Kashmir in the Modi Era: A multidimensional analysis from 2014 to the present.

The 21st century has marked the rise of India as a powerful global actor beyond South Asia. However, Indian politics is still marked by a nearly eight-decade-old problem: the disputed region of Kashmir. Since the 1947 Partition of India and Pakistan, Kashmir's territory has been sought by both the nuclear powers as well as China. Once a princely state under the British Paramountcy ruled by a Hindu maharaja, the Muslim-majority Kashmir acceded into the Indian union in October 1947 after an attack by Pakistan, which escalated into the first of many India-Pakistan wars. This dispute continues until today, and though the region was divided into Pakistani, Indian, and Chinese-administered regions, India and Pakistan maintain their claims over the entire territory. Though an uncertain agreement was reached in 1971 with the creation of a 'de facto' border between Indian and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir called the Line of Control, tension between the two rivals remains high, and border skirmishes erupt frequently; this tension has also been compounded by the fact that the Indian government has never held a plebiscite as mandated by the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 47 to determine whether the Kashmiri people want to be part of India or would rather belong to Pakistan.

The fragile situation in Kashmir has further deteriorated since Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014, when the BJP ousted the Indian National Congress to gain a majority in Parliament. Modi's implementation of 'Hindutva' policies and the desire to reshape India into a homogenous Hindu state severely threaten Kashmiris' freedom, identity, and basic right to self-determination(Akhtar 16).

The aim of this essay is to analyze how the partner-political landscape in Kashmir has changed since Modi and the BJP's rise to power in 2014 by analyzing the BJP government's policies in Kashmir and Pakistan's subsequent reaction.

Modi and the BJP acceded to power in 2014 through a campaign promoting an ideology called 'Hindutva,' which encourages and justifies Hindu nationalism as well as advocates for Hindu hegemony within India. Since he became prime minister, Modi has passed many repressive laws aimed at minorities in order to achieve his vision of a Hindu-only India. He has passed many similar laws restricting, prohibiting or penalizing the possession of beef and slaughter of cows.[1] While a substantial number of Hindus also consume beef, these laws are clearly aimed at non-Hindus who do consume cow meat thus constituting a restriction of their staff freedom. Modi and the BJP have also taken considerable steps toward demonizing non-Hindu minorities in India, especially Muslims. The BJP has promoted the derogatory term 'love jihad,' claiming that Muslim men lure and manipulate Hindu women into marrying them and converting them to Islam, and claiming that interfaith marriages, even those that happen with the consent of both families party to it, are forms of forced 'love jihad.'

Since 2020, eight Indian states, six of which are governed by the BJP, have passed laws banning religious conversion solely based on the purpose of marriage as an attempt to repress interfaith marriage. An excerpt from the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance (2020) states that the ordinance's purpose is "to provide for prohibition of unlawful conversion from one religion to another by misinterpretation, force, undue influence, coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage," an act which is blatantly anti-Islamic. Furthermore, Modi's BJP government passed the Citizenship AmendmentAct(CAA), in 2019, which offers easy access to Indian citizenship to illegal immigrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan or Bangladesh, regardless of religion-exceptMuslims. This law further threatens the equal rights of minorities such as Muslims in India, despite the Indian Constitution's secular character.

However, the most evident violation of the Indian Constitution was the unilateral abrogation of Article 370(Hameed and Shibli). Article 370 of the Constitution granted the state of Jammu and Kashmir autonomy in its internal affairs, and granted it the power to regulate its own laws and have its own legislative assembly. In 2019, Modi signed an executive order abolishing Article 370 after he failed to secure a majority in the Parliament to support his decision. Not only was the abrogation of the article unconstitutional, but it also had severe repercussions for the people in Kashmir, whose autonomy was stripped without consent. In order to prevent an uprising, Modi's government cut off communication lines in Kashmir and ordered a total communication blackout, shutting down cable TV, landlines, and the Internet. They further jailed leading Kashmiri politicians who had done nothing but criticize Modi's policies.

