Authors

• Róbert Veszteg(rveszteg@unav.es)
  School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract
This paper proposes a mechanism that can be operated without money in situations where agents have to decide over some common projects when they are not informed about others' preferences. The success of the mechanisms proposed in the literature to deal with similar problems usually relies on the assumption that the entire probability distribution that describes uncertainty is common knowledge. This modified linking mechanism requires the knowledge of solely two moment conditions. It proves to be a useful tool for achieving efficiency improvements in public decision problems. Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005] offer the study of the so-called linking mechanism. Here I show that, while allowing for heterogeneity among problems and agents, the linking mechanism keeps its asymptotic properties when run with solely two moment conditions.

Classification JEL:C72; D44; D74; D82

Number of Pages:21

Creation Date:2005-05-05

Number:null/05