Morocco, France's last gateway to Africa

Morocco has recently become France's last reliable ally on the African continent. Paris is at a crossroads: in addition to the numerous coups d'état in the Sahel during 2023, and the worsening of relations with other countries such as Algeria, there is now the request of several states demanding that it leave their territory, Chad and Ivory Coast being the latest to do so. Thus we arrive at a status in which Morocco presents itself as the only remaining major French ally in Africa.

France, a traditional power in Africa, is in retreat. Coups d'état, together with the nationalist awakening in the region and the intervention of China and Russia, have led France to reduce its position on the continent: from 10,000 soldiers in 2015, to about 2,000 remaining after the advertisement the closure of the French base in Côte d'Ivoire. Of these, 1,500 are mainly in Djibouti, a strategic point of core topic, while the other 500 are stationed in Gabon, the last French base in the area of the Gulf of Guinea from which it radiates a rather limited influence in the region compared to that which it could exert from the abandoned instructions in Mali or Chad.

In addition to having lost its military position, France has seen its social, cultural and political projection in the region diminished. Since the independence of many of these territories in the 1960s, Paris had built an idea of unity with the former metropolis through the concept of Francophonie, based on the idea that the former French colonies should continue to depend on France, not only in subject of security, but also economically and politically. The creation of the CFA franc (franc of the African Financial Community) in 1945 was, above all, a project to maintain some control over the monetary policy of up to 14 former French colonies in Africa.

The times of French absolute dominance in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea have, however, come to an end. China, with a series of strong investments in the region, and Russia, through the Africa Corps (former Wagner group ), have emerged as two new actors capable of bringing both political and economic security to the region. It is in this status, and with the clear projection of the Maghreb towards the Sahel, that the Elysian Fields have focused their attention on Morocco, where they see a reliable ally to maintain influence in both the Sahel and the Maghreb.

Three keys to French support

Paris sees the Alawite monarchy as a gateway to the continent, which is the main reason why it has given it great signs of support over the past year, materialized in three major political events over the past six months: the visit of President Macron to Rabat, the trip of the French ambassador to Morocco to Western Sahara and the visit of the Minister of Culture also to the Sahara.

The French President's trip to Morocco has marked a new point in the strategic relationship between the two countries: in Macron's own words before the Moroccan Parliament, "we are going to write a new book together". The importance of the visit, however, lies in Macron's reaffirmation, during the visit, of the Moroccan autonomy plan for the Sahara by referring explicitly to "the present and the future of the Sahara in the framework Morocco's sovereignty", in statements that came to reinforce the letter that the French president sent last summer to King Mohamed VI in which he spoke of Western Sahara in similar terms. In addition to making these political statements, the visit also served for French companies to close investments of nearly 10 billion euros in the North African country. Among these investments, those destined to projects such as the high-speed train between Kenitra (north of Rabat) and Marrakech, a section awarded to the French business Egis Rail two weeks after Macron's visit to the Maghreb country, passing over the proposal of the Spanish business Ineco, stand out.

The next sample support was the visit of the French ambassador in Rabat, Christophe Lecourtier, to Western Sahara. The visit, which had been confirmed without dates by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, took place without official advertisement , continuing the diplomacy of "small steps" that the French country is carrying out. It is an important step since, although France has supported since 2007 the Moroccan autonomy plan for the Sahara, until now it was usually the political attaché of the embassy who went to the territory to avoid confrontations with Algeria. In addition, and in line with this symbolic image, France has announced the opening of a consulate in the Sahara following the visit of the President of the French Senate, Gerard Larcher, who travelled to the Saharawi capital, El Ayoun. This move is intended to reinforce the recognition given by France to the annexation of the territory, as well as to continue to show its support for the Maghreb country and to strengthen a strategic relationship which sample indispensable to French interests.

The latest step in this diplomatic rapprochement was the visit, once again to Western Sahara, of the French Minister of Culture, Rachida Dati, who, in a statement, considered it "historic" and confirmed the opening of a French cultural center in the region.

