The ongoing 'war' in the Strait

The support given to Morocco by the Spanish government in 2022—in exchange for nothing—to formally take over sovereignty of Western Sahara (without even demanding conditions that guarantee respect for the autonomy that Rabat claims to promise for that territory) is a central theme in Alejandro López essay . On the one hand, the concession demonstrates the pressure Morocco exerts to achieve its objectives, resorting to the so-called 'gray zone' or even 'hybrid warfare' (migration pressure and Pegasus spyware, among other operations), and on the other, it demonstrates Spain's lack of a defined and solid strategy to safeguard its national interests, such as the Spanishness of Ceuta and Melilla or maritime rights around the Canary Islands.

The degree scroll book—'The War of the Strait'—may seem excessive, but it responds to an existing reality, if we understand the expression in a broad sense, as is usually granted to 'conflict', also included in the subtitle of the work. However, in addition to discussing the present, López Canorea also looks at possible futures—one of them being war itself—not so much because they are plausible in themselves, but as a strategic exercise, precisely to overcome the tendency toward short-termism and lack of programmatic vision that he rightly criticizes in the Spanish political and economic elites.

In a world where prioritizing national interests has become a stark reality, without the sugarcoating of the past—it is the return of geopolitics—talking about military capabilities and comparing those of one country and its neighbor is now an exercise in prudence. López Canorea, director portal la guerra" (Deciphering War) and therefore familiar with defense budgets and materials, points out that despite their modernization, benefiting from relations with the United States and Israel, the Moroccan Armed Forces are clearly behind the Spanish Armed Forces, even though Spain has had lower expense in relation to GDP. Established to confront Algeria, its great rival, they have developed aspects of land warfare; in contrast, Spain has more adequate means to win in a conflict that must cross the waters of the Mediterranean or the Atlantic.

This Spanish military superiority is an important deterrent, allowing relations with Morocco to be approached with a certain degree of relaxation, but this should not be complete, as López Canorea warns, because precisely because it cannot advance its objectives so expeditiously, Rabat takes advantage of indirect struggles in which Spain does not maintain its grip.

The author does not directly question whether, with the letter that Pedro Sánchez sent to Mohammed VI, Spain has revised its traditional policy on the Sahara, which endorsed the UN mandate for a solution that takes into account the will of the Sahrawi people. A country's position may vary if it understands that it needs to make changes to better defend its ultimate goals or in new circumstances. What López Canorea regrets is the lack of a 'grand strategy' that we Spaniards suffer from, with both PSOE and PP governments. In the pages of the book, there is a certain recognition that Morocco, on the contrary, is better able to read the moment and the possibilities offered to it.

Of particular interest is the final third of the work, which contains more of the author's own reflections, constituting the main contribution to discussion the relationship between Spain and Morocco. The previous chapters are a review of the latest developments in the friction between the two countries, which is also useful reading. Without affecting the rigor and appropriate nuance of ideas, the book sample moderately critical view of the liberal international order and is suspicious of the dominance of the United States in the West. The prologue is signed by José Julio Rodríguez, JEMAD, who participated in politics with Podemos.