Morocco-Algeria Conflict: Spain's Role and Medium-term Scenarios deadline

In recent years, Morocco has embarked on an ambitious arms programme that could make it the leading military power in the Maghreb. This rearmament stems primarily from its complex and increasingly tense relationship with Algeria - the two countries have severed diplomatic relations - but also from its expansionist ambitions and regional influence.

This complex statusis not lost on Spain, which has attempted to reorient its relationship with Morocco and Algeria in an effort to set itself up as a mediator between the two countries, only to end up recently being receptive to Morocco's thesis over Western Sahara. Spain's position needs to take into account the energy implications of the conflict, given its dependence onAlgerian gas, and given that the current war between Russia and Urania may lead to a reorientation of European energy policies with regard to gas.

Diplomatic relations between Morocco and Algeria have never been easy. Starting from a status quo reached three decades ago, it has gradually deteriorated to the current moment of severed diplomatic relations.

The reasons behind the current statusstem from the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco has claimed the territory since Spain abandoned it in 1975, while Algeria has been supporting the Polisario Sahrawi Liberation Front; in reaction to this support, Morocco has argued at the UN for self-determination for the Algerian Kabyle people, at odds with Algiers. The already tense relationship worsened in May 2021 with the killing of three Algerian civilians on the border between Western Sahara and Mauritania, which Algeria blamed on 'Moroccan occupation forces'. A similar incident in 2020 led the Polisario Front to end up breaking the 1990 status quo and resume attacks on Moroccan targets in the area, to which Morocco responded.

During the last years of Bouteflika's mandate (1999-2019), Algeria tried to regain control over Western Sahara, in reaction to Morocco's regionalist aspirations, materialised in its re-entry into the African Union in 2017 and its increasing diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries.

Since the summer of 2021, when Algeria broke off relations with Morocco, both countries have experienced an escalation of tensions. This resulted in a rupture finalof relations with Mohammed VI's decision in January 2022 to dismiss the Moroccan ambassador to Algiers, citing Algeria's lack of interest in restoring relations.

Two main events have marked the escalation of tension between the two countries. Firstly, the closure of airspace for Morocco by Algeria in September 2021. Secondly, the closure of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (the branch that passes from Algeria to Morocco to reach Tarifa) in October of the same year. This movement has entailed losses of 200 million euros for Morocco, but it has also affected Spain, since most of its gas supplies come from Algeria and one of the two supply routes has been closed. To make up for this loss, an increase has been negotiated in the volume of gas arriving directly to Spain via Medgaz (the pipeline linking Algeria with Almería, which has a smaller capacity, as it can transport 8 billion cubic metres a year compared to the 10 billion cubic metres of the other branch).

This is the context of Morocco's military build-up programme. goalTo understand this rearmament, which aims to ensure Morocco's military superiority over Algeria, one must go back to 2020, when US President Donald Trump made an explicit public endorsement of Morocco's position on Western Sahara in exchange for a diplomatic rapprochement between Rabat and the state of Israel that has led to closer ties on mutual security and defence issues. result

The establishment of relations with Israel in December 2020 has also been one of the reasons to understand Algeria's subsequent severing of relations in August 2021, as it sees these new Moroccan ties as a threat to its national security, especially following the memorandum of military cooperation signed in November 2021 between Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz and the Moroccan Defence Minister.

In response to this status, Algeria has increased its presence in Mali following the withdrawal of French troops and has become the third largest importer of Russian arms. It should be recalled that France has recently ended Operation Barkhane, but this does not mean that Europe is abandoning Mali, only that it is restructuring its presence in order to continue supporting Mali and the region.

Despite these moves, analysts point out that it is in the best interests of both countries to maintain the status quo, and that Algeria rules out in principle that the solution to this statuswill be an armed conflict.

Morocco: political strategy and regional pretensions

First, it is worth considering the implications of US recognition of the 'Moroccanness' of the Sahara. This move has completely displaced the role of European powers in their mediation efforts in North Africa, as it may allow Morocco to move beyond South-South international cooperation relations, becoming the central axis of Sahel-Maghreb-European cooperation relations.