All these events have led to Franco-Moroccan relations being at an all-time high, which has also spilled over into the military sphere.

Military support

Military cooperation is another area in which Rabat and Paris are seeking to reach agreements. Efforts in this field are currently focused on the possible contract with the French business Naval Group to submit to Morocco two submarines of the 'Scorpène' class , which would increase Morocco's deterrence capacity, and which fulfills the long-standing desire it has been pursuing since the 1990s to equip itself with this subject of weaponry to confront, mainly, Algeria's submarine fleet, which has 4 Russian-made submersibles of the 636 class .

In this project, France is competing with the German business TKMS, which is proposing its 'Dolphin' class submarines as an alternative. The recent improvement of mutual institutional relations seems to favor the French, who, if their efforts are finally successful, would be able to sign a lucrative contract in the Maghreb country.

If France finally wins the contract, Spain, in addition to Germany, would be another clear loser, since Navantia (Spain's main naval producer) has not even been considered in the discussion with its new class S-80. It is true that Morocco was looking for an economic and proven option, and that the German and French options perfectly met those criteria; however, the fact that Spain has not even entered the equation would demonstrate that Morocco sees Madrid as a regional competitor and does not wish to create a relationship of dependence on Spain in subject of armaments.

Another section where France and Morocco are cooperating militarily is aeronautics. France gave permission last year for the United Arab Emirates to transfer 30 of its old 2000-9 'Mirage' aircraft to Morocco over the next few years. This transfer will be gradual, as the UAE takes delivery of the Dassault 'Rafale' acquired to replace the 'Mirage'. Although the transfer is between Rabat and Abu Dhabi, France has to give its approval, being the country producing the aircraft. These two moves come to reinforce a cooperation that is taking place at all levels and in which the two states have much to gain.

Algerian core topic

It is also important to highlight the influence of Algeria in the Franco-Moroccan relationship. Algiers is Rabat's main competitor for hegemony in North Africa, and also has a complicated historical relationship with the Gallic country, a status that the Alawite monarchy has used since its independence to gain an ally with France when negotiating conflicts such as that of Western Sahara or the border disputes they maintain. In July 2024, Algeria withdrew its ambassador in Paris in response to Macron's aforementioned support for the Moroccan Sahara autonomy plan.

The case of the French-Algerian writer Boulaem Sansal is also part of this diplomatic crisis: the author was arrested on November 16 at Algiers airport on the grounds that he was "undermining the security of the State". Sansal was awarded a prize by the French Academy and has been a well-known defender of freedom of expression since he began writing in the 1990s, during the Algerian civil war, criticizing the scourges of his country's politics.

Despite recurrent crises, Paris had always tried not to cut all ties with Algeria, while maintaining a balance in the Maghreb: it neither strongly supported the autonomy plan for the Sahara, nor aligned itself entirely with Algiers. President Macron's letter in the summer of 2024 marked a complete reversal of this strategy and upset the balance in the region, leaving Algeria more alone in its confrontation with Morocco.

In early April, Macron tried to reduce tensions with Algeria by calling Algerian President Tebboune to redirect the status. During the call, it was agreed that the French foreign minister, Jean-Nöel Barrot, would visit Algiers to continue working on the thaw. However, despite these latest moves, France has more than ever opted for Morocco, so it seems complicated that an official visit and a simple call can redirect institutional relations, since there are underlying strategic interests in which the two countries have completely different positions.

Moroccan roadmap

In addition to their geostrategic importance for North Africa, these new relations also represent an attempt to level the playing field in the Sahel. The Maghreb has a clear strategic projection towards this region, which leads one to think that France may be looking to Morocco for a kind of proxy state with interests similar to its own and cooperating with it to impose them in the area. However, despite sharing concerns with Paris, the Alaouite monarchy has its own road map, articulated on two axes: the containment of terrorism and economic cooperation.

