Authors

• Róbert F. Veszteg(rveszteg@unav.es)
  School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract
This paper considers situations in which a set of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I propose the use of the individually-rational and budget-balanced multibidding mechanism according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules as defined by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) under complete information. It can be applied in a wide range of situations, and its symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria deliver ex post efficient outcomes if the number of players is two - for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty - or very large.

Classification JEL:C72; D44; D74; D82

Number of Pages:36

Creation Date:2004-11-01

Number:null/04