On the other hand, markets in Africa are becoming increasingly attractive to the West, as are those of Russia and China, so Morocco now has a golden opportunity to emerge as a regional leader. Moreover, as proposed by the report subject"Morocco, the Strait of Gibraltar and the military threat to Spain', recently published by high schoolde Seguridad y Cultura, 'Morocco's status as a preferential ally of the United States outlines its image as a mediating and exemplary state for the rest of the African countries in counter-terrorism, diplomatic and economic matters'.

In discussing Moroccan pretensions, reportemphasises a period marked by the two milestones of 1999 and 2017, that is, from the coronation of Mohammed VI to Morocco's re-entry into the African Union. If, in the first instance, it was a quest for regional leadership, it is now a question of going further by achieving supra-regional leadership.

To this end, recognition of the Moroccan ownership of Western Sahara has been of great importance. Thanks to the policies of Mohammed VI from 1999 to the present, fifteen countries have now recognised Morocco's claims to the area.

However, the real turning point comes in 2019, as, following US recognition, Saudi Arabia was the first country to announce the opening of a consulate in the area, causing a 'pull' effect. This decision comes in the context of the triangular relationship of Saudi-Moroccan-US cooperation through IMAFT and the 'internal attrition of Algeria, the effects of terrorism in Nigeria, the civil war in Libya, the fall from grace of South Africa's humanist diplomacy or an Egypt torn between dependence and independence from the Middle East'.

Morocco, far from focusing on the military, is seeking an integral strategy based on three aspects: political, religious and economic. development. The first two are framed by its system of government, which allows it to empathise with both the republics with strong Sunni Salafism and the Arab monarchies, which, together with the use of French, allows the country to convey its ideals and influence in an understandable way that is easy to empathise with even in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

As far as Economicsis concerned, Morocco, Africa's fifth largest power, has economic leadershipas goal, although it seeks to diversify its resources; Western Sahara's phosphates will be core topicfor this success. Furthermore, due to the border closure with Algeria, the transit of goods through Western Sahara is vital to achieve its objectives, which has led to greater investment in infrastructure by Rabat and the developmentof a projectwith Nigeria (a country that recognises the Moroccan status of the Sahara) to supply gas to the whole of Europe, known as the Nador Med Wers complex, close to Melilla and capable of competing with Algeciras or Barcelona. However, in order to do so, the Alaouite Kingdom must guarantee a modern army capable of fighting terrorism, keeping immigration at bay and making a success of state capitalism.

Finally, on the military front, the "Five-Year Plan 2017-2022", which aims to modernise the army, reduce dependence on foreign arms procurement, and unseat Algeria as a regional power, is worth highlighting.

Spain and Morocco: European relations and interests

Morocco's relationship with Spain has recently been characterised by growing tension, which seems to have reached a valley of relative calm with the Spanish Prime Minister's advertisementon Western Sahara.

As for Spain, Rabat pointed to the work of Foreign Affairs Minister Arancha González Laya as the main cause of the worsening relations between the two countries. entranceMorocco responded to the arrival of Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali in Spain to receive medical treatment in Logroño, attendance, with an incursion of immigrants towards Ceuta and Melilla. Spain tried to redirect the deteriorated statuswith the replacement of the foreign affairs minister. However, the publication 'The North African Post' criticised the Spanish government for its contradictory attitude, since shortly after her dismissal, the former minister was awarded "the most prestigious civilian distinction".

After the arrival in July 2021 of his replacement, José Manuel Albares, Spain offered a hand for cooperation; although Morocco welcomed the change with hope, in January 2022 it criticised Spain for maintaining its economic relations and cooperation in the fight against immigration and terrorism without giving an inch on the Western Sahara issue.

The beginnings for Albares were not easy, notably the failed attempt to mediate between Algeria and Morocco at the Union for the Mediterranean Forum in Barcelona, meeting, which both sides declinedattendto participate instead in the China-Africa Forum in Dakar, actually of greater importance due to the Asian country's growing investment in the continent. However, some Spanish and foreign media highlighted the work of King Felipe VI, who at the reception of the Moroccan diplomatic corps in January insisted on developing a stronger relationship between the two countries.

For its part, France has accompanied the active involvement of its companies in Morocco with an early commitment to Western Saharan autonomy within Morocco. As for German reconciliation, it is worth recalling that on 28 February 2021, Berlin suspended relations with the embassy in Rabat over deep disagreements over Western Sahara. Despite good economic relations between the two countries (see the 1.39 billion euros Germany gave to Morocco for the Covid-19 pandemic), Germany criticised Washington's decision to recognise Moroccan autonomy over Western Sahara. Berlin has, however, turned the relationship around, and in January this year recognised Morocco's important role as a bridge between North and South, while the autonomy plan for Western Sahara was beginning to be viewed favourably.