Unfortunately, the unconstitutional repudiation of Article 370 by Modi's government has severely worsened the partner-political landscape in Kashmir. Kashmiris' freedoms have been severely threatened, and elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir were suspended until this year, stripping away their rights to representation in the government. Moreover, the curfew imposed by the federal government as well as the complete shutting down of all communication to and from Kashmir infringed on people's basic human rights. Kashmiris have long held fears that Modi is trying to Hindu-ize Kashmir and diminish and oppress their majority-Muslim population(BBC News). With his abrogation of Article 370, Modi also revoked Article 35A, which gave Kashmir's legislative assembly the ability to define permanent residents and give them privileges such as exclusive land rights. As a result of taking away Kashmiris' exclusive land rights and making them available to anyone, Modi is opening Kashmir to be taken over by people who are not from there, leading to the systematic eradication of the Muslims who have lived there their entire lives(Al Jazeera). Many political activists in India argue that BJP under the Modi government has resorted to illegal, unconstitutional methods that have resulted in the deprivation of the basic human rights of the Kashmiri people(Human Rights Watch, 2024).

However, there are also some benefits to the abrogation of Article 370. Article 35A's restriction on the transfer of land to non-Kashmiris prevented the growth and development of large industries, leaving people with few options for employment. Removing these restrictions fosters economic growth and employment opportunities, leading to "prosperity for all"(Embassy of India in Madrid). Furthermore, this development will drive up levels of tourism in the area, creating even more employment opportunities for locals. Modi's government also seeks to protect the rights of women and children in Kashmir by making laws that safeguard these rights applicable in Kashmir as they are in the rest of India. Ultimately, although these undertakings are leading to some benefits in the region of Kashmir through the stimulation of growth and economic development, the government of India must also face the consequences that may arise from this.

An important element pertaining to this issue is Pakistan's reaction to the abrogation of Article 370. Pakistan has long held resentment toward India for what it terms the "illegal" occupation of Kashmir and has consistently been the aggressor in border skirmishes across the Line of Control, which continued through 2023. Unfortunately, but not necessarily surprising, the termination of the article has only fueled Pakistan's hatred of its neighbor. Though Islamabad constantly reiterates that "Pakistan does not recognize the supremacy of the Indian Constitution over Kashmir,"[2] Modi's actions involving Article 370 pushed the Pakistani government to concrete action. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan downgraded his country's diplomatic relations with India, removed the Indian High Commissioner from Pakistan, and refused to send an ambassador to New Delhi. Khan also suspended all bilateral trade with India, which is still non-existent today.

Though Pakistan recently urged India to undo its unilateral actions in Kashmir in order to potentially resume diplomatic talks, the possibility that this will happen is unlikely. Modi is clear on his stance toward Kashmir, and it is highly doubtful that Pakistan will change its views on the abrogation of Article 370 as having no legal value and treading upon Kashmiris' rights to self-determination. Though tensions between the two states might have cooled slightly since the initial abrogation of Article 370, the constant violent conflicts along the Line of Control are warnings that the situation in Kashmir could easily escalate into a larger war, one that could involve not only India and Pakistan, but other states as well. It must also be remembered that both India and Pakistan are nuclear states, and even the slightest change could escalate into an unprecedented conflict with catastrophic consequences for more than just Kashmiris.

Another contender in this dispute is China, who claims the north-eastern part of Kashmir as its own. China does not have as much at stake as India and Pakistan, but the Modi government's actions threaten to disrupt a fragile 'peace' between the three countries. Though China had shifted its South Asian policy away from being blatantly pro-Pakistan to being more neutral, the Modi government's abrogation of Article 370 led to Chinese President Xi Jinping affirming his nation's support behind Pakistan regarding Kashmir, with his Foreign minister claiming that the subsequent reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir was "unlawful and void." Furthermore, China claims that the abrogation of the article was a violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty, and the dispute escalated into a border skirmish in 2020, marking the first fatal confrontation between the two rivals along their disputed border since 1975.

Although India and China agreed to disengage from their border standoff in October, there still exists a chance that the conflict could re-escalate should India continue to greatly disrupt Kashmir. China has continually seen India's actions in Kashmir as encroachment on its territorial integrity, and could choose to engage in military conflict with India. This would create major consequences, as China has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, and is projected to have around 1,000 nuclear warheads by the year 2030. Moreover, a direct Chinese conflict against India would perhaps leave room for Pakistan to take control of the entire Kashmir area, seeing as India would be preoccupied and might not have the necessary military strength to fight a war on two fronts.

