Authors

• Markus Kinateder(mkinateder@unav.es)
  School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra, Spain

Abstract
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other players action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players reaction to it.

Classification JEL:C72, C73

Keywords:Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem

Number of Pages:22

Creation Date:2009-12-17

Number:null/09