In the picture
Satellite image of the Tartus naval base [NASA].
The sudden fall of the Al-Assad regime in Syria after almost 50 years of dictatorship has meant that Russia, its main ally since the times of the USSR, has seen its access to two of its most important logistical points threatened: the naval base of Tartous and the air base of Khmeimin. Moscow is now looking for alternatives, with options in Sudan and in the Libyan territory controlled by the military chief Khalifa Haftar.
The Tartous naval base is the only Russian base in the Mediterranean and the largest outside the territory of the former USSR. Its location allowed the Russian Navy to access the Mediterranean Sea without having to cross the Bosporus from the Black Sea. It was in 1971 when the government of Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar al-Assad, granted permission to the Soviet Union to use part of the port of the city of Tartous for the docking and resupply of its Mediterranean Fleet, through which it intended to counter the power of the US 6th Fleet based in southern Italy.
The base lost some of its activity due to the end of the Cold War, but in 2005 Russia sought to strengthen its presence in the Mediterranean as a consequence of its deteriorating relations with the West, so it agreed with Syria to convert the port into a permanent naval base with the capacity to host nuclear-armed ships. In 2017, Moscow's support for the Damascus regime during the Syrian Civil War was embodied in an international treaty whereby Syria not only allowed the expansion of the base, but granted Russia sovereignty over it for a period of 49 years.
About 50 km from the Tartus base is the Khmeimim airbase. This base was established in 2015 by a treaty in which Syria agreed to allow Russia to use part of the facilities of the existing Latakia International Airport. In 2017, Syria agreed to Russia's use of the base for 49 years and its runways were expanded to accommodate larger aircraft.
In addition to their obvious importance as entrance points for Russian material and staff in Syria in the framework their support to the al-Assad regime, the Tartous and Khmeimim instructions constitute a fundamental communication node for the operations of both Russia and its private security companies in Africa. Thus, the Khmeimim base is perfectly positioned between Africa and Russia to allow Africa Corps aircraft to stop and refuel on the long journey between Russia and its areas of operation in Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic and Mali and thus guarantee its supply chain.
For its part, the Tartus base became even more important for Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Turkey decided to cut off its access to the Mediterranean Sea from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus Strait invoking the Montreaux Convention and the non-obligation to allow passage to belligerent parties.
Satellite images detected a large movement of material and staff in both instructions in the days following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, which some analysts have pointed out could correspond to its dismantling, whether temporary or definitive. What is certain is that, after the change of regime, the future of these instructions is somewhat uncertain and will depend, to a large extent, on the relations that Russia establishes with the new Syrian regime. At present, Damascus and Moscow are discussing the future of the Russian military presence and, despite having been at loggerheads during the war, it seems that the new Syrian authorities are inclined to adopt a pragmatic view as far as Russia is concerned. Moscow has offered Syria humanitarian attendance exchange for continued access to instructions. However, this does not seem to be enough for the new Syrian leadership, which is demanding diplomatic and economic support.
This turn of events may precipitate other agreements that Russia already had on the horizon for the establishment of naval and air instructions to serve its objectives, mainly in Africa. Thus, the Kremlin had begun negotiations with the Sudanese government to install a naval base in the Red Sea; however, these were cut short by the outbreak of civil war in 2023. If this initiative succeeds, Russia would join other naval powers with instructions in the area, such as China and the United States, which have instructions in Djibouti.
During the civil strife, Russia has made its desire to build a naval base the price to pay for its support to the Sudanese army, to which Khartoum finally agreed on February 13, 2025. While a naval base in the Red Sea could bring enormous geostrategic benefits to Russia, it cannot replace one in the Mediterranean as far as its supply chain is concerned.
On the other hand, after the fall of al-Assad, the necessary air stopovers on the Russia-Africa routes have been taking place at airfields under Russian control located in Haftar-controlled Libya, i.e. the eastern section of the country. General Haftar, who controls the bulk of the country's natural resources, but not the capital, receives Russian support in the form of Africa Corps mercenaries, artillery, missiles and ammunition, which is why Russia already had air instructions in the area that it now uses as an alternative to Syria. In view of the increased use of such instructions, Russia is refurbishing and expanding some of them, as in Maaten al-Sarra, in the southeast of the country near the border with Chad and Sudan.
Russia has been trying for two years to get a naval base in eastern Libya. So far, Haftar has maintained good relations with both Russia and the US. However, Russia's urgency to secure a new base in the face of regime change in Syria may force him to make what may be a difficult decision. US diplomats have not stopped trying to convince him that Washington is a better long-term bet, recalling that Russia has not been able to contain the Syrian rebels supported by Turkey, precisely the main ally of the internationally recognized government of Libya.
Whether Russia will acquire a naval base in Libya will depend on the decision of the Haftar regime, which will have to carry out a circus-like balancing act. In any case, Russia's claim to new naval instructions is part of a strategy put in place prior to the regime change in Syria, which gives a very illustrative idea of the role of Africa in Russian foreign policy.