As the world's attention focuses on the Gaza Strip and prepares for the imminent Israeli offensive in Rafah, the Russian invasion of Ukraine slips, almost unnoticed, into its third year, making good the predictions of those who predicted a protracted war whose end is still in sight.

In these two years, the Ukrainian theater of operations has gone through different stages: a lightning offensive with center of gravity in Zelensky's leadership that did not achieve its objectives; a Russian reconsideration of the plan of attack and a redeployment to focus the effort on achieving territorial continuity between the Donbas and, at best, Odessa and Transnistria; an illegitimate Russian declaration of annexation of part of the Ukrainian territory; the rebellion and fall from grace of Prigozhin and the group "Wagner"; or, most importantly, a Ukrainian counter-offensive, launched in June 2023, in which the West had placed great hopes, but which did not achieve the objectives it set out to achieve, and which has led to the impasse in which the war finds itself at the moment, altered only by tactical movements which are not decisive, although not lacking in symbolism, such as the one which has led Russia to seize the locality of Avdivka in a move which has shortened the front in that sector.

Nothing in war is certain; everything in it is uncertain. Without losing sight of this axiom, being aware of the fact that almost any outcome is still possible, and without being inclined to pessimism, the truth is that some dark clouds are hovering over the Ukrainian sky today. The blocking by the U.S. congress of a new and decisive financial financial aid package to Kiev of ninety-five billion dollars, jeopardizing Ukrainian resilience and raising the specter of collapse and defeat; Europe's increasing difficulty in sustaining - let alone increasing - its effort without emptying its own arsenals and powder magazines, limited after decades of negligent defense budgets, along with its decreasing enthusiasm for doing so; or the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi, head of the Ukrainian armed forces, who may become a formidable rival to Zelenski, are some of the stations of the particular viacrucis that Ukraine is going through, and which may have a next and potentially fatal milestone in the American elections in November, if candidate Donald Trump manages to win.

Russia is not exactly free of problems; the recent sinking of the landing ship "Tsézar Kunikov" in waters close to Crimea, or the destruction of a heavy vehicle hangar in Staromlynivka in a "Wild Hornet" drone attack, are just some of them to which can be added the one caused by the shock waves generated by the more than probable assassination of the dissident Alexei Navalny, confined in a Russian penal colony in the Arctic. Despite all of them, on the battlefield, Moscow now seems to enjoy a certain tactical advantage over Kiev that may have a positive effect on the morale of its troops and encourage Russia to persevere in its offensive efforts to achieve results before Ukraine recovers from the critical resource supply problems -conventional artillery ammunition on all of them- it is going through.

It is difficult to predict where the war is headed. In the present circumstances, it does not appear that Russia has sufficient resources to mount an all-out offensive capable of collapsing the Ukrainian front and giving it full control over Ukrainian territory. Now, without the restitution of the vital attendance that the country has been receiving from Europe and the United States, the Ukrainian resistance will soon become unviable and will threaten a collapse that could tempt Russia to try, although it could also act in the West as a revulsive that would renew the unity and enthusiasm in the commitment to the Ukrainian victory that it showed at the beginning of the war. Perhaps it is more realistic to think of a limited Russian offensive aimed at fill in control over the whole of the Donbas in order, once achieved, to prepare to live with a chronified conflict and a frozen front, or to face a negotiation in which it could "settle" for maintaining the occupied territory in exchange for tolerating the existence of a mutilated and Finlandized Ukraine.

Should this be the case, it is up to Ukraine alone to accept or reject this path. In any case, any solution that does not consist in the restitution of the status quo prior to 2014 will be a hard blow under the waterline of the current system based on international rules and respect for the sovereignty of its members with unforeseeable consequences.