First of all, terrorism is a problem for Morocco, not only because it currently wants to convey the image of an open-minded and modern state (a clear example of this is its bid to host the 2030 soccer World Cup), but also because the extremist terrorism that has settled in areas of the Sahel is seen as a danger that must be tackled, as it could influence the Moroccan population, which is mostly Sunni and follows the Maliki school of Islam, less radical than other schools such as Saudi Wahhabism. He also sees this issue as an opportunity to gain influence in the region, as Morocco could eventually build a new military airport in the far south of the Sahara to carry out operations against these terrorist groups. This project would be built in partnership with France and the United States, and would be accompanied by agreements with the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso to carry out air strikes from there.

On the other hand, as far as economic cooperation is concerned, the 'Atlantic Initiative' stands out, raised by Mohammed VI in a speech for the commemoration of the anniversary of the Green March in November 2023, in which he offered landlocked Sahel countries the possibility of facilitating their exports through the port of Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros) in Western Sahara, for whose modernization a heavy investment of 1,250 million euros would be required. Burkina Faso, through the declarations of its foreign minister, Karamoko Traore, at the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in May 2024, has already given its approval to this initiative; other countries, such as Mali or Niger, have also been approached by Morocco (with quite positive responses), a country which would gain a great deal of influence in the Sahel, as opposed to Algeria, should they join the initiative.

In addition to the above, and according to Algerian sources, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco would have reached an agreement in 2023 by which the Persian Gulf country would give Morocco 15 million euros to create discontent in the Sahel countries towards Algerian influence, thus demonstrating Morocco's open intention to impose itself on its competitor in the region.

These latest moves point to Algeria as the big loser on the African continent. If Algiers had played a preponderant role in the Sahel during the last ten years carrying the weight, for example, of the peace process in Mali (the so-called 'Algiers Agreements'), now, during this last one, it is seeing its influence replaced by the Moroccan one, since the coups d'état that the region has seen in 2023, besides having a marked anti-French character, have also toppled governments favorable to Algeria, which has limited the margin of maneuver of this country to maintain its influence.

Plausibility and difficulties

France thought it had found its winning horse in Africa in Morocco. The policy shift led by Macron in the last year is a strong bet on Rabat, moving Paris away from Algeria. In the short term, the French option of supporting Morocco politically and militarily may appear to be correct, as it provides it with a core topic ally for its interests. However, it remains to be seen what the long-term results of this decision will be, since the success of this policy depends as much on Morocco's ability to transfer its influence on the continent as on Rabat's convenience in maintaining French interests in the region.

The first seems quite plausible, since Morocco's international policy revolves around the old desire of Moroccan irredentism: Greater Morocco, which would include part of the former domains of the Almohad and Benimerin dynasties in the territories of Mauritania or Mali. The second condition seems more problematic, for it is in the economic sphere that Morocco and France may clash. Paris has always claimed to have a certain control over the Sahel Economics and Morocco's 'Atlantic Initiative', which aspires to become the regional leader that the Sahel needs, would damage French influence in these markets; that could generate misunderstandings and friction within this new strategic relationship.

At the regional level, the impact of this alliance on the Maghreb also remains to be seen, since Algeria continues to have the largest military expense on the continent, as well as important allies such as Russia, and a favorable strategic position thanks to its energy resources (one only has to consult the latest agreements between Italy and Algeria on this topic). On the other hand, French support may unbalance the current balance of power. If the military agreements continue to expand, Morocco could end up possessing military capabilities that Algeria lacks, especially in subject conventional warfare (as highlighted by the aforementioned agreements), but also in cybersecurity and drones, areas in which Paris and Rabat can also advance in a cooperation that, if it takes place, would give Morocco a great advantage over its competitor, and would offer the Alawite monarchy a great springboard to impose its roadmap in the Maghreb.

As for Western Sahara, these latest developments seem to be the last nails in the coffin of the Polisario Front, which sees the possibility of achieving an independent Sahara as increasingly distant. Without Western support, such an outcome is a chimera and brings the Sahara closer to becoming an autonomous region within Morocco. Time will ultimately dictate whether this new strategic positioning can pose a common front both in the Maghreb and in the Sahel vis-à-vis Russia and China, allowing France to return to the helm of events in Africa.