In the picture
Ribbon in the colors of the Hungarian flag [freepick]
Hungary will hold its first genuinely competitive elections in years on April 12, 2026. Yet the country’s electoral system raises questions about fairness. The electoral reforms introduced in 2011 and 2024 have sparked suspicions of manipulation and gerrymandering among scholars and opposition figures. The mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system encourages strategic voting, as citizens must split their votes between local constituency candidates and national party lists to secure the best possible outcome under winner-take-all district rules and compensatory proportional allocation.
This article analyzes how Hungary’s post-2011 electoral system functions, how subsequent reforms—including the 2024 constituency revision—interact with its mixed-member, largely majoritarian design, and how these features shape both party competition and voter incentives. It first outlines the institutional architecture (seat allocation rules, the relative weight of single-member districts and party lists, and the role of compensation mechanisms), then synthesizes existing critiques regarding bias, disproportionality, the treatment of “wasted” votes, and gerrymandering. Building on this, it examines the logic of strategic voting within the current rules, illustrating how citizens who understand the distinct functions of district and list votes can, in principle, adjust their behavior to increase the effectiveness of their choices at the ballot box. To provide the necessary context, it begins by describing Hungary’s electoral system and the reforms it has undergone over time.
Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, a highly complex mixed-member electoral system was established by the 1989 transition law, allocating 386 seats in Parliament across three distinct tiers: 176 single-member districts (SMDs), 152 regional list seats, and 58 national compensatory seats.
Voters cast ballots in three contests, often spanning two rounds for single-member districts (SMDs).
First, in the individual constituencies—the single-member districts (SMDs, where only one candidate wins per district)—voters elected individual candidates in geographically defined constituencies using a two-round runoff system; in the first round, a candidate needed an absolute majority (at least 50%), while in the second round, the seat was secured through a plurality vote (the candidate with the most votes wins).
Second, voters elected representatives from party lists at the territorial level in the 20 regional constituencies, where parties submitted lists in multi-member districts (meaning that more than one candidate ran for office in the same district), and seats in Parliament were allocated proportionally using the d’Hondt method, which will be explained later. Parties were subject to a 5% threshold, meaning that if a party did not receive at least 5% of the popular vote, it could not win a seat.
Third, a national compensatory tier was used in which the remaining 58 seats were allocated based on “wasted” votes. Wasted votes were calculated from the votes cast for losing candidates who were unable to win any seats (losing single-member district candidates). This tier further balanced representation.
Voters cast three ballots: one for a candidate in their single-seat district, one for a party list in their territorial district, and one that counts toward the national list (via transferred or compensation votes).
Although this complex system was rather confusing, its structure emphasized proportionality, seeking to balance geographic representation (SMD) with party-list proportional representation and to reconcile local accountability with national vote shares.
Fidesz (Hungary’s ruling party since 2010) triumphed in 2010. Viktor Orbán’s party won 67.88% of the parliamentary seats with 52.73% of the vote, securing a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. After a year in office, the existing electoral system came under threat, as Fidesz held a constitutional majority(Art. S (2)) and the Parliament consisted of a single chamber. Orbán’s government exploited its legislative dominance by unilaterally changing the electoral law.
The electoral reform was not discussed with other political actors, nor was the proposal presented by Orbán’s government to the general public. The National Assembly passed the government’s electoral reform bill on December 23, 2011. Many scholars argue that this was one of the regime’s first moves toward illiberalism, as politicians seek to strengthen their position by altering electoral systems and amending the constitution whenever the opportunity arises. The reform reduced the size of the Assembly from 286 to 199 seats and simplified the structure by replacing the three-tier system with a two-tier one.
Under the new system, the first round of voting determines the allocation of 106 parliamentary seats based on the plurality rule in the 106 single-member districts at the local level, while the second round determines the allocation of 93 seats, elected through the proportional representation (PR) system in a single nationwide electoral district.
The second round of voting introduces a degree of complexity. Citizens vote for a single party list, not for individual candidates, and the seats are allocated using the d’Hondt method. This method provides a simple way to distribute a fixed number of seats (93) among parties based on their total votes, by repeatedly dividing each party’s vote totals by consecutive integers (1, 2, 3, ...) and awarding seats to the highest resulting quotients until all seats are allocated, thereby maintaining a close approximation of proportionality while slightly favoring larger parties. The following graph illustrates this “auction method.”
Furthermore, a 5% threshold has been established that prevents parties with less than 5% of the vote from winning any seats (10% for two-party alliances and 15% for alliances of more than two parties). In this system, wasted votes consist not only of votes for losing candidates, but also of the extra votes cast for winning parties that were not necessary for their victory (excess votes). These votes are redistributed to the national list tier, which reinforces the winner-take-all nature of the electoral system, which will be used in the upcoming elections.