The EU's position can be clearly seen on the occasion of the AU-EU Forum in February 2022. It is worth recalling that this was a minor setback for Spain in its relations with Morocco, as Pedro Sánchez was the only leader present who addressed Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front. The summit was of particular importance, as Spain would be sharing a table at discussionwith Morocco. For the EU, this meetingwas particularly relevant insofar as it sought to curb China's economic influence in Africa, as well as to bring positions closer together. In fact, some of the issues discussed included agriculture, the fight against terrorism, climate change, the health crisis and, above all, agreementof aid worth 150 billion euros for the next seven years. Finally, it should be noted that with regard to Spain, following the incident with Ghali, Morocco once again criticised the ambiguity of Spain's actions: Rabat appreciated Albares' attempts to forge closer ties, but said that his actions "ruined" his good intentions.

In this context, prior to the advertisementof willingness to recognise a regime of autonomy for Western Sahara in a Moroccan sovereign framework, the territorial claims of the Maghreb country should be taken into consideration. Following Spain's move, Morocco declared that the next step would be to reopen the topicof Ceuta and Melilla. Two years after the US recognition in December 2021, Rabat agreed with Israel on the developmentof instructionsmilitary sites near Ceuta and Melilla (specifically in Tangiers and Nador), thus strengthening their strategic relationship. To this, Spain responded in February 2022 at congressthat, in the event of a conflict with Morocco over these two Spanish sites, it would 'act firmly'. Likewise, on 23 March, Morocco published on the website of its embassy in Madrid an updated map of the country including Western Sahara along with the annexation of both cities.

More succinctly, with regard to the Canary Islands, we will have to be attentive to how a possible modification of the Moroccan map would affect them, given that, if Western Sahara were to be integrated, the 250 nautical mile area claimed by Morocco would clash with the waters under Canary Islands sovereignty, not to mention the possibility of entering into a dispute over underwater volcanic mountains rich in resources such as lead.

Spain and Morocco: European relations and interests

Morocco's relationship with Spain has recently been characterised by growing tension, which seems to have reached a valley of relative calm with the Spanish Prime Minister's advertisementon Western Sahara.

As for Spain, Rabat pointed to the work of Foreign Affairs Minister Arancha González Laya as the main cause of the worsening relations between the two countries. entranceMorocco responded to the arrival of Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali in Spain to receive medical treatment in Logroño, attendance, with an incursion of immigrants towards Ceuta and Melilla. Spain tried to redirect the deteriorated statuswith the replacement of the foreign affairs minister. However, the publication 'The North African Post' criticised the Spanish government for its contradictory attitude, since shortly after her dismissal, the former minister was awarded "the most prestigious civilian distinction".

After the arrival in July 2021 of his replacement, José Manuel Albares, Spain offered a hand for cooperation; although Morocco welcomed the change with hope, in January 2022 it criticised Spain for maintaining its economic relations and cooperation in the fight against immigration and terrorism without giving an inch on the Western Sahara issue.

The beginnings for Albares were not easy, notably the failed attempt to mediate between Algeria and Morocco at the Union for the Mediterranean Forum in Barcelona, meeting, which both sides declinedattendto participate instead in the China-Africa Forum in Dakar, actually of greater importance due to the Asian country's growing investment in the continent. However, some Spanish and foreign media highlighted the work of King Felipe VI, who at the reception of the Moroccan diplomatic corps in January insisted on developing a stronger relationship between the two countries.

For its part, France has accompanied the active involvement of its companies in Morocco with an early commitment to Western Saharan autonomy within Morocco. As for German reconciliation, it is worth recalling that on 28 February 2021, Berlin suspended relations with the embassy in Rabat over deep disagreements over Western Sahara. Despite good economic relations between the two countries (see the 1.39 billion euros Germany gave to Morocco for the Covid-19 pandemic), Germany criticised Washington's decision to recognise Moroccan autonomy over Western Sahara. Berlin has, however, turned the relationship around, and in January this year recognised Morocco's important role as a bridge between North and South, while the autonomy plan for Western Sahara was beginning to be viewed favourably.

