 in July. They have also led to increased insecurity due to South Sudan's dependence on Sudanese infrastructure for oil exports, as tensions in the conflict in Sudan do not seem to be easing.
The effects of inflation have been seriously felt by different sectors of the country. The radical increase in prices has affected, first of all, consumers and small businesses: the price of corn, a staple food product for the Sudanese, went from 800 to 2,000 pounds in just a few months, which has made it difficult for many families to access basic necessities, as well as the ability of vendors to keep their businesses afloat. Inflation has also impacted the public sector: in May 2024, Awow Daniel Chuang, Minister of Finance, warned of the state's inability to pay the salaries of police, military and civil servants as a result of the budget deficit caused by the loss of 70% of oil revenues.
On January 4 of this year, the Sudanese Oil Minister declared in a new letter the lifting of the "force majeure", thanks to the improvement of security conditions in the territory and to a series of agreements to ensure the safe transport of oil made between Yuba and Bapco, the Sudanese business in charge of the pipeline. Exports through the Petrodar pipeline, with a length of more than 1,500 kilometers, linking South Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, now reach 90,000 barrels per day, still far from the more than 150,000 barrels per day before the stoppage.
Not all of the consequences of the resumption of exports will be positive for the country: despite providing an important source of revenue for the government, South Sudanese citizens fear that increased oil revenues will lead to increased corruption and social inequality, and a return to civil conflict. Transparency is a serious problem in the South Sudanese government, being ranked by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt nations in the world, ranking 177th out of 180 nations. In addition, the funds raised could be used to finance the various warring sides in Sudan, especially if they control any of the areas through which the pipeline runs, in order to prevent further obstructions.
Finally, there is a real possibility that the conflict in Sudan will degenerate into a regional contest that will eventually involve its neighbor to the South. In fact, South Sudan has already come into contact with the FAR: in February of this year an alliance took place between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, a political party and militant organization in the Republic of Sudan that has been fighting the Sudanese army for decades, and the FAR. To counter this alliance, the Sudanese army has sought the support of South Sudanese militias in the border area. These developments could further contribute to the destabilization of the country, especially on the border, which was already embroiled in a conflictive status as a result of various government practices, such as appointing corrupt governors, co-opting local militias and extracting resources.
Gloomy outlook
The status of instability in both countries is not improving: Sudan continues to host a bloody conflict in which it seems that none of the parties intends to reach a peace agreement , while South Sudan is in a transition period since the end of the civil war to implement the peace agreement reached in 2018. The elections scheduled for 2024 were postponed until 2026, and the tension in South Sudan heralds the possible start of a new internal conflict, tension that has been heightened as a result the effects generated by the war in Sudan. The country is already on edge, and if the government is not able to maintain order and stability and manage the revenues generated by the resumption of oil exports properly, the status could escalate to a higher level.
The reality is that both states are stuck in their respective crises and do not seem to be willing to change the status quo: in Sudan, the possibility of a peace agreement seems very remote without the intervention of some external agent trying to mediate the conflict, while in South Sudan, adequate transparent and efficient economic planning will be necessary, which can alleviate internal tensions and citizen discontent, thus avoiding an uprising. If the war in Sudan, corruption and the government's institutional inefficiency continue to hinder the proper utilization of the country's oil wealth, it is only a matter of time before internal instability evolves into a new civil war. The possibility of a regional conflict does not seem too remote either, which would undoubtedly increase casualties and the level of violence, although this could attract international attention and encourage cooperation to reach an agreement.
The problem that, without a doubt, seems to be the most relevant and the one that most hinders the peace process is the lack of commitment of each of the parties involved to resolve the conflict. These are two countries that have made violence their normality and, not seeing it as an anomaly, may be more interested in maintaining the current status quo and their desires for political and economic power than in resolving their contradictions. It is hard to imagine the respective sides in the war in Sudan being able to put stability and the needs of the civilian population before their own interests; and it remains to be seen whether the same does not happen in South Sudan, for, as already mentioned, tensions could trigger a civil war there in the short term, or even a war with certain factions of its northern neighbor.
Nor does it seem very likely that a government such as that of South Sudan, where democratic values are not exactly abundant and corruption is rife, will be able, on its own, to achieve a transition stable enough to promote peace and restore economic, political and social stability. There are too many interests behind it and too few incentives to set them aside. Third party intervention is urgently needed in both countries.
It seems clear that both Sudan and South Sudan will not be able to achieve much improvement in the short term, at least as long as the international community continues to ignore the status. Urgent support for this cause is needed, not only from humanitarian organizations, but also from states and international agencies that are willing to bring order and ensure internal security, especially that of the civilian population, which is undoubtedly the most affected.