In summary, Hungary qualifies as a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system because its 106 single-member districts (53% of seats) use plurality voting—resulting in winner-take-all outcomes—while the 93 compensatory list seats (47%) provide only partial proportional correction.
Upon examining the fundamental changes brought about by the reform, it is clear that the new system is more majoritarian, as single-member districts now dominate, granting disproportionately large seat bonuses to locally dominant parties rather than ensuring full proportionality. In the pre-2011 system, 46% of all members of parliament were elected from single-member districts, while in the post-2011 system, that figure has risen to 53%.
The 2011 electoral reform gave Fidesz a structural advantage, as demonstrated by its 2014 victory in91 of the 106 single-member districts (86%) despite receiving only 44% of the national list votes. This outcome illustrates asymmetrical competition: Fidesz entered as a cohesive alliance backed by strong local networks, whereas a divided opposition comprising several parties fragmented anti-Fidesz support in districts (for instance, 60% of combined opposition votes were dispersed as 20% each across three candidates). As a result, Fidesz secured plurality wins with only 35–40% in many races. This highlights to voters the necessity of opposition unity behind a single candidate per district to overcome such imbalances.
Under the pre-2011 system, a candidate had to receive more than 50% of the vote to win the first round of an election if voter turnout in the constituency exceeded 50% and the candidate obtained more than 50% of the valid votes; otherwise, a second round was required. Under the post-2011 system, the candidate with the most votes wins; there is no minimum turnout requirement, making it easier to win districts with low turnout, while favoring parties with a loyal base of voters over those with broad appeal.
On the other hand, the new system is simpler for voters because it consists of only one round and two ballots, causing less confusion, although it still requires strategic voting.
Perhaps the most significant consequence of electoral reform is the suspicion of gerrymandering. Throughout this article, the question of how these electoral districts are constructed and how their boundaries are drawn has been overlooked. According to Grofman et al., there are three potential sources of electoral bias: malapportionment, reactive malapportionment, and partisan gerrymandering. Malapportionment refers to variations in the population size of constituencies, which can result in unequal representation across districts. Reactive malapportionment refers to differences in voter turnout across electoral districts, which can Lastly, partisan gerrymandering involves the manipulation of electoral district boundaries to favor certain parties.
Act CCIII of 2011 on the Election of Members of Parliament, Section 4(2)(a), explicitly states: “Single-member constituencies shall be established in such a way that a) they do not cross county boundaries or the boundaries of Budapest; b) they form contiguous areas; c) the number of voters is approximately the same.” Although this rule was intended to serve as a standard safeguard against gerrymandering, critics argue that the country is subject to gerrymandering; moreover, this law can create a population balancing problem and forces intra-county gerrymandering.
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s research team of governance experts (BTI 2024 Country Report) argues that “The most B is gerrymandering, which allows Fidesz candidates to dominate electoral districts except in Budapest.” Nevertheless, this report did not take into account the 2024 boundary changes.
Act LXXIX of 2024 adjusted Hungary’s 106 single-member constituencies for the 2026 parliamentary elections to account for population shifts. The number of districts in Budapest was reduced from 18 to 16, while the number in Pest County increased from 12 to 14. Furthermore, this amendment necessitated the redrawing of all constituencies in Pest County, including Budapest.
In addition, boundary adjustments were made in Fejér and Csongrád-Csanád counties. The official purpose of the amendment was to ensure fair representation of constituencies and equal voting power for all citizens. The bill’s explanatory memorandum cites demographic shifts—specifically, the growth of the urban population and the decline of the rural population—which led to voter imbalances exceeding 20% in some constituencies, particularly in Pest County and Budapest, where the inner-city population declined.
Máté Tóth, a Hungarian lawyer, argues that the reform was not only justified but necessary and was in no way motivated by political goals. He points out that between 2010 and 2022, the population of Pest County has grown, while the population of the capital has been declining due to suburbanization. He cites a 9% decline in the population nationwide and a 20% decline in Budapest. He argues that a vote cast in Budapest would carry more weight than a vote cast anywhere else in the country, citing national laws establishing that votes should carry equal weight regardless of where they are cast, as affirmed in Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure, Preamble / Section 1. Additionally, failing to make the necessary changes to adjust electoral districts to population size constitutes a constitutional violation by omission. Furthermore, he stresses that, based on national laws, the timing was lawful, and that nothing was incorrect or rash. He expresses his support for the reform, while criticizing the criticism from the left.