The EU's position can be clearly seen on the occasion of the AU-EU Forum in February 2022. It is worth recalling that this was a minor setback for Spain in its relations with Morocco, as Pedro Sánchez was the only leader present who addressed Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front. The summit was of particular importance, as Spain would be sharing a table at discussionwith Morocco. For the EU, this meetingwas particularly relevant insofar as it sought to curb China's economic influence in Africa, as well as to bring positions closer together. In fact, some of the issues discussed included agriculture, the fight against terrorism, climate change, the health crisis and, above all, agreementof aid worth 150 billion euros for the next seven years. Finally, it should be noted that with regard to Spain, following the incident with Ghali, Morocco once again criticised the ambiguity of Spain's actions: Rabat appreciated Albares' attempts to forge closer ties, but said that his actions "ruined" his good intentions.

In this context, prior to the advertisementof willingness to recognise a regime of autonomy for Western Sahara in a Moroccan sovereign framework, the territorial claims of the Maghreb country should be taken into consideration. Following Spain's move, Morocco declared that the next step would be to reopen the topicof Ceuta and Melilla. Two years after the US recognition in December 2021, Rabat agreed with Israel on the developmentof instructionsmilitary sites near Ceuta and Melilla (specifically in Tangiers and Nador), thus strengthening their strategic relationship. To this, Spain responded in February 2022 at congressthat, in the event of a conflict with Morocco over these two Spanish sites, it would 'act firmly'. Likewise, on 23 March, Morocco published on the website of its embassy in Madrid an updated map of the country including Western Sahara along with the annexation of both cities.

More succinctly, with regard to the Canary Islands, we will have to be attentive to how a possible modification of the Moroccan map would affect them, given that, if Western Sahara were to be integrated, the 250 nautical mile area claimed by Morocco would clash with the waters under Canary Islands sovereignty, not to mention the possibility of entering into a dispute over underwater volcanic mountains rich in resources such as lead.

Recognition of Western Sahara, energy and paradigm shift

Following the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine - and before the recognition of Morocco's autonomy plan - it seemed that Spain could play a role core topicin the EU's new energy security demands due to its privileged position with Algeria. In fact, it was suggested that relations with Algeria would go from strength to strength, as Spain, hand in hand with Europe, would try to mediate with Morocco to ease tensions with Algeria, while the latter could become an alternative to Russian gas. This was also linked to the need not to have any more active or potential conflicts beyond the war in Ukraine.

However, in light of Spain's recognition of Western Sahara, many questions remain. From Spain, both Pedro Sánchez and Albares claim to have put an end to a 46-year conflict with Morocco, strengthening ties between the two countries and complying with current international law (Resolution 2602 of the United Nations Security Council committeedecides to extend MINURSO's mandate and find a just, viable and lasting solution for Western Sahara). On the other hand, in the letter sent by the head of the Spanish government to King Mohammed VI, allusions are made to the importance of the two countries being united, their cultural connections and the need to build a relationship based on 'transparency and permanent communication'. Among other things, Sánchez hints that he would like to meet with the monarch, a response that would be clarified on 30 March.

As can be seen, the main victims of this agreementare none other than Algeria and the Polisario Front. Relations between Spain and Algeria have worsened following Madrid's rapprochement with Rabat, as was to be expected, and there were even fears of a possible cut in gas supplies to Spain via the Medgaz pipeline, recently extended as a result of the closure of the Maghreb Europe pipeline. However, the government claims that, despite the fact that Algeria has recalled its ambassador to Madrid for consultations, the supply is assured, as Spain offers very competitive prices economically and is core topicso that Algiers can diversify its client portfolio and reach out to Europe.

On the other hand, with regard to the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali condemned the position adopted by Spain, and insisted that the sovereignty of Western Sahara belongs to the Saharawi people, affirming that the Spanish authorities have once again committed a betrayal like that of 1975, since they have acted illegitimately. Moreover, although the government claimed to have secured gas supplies, relations have been strained since Algiers, and Spain risks losing its central role as a gas supplier to Europe, to the detriment of Italy.

Finally, it should be noted that Spain and Morocco have decided to cooperate in the energy field: Madrid will allow liquefied natural gas purchased by Rabat to reach plants in southern Spain and then circulate through the Maghreb-Europe pipeline to Morocco.