Despite these seemingly regressive policies in Kashmir, the BJP performed relatively well in the most recent elections of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. The state-wide vote was held in October 2024, marking the first time Kashmiris have been allowed to elect their own representatives since 2019. Though the INDIA coalition won the popular vote and gained the most seats in the legislature (49 out of 90), the BJP won the second largest number, gaining 29.[3] They understandably did not win any seats in Kashmir, but since the legislative assembly represents the territories of both Jammu and Kashmir, it is necessary to analyze why the BJP is still heavily present in the local political affairs of Kashmiris.

It is important to note that while Kashmir has a majority Muslim population, the neighboring Jammu is mainly Hindu, constituting the leading factor in the BJP's successful performance in the state election. A reason for the BJP's success might be due to the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act (2019), which reconstituted the state of Jammu and Kashmir into the union territories of Jammu and Kashmir (a single territory) and Ladakh, splitting the state in two. The changes to the organization of the state allowed Hindu refugees residing in Jammu who were displaced from Pakistan following Partition in 1947 to vote in state elections. Nevertheless, while some of the Hindus living in Jammu came to reside there as a result of the Partition, there is also a large portion of Hindus-KashmiriPandits-whofled Kashmir in a mass exodus during a violent insurgency in the Kashmir Valley in the 1990's.

The plight of the Pandits serves as emotional fuel for the BJP to gain votes. However, the exploitation of Kashmiri Pandits for political purposes has received backlash from the Pandits themselves, with the chairman of the Panun Kashmir organization saying that "[t]he BJP leadership has used Kashmiri Hindu religious cleansing to blame its opponents and to garner Hindu votes in the rest of India"(The Economic Times, 2024) while accusing him of treating Kashmiri Pandits like second-class citizens and not caring about them outside of the power they can bring the party[4]. Expanding upon this last criticism, Mehbooba Mufti, the chief of the People's Democratic Party and native Kashmiri, also claimed that Modi never mentioned Kashmiri Pandits' predicament during his quest to abrogate Article 370(Swadharma), though he has repeatedly pledged to help the refugees in their resettlement efforts(Reuters).

The case of Kashmir is a difficult one to resolve. Pakistan and India have been at odds on this issue since their modern existence, a tense conflict only exacerbated by the 2019 abrogation of Article 370. Though the United Nations tried to assuage the dispute with a mandate in 1948, neither country followed the terms it set out. One of the most consequential parts of the UN mandate was the instruction for India to hold a plebiscite in order to determine whether Kashmir would subsequently belong to it or to Pakistan. In spite of the fact that Kashmir acceded to the Indian state in 1947, it did so upon the threat of a Pakistani invasion, and the Kashmiri people were not given a chance to opine on the issue of accession. India did not hold a plebiscite in 1948 and it has still not held the popular vote, despite the many instances it has had to do so. The government's reason for not doing so is most likely founded on its fear that, given the option, Kashmir's Muslim majority will vote to switch masters and become part of Muslim Pakistan. This poses another problem: Kashmir is not a state in its own right, having in 2019 become a joint union territory with Hindu-majority Jammu. If Kashmir becomes part of Pakistan, so does Jammu, leading to the probable discrimination of the Hindus in Jammu by the Pakistani government.

The only solution that seems viable would be to look back at the Dixon plan of 1950, a proposal limiting the plebiscite to the Kashmir Valley. Since Jammu and Kashmir are not one homogenous unit, and the people of Jammu most likely want to remain part of India, it would be more sensible to first make Kashmir its own union territory separate from Jammu, and then hold a plebiscite only for it(Dixon 17). It is necessary to recognize the distinct identities of these different areas, and plans such as this one would strengthen India's federalist structure by granting limited autonomy to these areas while still keeping them under some form of control. Furthermore, the use of a mediator, like Sir Owen Dixon was when he proposed this plan, could limit third-party interventions by states such as China and prevent them from undermining the goal of the plebiscite. However, this solution also comes with its own set of problems, both on the logistical scale as well as on the political side. Modi would not be willing to relinquish his hold on Kashmir so easily, especially when he is on his way to achieving his desired Hindu-ization of the country. The case of Kashmir is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially as long as systematic oppressors like the BJP are in power.