In the picture
meeting of the President of the European Commission and the French President with the Chinese President in Beijing in April 2023 [Commission].
The post-national, welfare-state, cooperative and peaceful Europe was not born out of the optimistic, ambitious and far-sighted project imagined in retrospect by today's Euro-idealists. On the contrary, as the British historian Tony Judt wrote, Europe was the "insecure child of anxiety." European history after 1945 has been a long succession of breaks with a terrible past, the incredible rebirth of a wild continent.
It is worth remembering, therefore, that Europeans did not cooperate to unify out of idealism. They did so out of sheer necessity, out of sheer exhaustion and extreme collective poverty after the most devastating war in the history of mankind. Europe had hit rock bottom with the rise of totalitarianism. The subsequent division of the continent with the Iron Curtain reinforced the idea that Europe had to reinvent itself.
In European unity, a community of values coexists with an ambitious geopoliticalproject of international leadership. The Union began with the creation of a single market in the coal and steel industries that would indirectly prevent further antagonism between France and Germany. By contrast, the European energy market is currently sample severely divided internally: while Germany is abandoning nuclear power, France is investing in the construction of nuclear power plants.
This is one of the many debates facing the parties in the upcoming elections: those who defend national sovereignty on vitally important issues such as energy autonomy, and those who advocate greater integration into supranational guidelines from Brussels. However, the strict division between pro-Europeans and Euroskeptics poses a false dichotomy: neither pro-Europeans are exclusive defenders of liberal democracy, nor Euroskeptics are nationalists and populists opposed to further integration.
The foreseeable shift to the right in the upcoming European elections may confirm the growth of Euroscepticism in the EU, and the underlying reasons are clear. This is not the first time that we Europeans have seen Western hegemony crumble without medium- and long-term solutions. In recent years, two serious crises have highlighted the fragility of Europe's position, and point to difficulties in the immediate future: the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. If Europe wants to maintain its geopolitical status and keep its voice heard in future peace negotiations in Ukraine, it will be necessary to opt for a resolute policy in these areas.
Broadly speaking, three main scenarios - depending on the composition of Europe's committee after the elections - could be envisaged for the future of the EU: continuing as a minor partner on the side of the United States and NATO, succumbing to the sphere of influence of Russia and China, or following a third path without taking sides.
In the first case, if a probable defeat of Ukraine is consummated, the question is how to establish a European security area . Europe could continue with its continuist foreign policy, closer to the United States than to Russia. If so, EU members will have to invest in security and defense.
However, one fact reflects well the general disinterest in Europe in the war conflict: although EU funding for Ukraine is greater than that of the United States, military support comes mainly from funds in Washington. If for the United States Ukraine can function as an intermediary to punish Russia, for the Europeans the Ukrainian neighbor is an indispensable pillar of regional security. If that consummates the Ukrainian defeat, not only does it increase the risk of a full-scale war, but it could aggravate the already very difficult refugee crisis.
Another unknown, closely linked to the previous one, is the viability of the European green pact. The Russian invasion has put the precarious energy market in check, pushing up gas prices. The unacceptable Withdrawal to investigate the sabotage of Nordstream 2 sample clearly shows the helplessness of Europeans in adopting policies independent of Russia or the United States. Nordstream was a centerpiece for gas supplies to central European countries, but a strategic liability for the United States.
In the second case, if there is indeed a shift to the right in the upcoming elections, Europe could yield to Russian strategic spheres of influence while accelerating collective rearmament. This would allow Russia to win the war, creating 'de facto' a new Iron Curtain. In this scenario, Germany and France could go so far as to re-establish relations with Russia and strengthen indispensable trade ties with China. As a result, Europe would bifurcate between the countries on the eastern flank, such as the United Kingdom, which would align with the United States against the rest of continental Europe. This is certainly the most unlikely option at this time.
There is another possibility, which requires a much more alternative policy. If Europe chooses not to side with either side, it could sign free trade agreements with the Middle East and India, extending the network oil and gas pipelines to the East. This option would imply the withdrawal of the United States from the old continent, turning Europe into a giant neutral Switzerland (militarily non-aligned), while Withdrawal to Ukraine, subjugated by Russia. Although difficult to imagine, this option would only be viable if there is a major European rearmament.
Any of the three scenarios poses a dilemma linked to the fundamental problem: the absence of a strong government. The EU operates with a tragic combination of government without politics. Brussels runs a colossal administration with a timid and timid government. Hyper-legislation produces an atrophy in dealing with major governance challenges and far-reaching geopolitical decisions. The European system has allowed acceptable compromises to be reached between member countries, but they are insufficient to provide a coordinated response to the most urgent challenges.
To question the anachronistic version of the nature and purpose of the European Union is not to belittle its achievements. However, to believe that past achievements can be projected indefinitely into the future is an illusion, however worthy and well-intentioned.
The founders of the European Communities were clear that they did not want to create a super-state, and they sought effective forms of cooperation to solve common problems in the short and medium term with imaginative solutions. Today, the efforts of the European institutions are more interested in maintaining the status quo than in solving concrete problems. This is because the technocratic logic is one of procedure, not of consequence. The solution is always "more Europe", not less, regardless of the effectiveness of supranational policies.
At the time, Charles de Gaulle's stubbornness and Margaret Thatcher's misgivings forged the European project with a healthy Euroskepticism. The European Union has proved powerful, despite its complex and unpredictable nature. The crisis of the Union calls for a high-flying policy that, without disdaining the achievements of the past, also recognizes the novelty of the present challenges.
If we want to think about the future of Europe, we must give priority to common problems, such as collective defense and energy autonomy. Perhaps the current crisis requires strengthening politics to move away from the overly normative approach . Ultimately written request, this requires trusting that what unites us Europeans is stronger than what separates us.
* Santiago de Navascués is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Navarra.