Looking to the near future

In light of what has been analysed above, it is worth briefly outlining the scenarios that can be envisaged. Taking Algeria, Spain, Morocco and the EU as the main actors, the following events can be considered the most relevant:

• Worsening of relations between Algeria and Morocco (rearmament and breakdown of diplomatic relations).
• Morocco-Spain reconciliation over recognition of Western Sahara and worsening relations with Algeria (and consequently with the Polisario Front).
• German and EU cooperation with Morocco, with an emphasis on the search for energy alternatives.
• Militarisation of Morocco and the search for regional leadership, as a bridge between Africa and Europe and extending its relations to Middle Eastern countries such as Israel.

In this context, Spain's recognition of Western Sahara seems more part of a strategy orchestrated by Europe, which now seeks to guarantee an alternative energy supply to Russia, as well as to follow Washington's line with regard to its actions in North Africa. Spain, it should be recalled, plays a central role in this equation, as it is a bridge country between Europe and North Africa. Recognition of the Sahara implies a de-escalation of tensions between Europe and Morocco, guaranteeing a low-conflict relationship with a regional leader. On the other hand, any subjectconflict with Algeria seems pointless, since, for its Economics, the sale of its energy to Europe is of vital importance. However, in order to guarantee a stable gas supply without major problems, the Moroccan issue must first be brought under control. In this way, Algeria is forced to compromise and cooperate for the sake of its Economics, while Europe gets a strong and stable partnerand gains some leverage over another regional leader, Algeria.

A conflict between Algeria and Morocco is unlikely. Although it could happen, it would end up affecting Spain and therefore the EU, which would not be in the interests of either side. Europe has established strong security ties with Morocco and seeks to do the same with Algeria and its gas. It remains to be seen how the conflict in Ukraine develops and how it is resolved, but for the time being, both countries have business opportunities that they cannot afford to miss. However, while it is true that the resource endowment that Western Sahara can give Morocco would be detrimental to Algeria, neither country is compensated for a large-scale conflict.

Next, although more likely, it does not seem likely that Morocco will make incursions into Ceuta and Melilla in a few months' time to reclaim these places. Let us remember that, along with the Canary Islands issue, now is the time for Spain to enter into negotiations and defend its interests. Right now, we are at the point of presentationof intentions and reaching agreements. Spain has given ground on one aspect in order to start talking, but the sovereignty of its territory is non-negotiable. It may be that, as far as sovereignty over nautical miles is concerned, Morocco will manage to impose itself. Less likely would be that, at the risk of generating a larger conflict, Morocco would try to exert pressure by encouraging migratory incursions into Ceuta and Melilla.

All indications are that we are likely to have reached a plateau of relative calm in recent months, but a lot of negotiations. Spain has slowed down the escalation and Europe seems to have contained Algeria. While it is true that tensions between Morocco and Algeria will continue, and that it does not seem likely that in the short term deadline, both nations will be willing to resume relations, cooperate and reopen the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline, it seems most likely that as a result of what may be discussed in the negotiations on Saharan soil, Algeria will position itself against Moroccan claims, trying to diminish its rights over Saharan territory, or postponing its final possession of the area as much as possible.

Brahim Ghali's change of position will obviously be supported, and he will have to adapt to the new circumstances in order to defend the interests of his people. On the other hand, in this phase of negotiations it is Spain's turn to guarantee its sovereignty and interests with respect to Ceuta and Melilla and the Canary Islands. Morocco is likely to threaten both cities or even push for a massive crossing of the border fences, generating a specific crisis. Likewise, Spain will also try to act in line with European interests in the frameworkof the energy needs derived from the war in Ukraine.

Spain needs to be smart about how it positions itself and in favour of what. Algeria's move to threaten to make Italy the hub of gas transmission to Europe seems to make Spain the likely loser in this conflict.

In other words, although it now remains to be seen how events unfold, it seems that we are facing a potential Pyrrhic victory for Spain, since, although it is true that it is calming tensions with Morocco, it is losing a great trump card with Algeria, with the European Union being the great beneficiary of all this status. Without thinking that Europe has completely ignored Spanish interests in determining its position, statusobliges Spain to play its cards right if it does not want to lose out.