Venezuela and Guyana sparring as territorial dispute moves forward at ICJ

report SRA 2024 / [PDF version]

An armed confrontation is not foreseeable, but the escalation of tension offers the risk of unwanted incidents, by accident or miscalculation.

° Caracas has the discomfort of not recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the case and having to defend its position before that Court in response to the arguments of its neighbor.

° The referendum of December 2023, although of little effective value, highlighted the aggressive image of the Maduro regime, by deciding the annexation management assistant of the territory.

The historic dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo, a territory that accounts for two thirds of the latter country and whose neighbor claims as its own, has taken a qualitative leap in the last year. In April 2023, at Guyana's request, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that it had jurisdiction over the case. The regime of Nicolás Maduro then became more assertive and called a referendum, of dubious representativeness, which in December endorsed the annexation management assistant of the disputed territory. Venezuela has mobilized troops on the border, while countries such as the United States, Great Britain and Brazil have made gestures of support for the defense of Guyana.

The dispute, which affects 160,000 km² of Guyana, is not merely territorial, but also involves a struggle for the mineral and energy resources it contains (Guyana is experiencing an oil boom thanks to the area maritime area adjacent to this coastline). Venezuela's historical claim dates back to colonial times, when it was still the Captaincy General of Venezuela and the British Empire began to expand on its own in what was then British Guyana. Tensions began in 1841, after Venezuela became independent, when British maps took for granted that the strip east of the Essequibo River was part of their colony.

Paris Award and agreement of Geneva

The Paris Arbitral Award of 1899 ceded a large part of the disputed territory to Guyana, as a British colony. Although the result was complied with by both parties for 63 years, the status became inconclusive after the death of the American lawyer who defended Venezuela in the Award, as evidence was made public that showed the bias of the jury in the arbitration award, pointing out that Judge Friedrich Martens had persuaded the court to rule in favor of the United Kingdom.

In 1966, when London was about to grant independence to the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Venezuela and the United Kingdom signed the Genevaagreement , which recognized the existence of the dissent and expressed the commitment of both parties to the peaceful resolution of the dispute. The conversations held did not yield result and the case was left to the good offices of the United Nations University Secretary , who has repeatedly determined the judicial settlement, through the ICJ, as the ideal means to put an end to the dispute over the Essequibo.

The Arbitral Award of 1899 has conditioned the Venezuelan position regarding the legitimacy of the ICJ to resolve disputes, since it accuses that tribunal of "having a historically traumatic burden for the country". However, Venezuela has appeared before the Court to present its preliminary objections on the admissibility of the dispute raised by Guyana, which implies a tacit recognition of the jurisdiction of the body. The Venezuelan primary objections were rejected in the Court's order of April 6, 2023. April 8, 2024 is the deadline for Venezuela to defend its position on the merits of the case; if it does so, it will endorse the process.

Guyana has been steadfast in its defense of the 1899 Arbitral Award and in its rejection of political negotiations as a substitute for the ICJ's judicial pathway , whose mediation channel is also supported by the international community.

The referendum

During Hugo Chávez's long period in power, Venezuela did not make special demands of Essequiba Guyana. Chávez showed disinterest in the border conflict, as he preferred to politically win over the Caribbean in his desire for regional influence. The same happened initially with Maduro, so that Guyana's oil activities, started in 2015, did not generate much reaction from Venezuela. It was not until September 2023 that Caracas made a pronouncement on the matter rejecting and deploring the business undertaken by the neighboring country. Maduro warned both Georgetown and the companies involved in the operations that it would apply "all necessary measures to avoid the illegitimate exploitation of the natural resources that belong to our nation". Guyana declared itself in plenary session of the Executive Council right to maintain its activity and had the support of the international community, especially CARICOM, the OAS and the United States, which interpreted the Venezuelan attitude as a threat to the use of force in detriment of what is established by international law.

At the national level, the Essequibo has always represented in Venezuela a point of union in the political discussion . In the face of a complex economic and social status , resorting to the topic of the Essequibo is a method to direct the gaze of Venezuelans towards a common horizon, while generating division among the political civil service examination . Thus, a Maduro in difficulties raised the territorial flag and called for a referendum on December 3, 2023. In reality, the enquiry had minimal repercussions on the judicial evolution of the dispute, but its questions increased the confrontation with Guyana, especially due to the use of the term "annexation" to refer to the Venezuelan project over the Essequibo, which would constitute an act of aggression.

agreement of Argyle

Following the publication of the results of the referendum, which did not fail to cause doubts due to their curious statistical basis, both parties met at quotation on December 14 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Convened in Argyle, in the presence of high ranking officials of the United Nations, CARICOM prime ministers, the Brazilian president and the prime minister of the host state, who in turn held the pro-tempore presidency of CELAC, the parties to the dispute declared 11 points for dialogue between Caracas and Georgetown.

The first of these points stands out, which commits them to refrain from threats and actions involving the use of force. In the same sense, the sixth point indicates that both parties will refrain from escalating the conflict, either by word or deed. If this last point were to be violated, a line of dialogue would be opened as soon as possible between Guyana, Venezuela, the President of Brazil, CELAC and CARICOM to activate guarantees of non-repetition. A "mixed commission" was also created to follow up on what was agreed, with international interlocutors and observers, which took place in Brasilia in January.

Transition from the political to the military level

These rapprochements have not prevented military movements in the border area. An armed confrontation is not foreseeable, but the status offers the risk of unwanted incidents, by accident or miscalculation. Units of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces have been deployed at various points along the line of separation and have even positioned themselves in particularly disputed enclaves, such as the small island of Anacoco, attributed to Guyana in 1899 and administered by Venezuela since 1966, as initially revealed by satellite images. For its part, the U.S. Southern Command has carried out military exercises with Guyana, to which the United Kingdom sent a warship as a warning to Venezuela. Brazil, which in this conflict is aligned with Georgetown despite the fact that Lula da Silva is politically closer to Caracas, has also sent soldiers to its border with Guyana.

Venezuela thus maintains aggressive political measures while presenting itself as open to diplomatic dialogue. This duality in foreign policy loses sight of the consequences that a defiant attitude may have on its image before the Court. Tension is likely to escalate as the case progresses in the ICJ and the Venezuelan presidential elections in July approach. If he remains in power thereafter without particular turbulence, Maduro could lower the tone, although a dangerous flight forward is always possible in a challenged dictatorship.