While the amendment may have been necessary, the manner in which it was implemented has raised concerns and questions among scholars. The Venice Commission (Council of Europe, 2025 Opinion CDL-AD(2025)018), for example, expresses concern about possible political motivations behind the reform and a lack of political neutrality.
The opposition, meanwhile, claims that the redistricting process was conducted in a questionable manner, breaking up constituencies and dividing them into two or more parts. According to demographic experts, the imbalance between constituencies 1 and 2 in Csongrád-Csanád County did not decrease significantly even after the changes. In Tolna and Somogy counties, where the constituencies remained unchanged, a high level of disproportionality persisted, which benefits the ruling parties. The modification in Fejér County was described as a clear example of politically motivated gerrymandering. In a few districts, several gerrymandering techniques were identified, including cracking, packing, and mixing. Cracking refers to the splitting of voters from a particular party across many districts, so that they become a minority everywhere. Packing concentrates many opposition voters into one or a few districts, so they lose influence in other districts, while mixing blends voters from many different parties within the district to ensure a small but reliable majority for the preferred party.
The 2024 constituency boundary changes raise questions regarding their consistency with point 4.2 of Decision 22/2005 (June 17) of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, which clearly states that the legislature may deviate from the strictest compliance with the constitutional requirements concerning the equal weight of votes—which stem from the principle of equal suffrage—only if there is an appropriate constitutional justification. Therefore, such deviations cannot serve political interests.
Two Hungarian experts are informing citizens about potential political manipulations and tactics employed by the current government. Róbert László, an election expert at Political Capital, and Dániel Döbrentei, a lawyer specializing in electoral and voting rights at the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ), a Hungarian NGO focused on civil rights, the rule of law, and democratic institutions. Their arguments include pervasive daily electoral abuses involving the use of state resources for pro-government messaging (László), which blurs the line between public communication and partisan campaigning to create an uneven playing field even if voting procedures are technically correct; and legal loopholes enabling vote-buying schemes, fake parties designed to split opposition votes, and lax oversight of campaign finance that allows for hidden influence operations (Döbrentei).
Overall, the 2024 amendment did not fully resolve the issue of disproportionality, and in some cases even exacerbated it. According to the experts consulted, it appeared that the districts were not primarily designed according to settlement structures but rather based on considerations of electoral geography. The European Commission for Democracy through Law and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have previously emphasized that the delimitation of electoral constituencies should be based on broad and inclusive political consensus, conducted in a transparent and professional manner through an impartial and non-partisan procedure, avoiding short-term political considerations such as gerrymandering. The 2024 process—reportedly driven more by electoral geography than by neutral criteria—thus raises questions regarding the impartiality of the boundary delimitation, as underscored by these authoritative standards.
It is clear that citizens are forced to vote strategically to achieve their desired outcome. Maškarinec’s article on the 2014 election finds that voters follow Duverger-type logic, which shows a shift from choosing weaker parties to the strongest local challenger under plurality rules. In practice, this means that voters must not only consider whom they want to empower, but also whom they do not want to empower. The system compels citizens who support the opposition to vote for the candidate with the best chance in the district, in order to secure as many votes as possible against Fidesz. This tactical voting benefits the largest parties and weakens the smallest ones, as the latter have no chance of winning at the local, district level, since only one candidate can represent the single-member district (SMD). In practical terms, votes that are neither for the Fidesz candidate nor for the strongest anti-Fidesz candidate (in the current political race: Tisza) are wasted votes. Citizens who aim to change the current government in the upcoming elections are best served by voting for the most viable anti-government candidate, even if from a different party. This understanding of the election highlights the flaws in the system.
Vote-splitting is a phenomenon in which voters cast a tactical district vote—as mentioned above—and a sincere list vote. On the list ballot, voters can express their sincere preference by voting for their true favorite party, as the system allows for proportional representation using the d’Hondt method. However, it is important to take into account the 5% threshold.
The mixed-member system compels opposition voters, in the upcoming 2026 election, to employ split-ticket strategies—tactical choices at the district level combined with sincere list preferences—to counter disproportionality, regardless of normative views on voter behavior.
As Hungary approaches its 2026 election—a truly competitive contest between Fidesz and the newly prominent Tisza—the structure of the mixed-member majoritarian system will shape the outcome. Whether citizens understand and use their two votes strategically will further influence the results. Coordinating around the strongest challenger in each district, avoiding wasted list votes below the thresholds, and combining tactical SMD choices with sincere list preferences to limit disproportionality and make their voices count—despite enduring concerns about bias and gerrymandering in the electoral framework—are crucial. In this landscape, informed, coordinated participation becomes not just a right but a strategic necessity for those seeking political change in 2026. Ultimately, the election will test not only party strength, but also voters’ ability to navigate an imperfect system to effectively express their preferences.