Iran's options: Delay, slow down or accelerate its nuclear program

The apocalyptic scenario envisioned in the event of an Israeli attack (with or without the United States) on Iran's nuclear facilities has proven false. It has not resulted in open warfare between the two bitter enemies, nor has it resulted in a widespread regional conflict, given the Iranian inability to respond substantively to the aggression. Even the Revolutionary Guard has not brought out its gunboats to, at the very least, harass shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, a response that was taken for granted.

That absence of a forceful reaction from Tehran has been, arguably, the main surprise of the war that Donald Trump has called the 'twelve-day war'. The attack came at a time of unthinkable Iranian weakness. The loss of its pillars in the region (especially the fall of Assad in Syria and the Israeli strikes against Hamas and Hezbollah after 7-O) had left Iran increasingly isolated and vulnerable and this facilitated Benjamin Netanyahu's decision and the financial aid provided by Donald Trump.

If the near impunity with which Netanyahu and Trump have struck and withdrawn their hand can be qualified as at least an operational success, some have labeled the action as completely counterproductive, since it would have convinced the Islamic Republic of the need to obtain the nuclear bomb (if it had had it, it would have prevented the attack). However, what happened does not push Tehran towards the atomic bomb, because it already had it as a goal, near or distant. It may have increased the conviction of its convenience, but Iran has known for decades that in order to guarantee its geopolitical interests (of the ayatollahs, but also of any secular government assertive in security subject ), the atomic deterrence is a logical step.

A country with a self-awareness of its uniqueness in the context of Middle Eastern rivalries-an imperial history and a particular civilization, with characteristic ethnicity and religion-thinks in terms of survival, not only as a specific regime, but also as a nation. Another thing is that, without the ayatollahs, the international civil service examination would most likely have deterred Iran from pursuing a program of nuclear capabilities. The Islamic regime itself, more urged to carry it out because of its subsistence, has had to manage the timing: temporarily renouncing it in 2015 when the economic sanctions of the previous decade greatly constrained the national Economics and generated a 'dangerous' social disaffection towards the authorities, and then surreptitiously advancing it to gather, for the moment, about 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% (these are the figures released by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA).

The 2015 agreement , called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was not an end point. The Obama Administration knew that it simply delayed the plans by 10 to 15 years. Given the difficulty of destroying the Iranian nuclear program, it was a diplomatic gamble that was played on a single card, in case it proved to be a winner and the problem could be avoided at a later date. The bet was on favoring the more moderate currents of the regime and hoping, fingers crossed, that the end of the economic sanctions would create an internal bonanza that would strengthen the middle classes and lead to a certain liberalization, so that the nuclear program would be put aside.

Trump's arrival in the White House changed the circumstances of the agreement. In any case, the progress of the program in recent years, with the multiplication of centrifuges and the proliferation of work on nuclear plants, including the subway Fordo plant, suggests that if Khamenei considered pausing the nuclear program, he did so tactically and for a short time. Western intelligence services claim that there is no record of a formal Iranian decision to build the bomb, but such an administrative act may be reserved for the last moment.

Gaining time

Whether or not the damage caused by the bombing has been extensive, the Islamic Republic is not likely to shelve its purpose. When there is a credible evaluation of the destruction caused, it could be determined whether Iran is in a position to accelerate the program or not, although if it is, it could also choose to take its time.

For the time being, from what we know, it would probably be necessary to conclude that Iran will find it rather difficult to accelerate the work of achieving the bomb, its multiplication and its placement in nuclear warheads. It is not enough to have receipt quantities of enriched uranium, if that has happened. The death of some of the leaders of the program - military and scientists -, the weakening of the regime's structure and its internal disrepute are elements that advise the ayatollahs to be very cautious. For the survival of the regime, damage control comes before consummating the bomb.

If in all these years the Supreme Leader and the committee of Guardians have shown great pragmatism, there is no reason why it should be otherwise now. It is true that until now they have applied stealth to avoid an attack, and one might think that, now that the cards are laid bare, everyone can act without dissimulation. But Iran's current cards are not the best.

The discussion within the regime may be between briefly deferring the nuclear program or maintaining it with very gradual progress that will no longer be partially in view of IAEA inspectors (or both options, first one and then the other). The US attacked once and it is not clear that it will do so again; more active in retaliation might be Israel, but it will not always find Iran as prostrate as it is now (the removal of air defenses from Iranian soil is something Israel can hardly repeat).

It is conceivable that the regime will want to gain time to rebuild itself, perhaps with some minor agreement on the matter with the United States or the international community. And that the crisis will arise again with an Iran that may then go hand in hand with China or Russia, powers that on this occasion have decided not to get involved.