Maduro and the support of the Armed Forces: A civil-military relations perspective

Following the Venezuelan presidential elections of July 28, 2024, both current President Nicolás Maduro and candidate of the civil service examination Edmundo González claimed victory. Hours after the closing of the polling stations, the committee National Electoral Council (CNE) gave the victory to Nicolás Maduro[1]. A series of protests and events erupted, leaving 24 dead[2] and 2,200 arrested, including supporters of the civil service examination, journalists, and human rights defenders[3].

Shortly before the end of August, the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) ratified the CNE's decision[4] and, on September 2, the Venezuelan Attorney General announced that the TSJ had issued an arrest warrant against González after civil service examination published on the Internet the conference proceedings votes showing that he had won the elections[5]. The arrest warrant was rejected by nine Latin American countries - with the notable absences of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia - and by the administrative office General of the Organization of American States[6].

Before the end of the week, Gonzalez and his wife landed at a military base in Madrid to request diplomatic asylum[7]. From Spain, Gonzalez announced that he would return to Venezuela as soon as possible to assume the presidential mandate on January 10, 2025[8]. Meanwhile, Washington implemented a series of individual sanctions against officials of the CNE and the TSJ for considering them accomplices of the electoral fraud[9], and at the same time made a call from the UN General Assembly to initiate a dialogue between Maduro and the civil service examination[10], while keeping open the possibility of extending the individualized sanctions and revoking licenses for oil companies operating in Venezuela[11]. Despite the support of partisan institutions, popular and international rejection makes a permanence of Maduro in power not evident.

However, there is another important factor influencing the outcome of this story: the support of the armed forces. Venezuela's Minister of Defense, General in Chief of the Bolivarian Army Vladimir Padrino López, reaffirmed in August the "absolute loyalty" to Nicolás Maduro on the part of the military institution[12]. Since the elections, the regime has promoted soldiers injured in the protests and has published a campaign on social networks sample to the Bolivarian National Guard under the slogan "To doubt is treason"[13].

How the regime, despite all subject of setbacks, has managed to maintain this crucial support over time is a question we can analyze in the framework study of civil-military relations (CMR) in Venezuela. The 1999 Chavista Constitution reformed the mechanisms to govern the relationship between politicians and soldiers, including, among others, the elimination of the parliament in the process of election and decision on promotions and promotions in the armed forces; the expansion of the military's field of activities in the public administration; the change of the adjective of "apolitical" armed force to the more restricted and null in practical meaning of "without political militancy", guaranteeing the right to vote to active officers; and the consecration of the principle of State-society co-responsibility in the maintenance of the security and defense of the nation[14] through the so-called "collectives".

Gradually, between 2005 and 2010, a project of ideological indoctrination was promoted within the armed forces through legal, doctrinal and political mechanisms, and a General Command of the Bolivarian Militia was established, which was separated from the regular command and at the disposal of the orders of the president, constituting a counterweight to the regular armed forces[15]. In addition, a new system of training of the military staff was established without university autonomy, which allowed the regime to broaden its social base, and the professional promotion of military personnel was actively used to maintain the loyalty of the army leadership[16].

These mechanisms clearly deviate from the model of balanced CMR that allow the stability of democratic regimes[17], by contradicting what Samuel Huntington called "civilian control goal" over the armed forces[18]. The subordination of the military institution to the ideological project and the political program of the government transforms the relations that Peter Feaver calls "principal-agent" between the government and the armed forces; from a civilian control, it became a political control, in which the margin of military autonomy decreased as its absorption in the framework of Chavist power progressed[19]. Hugo Chávez totally altered the balance of civil-military relations and consolidated the political control of the armed forces.

Maduro maintains the state of civil-military relations inherited to minimize the risk that the armed forces may pose to his regime. Along with the control measures, he continued with the salary increases to the military staff ; launched a specific social program for the military with the degree scroll "La Gran mission statement Soldado Negro Primero"; filled high positions in the public administration with military figures; and filled the ministerial cabinet with military presence, involving the soldiers in areas of political and economic nature[20]. In fact, during Maduro's mandate, the military has been colonizing more and more spaces of the country's Economics - for example: Defense Minister General Vladimir Padrino headed the government's economic bloc; Major General Manuel Quevedo, the Venezuelan Petroleum Ministry and the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) corporation; in addition, the military controls the electricity industry, aluminum, iron and steel production, foreign trade, ports and customs, a bank, one of the television channels, a transportation agency and an agricultural business ; they hold important positions in the Orinoco Mining Arc where gold, diamonds and coltan are extracted; they have control over the production, importation and distribution of food, medical equipment and medicines[21]; and a long etcetera. The effectiveness of their efforts to minimize risks was evidenced, at least, until August, when Padrino announced the total loyalty of the armed forces to Maduro.

But the portrait of the outcome is not complete. While a study of the RCMs in Venezuela can explain one aspect of how the present status is arrived at, its contribution in terms of determining whether Maduro will remain in power in the near future is more limited. The only conclusion that can be drawn with a cautious Degree of certainty is that the armed forces as an institution will not present a danger to the continuity of the Maduro regime. Another thing is that in the upper echelons of power, outstanding military individuals may end up in confrontation with Maduro and, attending to the interests of organized crime groups, given their involvement in drug trafficking and other illicit businesses, may seek a change of regime in exchange for a benign attention in the face of judicial proceedings.