In the picture
Trump, with the foreign ministers of Rwanda and DR Congo, Olivier Nduhungirehe and Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, respectively, in June 2025 following the peace agreement reached [White House].
In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on the occasion of the opening of its 80th session last September, Donald Trump claimed to have ended 7 conflicts. To Cambodia and Thailand, Kosovo and Serbia or Israel and Iran, among others, the US President added the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. The agreement mediated there by the US brings, as a novelty, great economic incentives that no other actor had been able to generate so far, but the implementation - always extremely complex in conflict resolution - is not assured.
The conflict in eastern DR Congo pits, on the one hand, the armed group M23, supported, according to the United Nations, by Rwanda and, on the other, the Congolese army, as well as a number of local militias that proliferate in the area as a result of its failed state status . Rwanda's role in the conflict is not only limited to providing logistical support to the rebel movement, but the UN has documented the presence of Rwandan troops on the other side of its borders, in DR Congo territory.
This area has been experiencing periods of great instability for more than 30 years as a consequence of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, as the DR Congo government welcomed into its territory a large issue of its perpetrators once they lost power in neighboring Rwanda. Settled across the border, they founded the FDLR armed group , whose presence has been consistently characterized by Rwanda as an existential threat to its security. Local ethnic tensions as well as the presence of strategic minerals in the area explain the prolongation over time of this conflict, which has intermittently tormented the local population for more than three decades.
The framework this conflict includes both the First Congo War and the Second Congo War, also known as the Great African War, which claimed an estimated 4 million lives between 1998 and 2003. The last movement of this macabre symphony began in 2021 as a consequence of the failure of negotiations between the government and the armed group M23 and the perception by Rwanda that its position of influence in the area was threatened.
In early 2025, the M23, supported by Rwanda, carried out a lightning offensive in which it took control of much of the territory of the Kivu region, including its two main cities: Goma and Bukavu. As a result, inspired by Ukraine, the DR Congo government offered the US priority access to its huge reserves of critical minerals in exchange for security guarantees. Thus, in an exercise of businesspolitik, the Trump Administration joined the international mediation efforts and brought both states to the negotiating table, which led to the signature in late June of the Washington Peace agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali.
This peace agreement reflects the new American policy for Africa, defined by the president himself as moving "from aide to trade". It rests on three pillars: the pacification of conflict zones, especially in the Great Lakes region, the Sahel, Sudan and Libya; trade agreements, encouraging American companies to invest in the continent with government support; and the prosperity generated by both. The US seeks to sign a series of bilateral agreements with both the DR Congo on the one hand, and Rwanda on the other, with the signature a peace agreement being an indispensable prerequisite for their signature .
Washington' s agreement includes security measures that the two states have agreed to implement in full by the end of 2025. The central idea is to cooperate to neutralize the threat of the FDLR and, therefore, for Rwandan troops to withdraw from their neighbor's territory. However, some analysts point out that the FDLR has not been a real threat to Rwanda for a long time and its existence is used as a pretext to exert its influence in an area rich in minerals and with a population with which it shares language.
At the same time, in July, the DR Congo and the M23 signed a declaration of principles in Doha as a roadmap to end the conflict. The Doha Declaration included a permanent ceasefire as well as a commitment to sign a final peace agreement by August 18 at the latest. However, this commitment has not been reached by the parties and attacks have continued on a regular basis despite the permanent ceasefire. According to some sources, the rebels are reportedly seeking the release of their members imprisoned by the Kinshasa government before signing a final peace, as well as a power-sharing agreement in areas now under their control, which the Congolese government refuses to do.
Whether or not these agreements signed under the auspices of President Trump's 'businesspolitik' in Africa can bring lasting peace to the region remains to be written. What is certain is that the US-led peace proposal offers, for the first time, a dual DR Congo-Rwanda and DR Congo-M23 negotiation approach , as well as major economic incentives that no other actor has so far been able to generate. However, after three decades of failed peace processes, none of them, including the latter, have involved the affected communities or addressed the root causes of violence, and this one makes no difference.
Many previous agreements have also failed to achieve results as a result of weak implementation, mistrust between the parties and political manipulation, risks which unfortunately also present the latter. Experiences with past agreements such as those of Nairobi or Luanda have shown that declarations often fail to bring about change on the ground because the parties use them as an instrument to gain time or increase their international legitimacy, rather than to seek lasting peace. Their implementation also requires stable funding for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants, the return of refugees and the implementation of cross-border coordination mechanisms.
Finally, from the internal point of view, DR Congo also needs to carry out a series of reforms in the army, infrastructure and power distribution. The Congolese army is currently facing a status characterized by weakness, fragmentation and dependence on international support. At the local level, it is imperative to prevent the area from continuing to be a failed state where armed groups proliferate. In addition, previous experiences of large investments in the DR Congo in exchange for access to mineral reserves have resulted in obscene enrichment by certain elites rather than an improvement in the living conditions of the local population.
Oscar Goñi Iribarren is a researcher at GASS.