The Neptune Factor: Saving Admiral Mahan

Nicholas Lambert's latest book is undoubtedly one of the most relevant works of the last five years in the subject of maritime strategic thinking. Despite being one of the most mentioned authors in this area of study, the American naval strategist Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) has always been much more quoted than read, and, therefore, writing about him and his work is never an easy task.

Lambert's work-who, by the way, is not to be confused with British naval historian Andrew Lambert, whom this writer is privileged to have as dissertationboth a biography and an in-depth review of Mahan's works. Both make for a work B and scholarly importance, combining elegantly to shed light on some of the misunderstandings that, in the wake of the work produced between 1885 and 1914, have dogged the author since his death.

Lambert's central purpose is to highlight how some of Mahan's central thesis have been misinterpreted and, above all, simplified, especially in relation to two of his most famous works: 'The Influence of Naval Power in History: 1660-1783' and 'The Influence of Naval Power in the French Revolution'. Without going any further, suffice it to point out the basic error made in the Spanish translation by substituting 'sea power' for 'poder naval', when the more correct translation would be 'poder marítimo'. Naval power reference letter, generally speaking, to the ability of a state to act on and from the sea through its navy in pursuit of its national security objectives. Maritime power, however, encompasses all those activities that states carry out on and from the sea, not only from a military perspective, but also from an economic, social and political perspective.

This is precisely one of the aspects of Mahan's work that Lambert rightly points out in order to dismantle the criticism that the American has suffered for decades, accused of focusing exclusively on naval warfare at sea with the goal of destroying the enemy fleet through decisive battle. Nothing could be further from the truth, as Lambert makes clear, supported by an extensive review of the author's works and his staff correspondence: Mahan's interest in the United States learning from Great Britain and building a world-class navy was, in the last written request, mainly economic. Mahan saw the navy as one more instrument in the service of the state to project national power far from home, and to protect the economic interests of a country that was heavily dependent on the sea.

Throughout the pages of 'The Neptune Factor', Lambert traces the admiral's life from his entry into the Naval Academy at Annapolis, through his years of both shipboard and shore-based service, to his last days as a writer and commentator on the evolution of early 20th century naval strategy. Knowledge of his life and personal circumstances, as well as the historical context in which Mahan lived, is a fundamental prerequisite for understanding his work. Mahan became a 'prophet' for Americans at a time in history when the United States had already embarked on a process of reform and construction that would lead it decades later to become the world's leading power, just as the British Empire had been before it.

As Lambert demonstrates, Mahan deserves less credit than he deserves on certain issues, but his work should not be read and understood superficially and without attention to the message -often hidden in the pompous and disorderly grammatical construction- that characterizes some of his works. Moreover, at a historical moment such as the present, when the world is entering a new era of struggle between great powers in which maritime power will be decisive, rereading Mahan with an open mind is once again an indispensable task. Especially for a U.S. maritime community that finds itself in dire straits as it tries to reverse the effects of three decades of barely looking at the sea through Mahan's eyes.