C.124 - Alcobendas Treasure Case

I. In the facts considered proven, it is highlighted how Alberto finds an object of great archaeological value, goes to find out if he has the right to appropriate it, and, believing that he does, orders Manuel to dispose of it.

II. On the basis of these facts, and without modifying them, the following analysis can be made.

II.1. As to whether Alberto and León, as well as Luis and Manuel, and the subject of the establishment selling works of art (whose identity we are not told) are engaged in human conduct, we can identify various data that evidence self-control on the part of their agents. Thus, the finding presupposes human behaviour (seeing, discovering, being surprised...); the enquiry to a lawyer or a student, too; and, of course, the sale of an object... All this shows that the subjects have options and decide on one of them, which sample shows that they act with self-control. Therefore, all those involved are engaged in human behaviour. Let us analyse whether such conduct is a typical criminal offence.

II.2.1. With regard to typicality, let us begin with its aspect. goal.

A) Alberto's conduct is of different interest for criminal purposes depending on the phase in which he intervenes: the finding itself and the phase of consultation with Luis and Manuel do not involve any typical risk; not so, on the other hand, for what happens around 28 October. Before this, Alberto has located the ark, but we are not yet told that he has appropriated it (he digs it up to transport it on the 28th), and it is the appropriation that can display a typical risk in the criminal sense. As I understand it, the factors of discovering, concealing and digging it up are causal of the seizure that takes place at least by taking possession of it and transferring it to his sphere of power (and hence to Manuel). In addition to being causal, they are factors that can be assessed ex ante as typical for the purposes of a crime that requires appropriating lost things of artistic or historical value, such as that provided for in art. 253: in effect, taking possession of the discovered cofferdam by incorporating it into his patrimony (by digging it up, moving it, having it in his possession and disposing of it) frustrates the collective interest in protecting unscathed goods of a certain value as part of the collective cultural heritage, even without prejudice to who the specific owner may be. And it is this risk that is realised ex post in the result of effective seizure, because otherwise, the chest would remain hidden. Therefore, Alberto's conduct objectively constitutes the crime of misappropriation of things of historical value (art. 253).
With regard to León, his conduct of digging up the casket by helping Alberto would be typical of the offence now argued (that of misappropriation of art. 253), as his contribution consists of a relevant conduct for that risk deployed. Therefore, his conduct would also be relevant for these purposes.

B) Manuel's conduct, by giving incorrect information and promising Alberto a profit from the sale, can be understood as the driving force behind the operation of digging up, moving and delivering it to him. Similarly to Leon, we now also see that his contribution is a relevant conduct for that risk deployed (that of misappropriation of art. 253).
With regard to Luis, there is nothing that would allow us to say that he is displaying a risk in the sense of subject criminal in any way: it is not that he does not know how to respond, it is that responding to one thing or another is innocuous for these purposes (it would be different if his professional skill or position demanded a response in Law, which is not the case for a student). So that is the end of the analysis of the case for him.

C) For the conduct of the subject of the establishment selling works of art, it can be argued that he displays a risk in the sense of subject of receiving (art. 298), for which it is necessary that the recovery of the ownership of a thing originating from a patrimonial offence is endangered. Since it is a case of an illicit sale, everything seems to suggest that the risk is indeed one of receiving. However, the data available to us in the proven facts are scarce: we do not know if it was already on sale with the appearance of legality, if the business only sold illicit goods, if it was clandestine... Therefore, it is preferable not to argue the objective criminality of the conduct without data; so that the analysis of the case for him would end here.
In conclusion, for the moment it can be affirmed that Alberto's conduct, on the one hand, fulfils the subject goal of the offence of misappropriation (art. 253); and both León and Manuel make relevant contributions to this offence. This is not the case of Luis, a law student, whose conduct does not pose a risk in the sense of any criminal subject (so we will not continue analysing his conduct). And, on the other hand, with regard to the conduct of the subject of the establishment selling works of art, we lack data to be able to affirm the objective typicity as a crime of receiving. Let us see if they are also subjectively imputed to the respective agents.

II.2.2 . As regards the subjective aspect of the offence, a distinction must be made between Alberto, Leon and Manuel.

A) As to whether we can also subjectively impute to Alberto his objectively typical conduct of misappropriation, it is appropriate to note that he has serious doubts about what he should or can do. That is why he turns to a law student and a lawyer for information about what the law allows. He knows for certain that he has discovered an ancient object of a certain value; he also knows that the property on which it appears is owned by Pedro, who could also be the owner of what is on the property; he knows, from entrance that the thing is not his, for the moment, but belongs to someone unknown and ancient, so it is not to be expected that it will appear. With these data we can affirm that he knows that the thing is old, of certain historical value and lost. Therefore, he knows the risk of appropriating the thing. Therefore, if he is aware of these circumstances and takes possession of the thing, he is acting with intent to commit the crime of misappropriation. However, he has reason to believe that he has a right of ownership over the thing. Therefore, it could be thought that there is an error regarding an element of the subject (that the thing is lost as alien). The alien nature of the thing is an element that can be conceptualised as belonging to the subject, or as part of the unlawfulness of the conduct; we will return to this question later when referring to unlawfulness and culpability. If we understand that the knowledge that the thing belongs to subject, with respect to Leon we cannot affirm subjective criminality, as it does not seem that he is aware of the appropriation operation that Alberto is going to carry out. If so, he would go unpunished for atypicality, as his lack of knowledge can be seen as a mistake (overcomeable or invincible) but in a subject which does not foresee modality imprudent. Therefore, it must go unpunished in both cases (whether it can be overcome or invincible). If the element of the alien nature of the thing is part of the unlawfulness that the perpetrator must be aware of in order to be guilty, then his error would have other consequences, as we will argue below for Alberto.
For Leon, we can see that he is unaware of the meaning of his actions: he knows that financial aid is going to dig up the cofferdam, but that is not enough to affirm the intention to contribute to the realisation of subject of misappropriation, which requires appropriation, which Leon does not do, nor do we have data to say that he knew that Alberto was appropriating. Therefore, his conduct is not subjectively typical and the analysis of the case for him would end here.

B) As to whether Manuel, who gave the incorrect information "knowingly", can be subjectively accused, we can answer in the affirmative: he knows that the thing does not belong to the person who discovers it, but to the owner of the property on which it appears, although the discoverer has a certain right over the thing (according to art. 351 of the Civil Code, the treasure belongs to the owner of the land on which it appears, but if it was discovered by chance, half of it applies to the discoverer). Therefore, he has knowledge that the appropriation is against the law, and that Alberto has a firm decision to dig up the thing and make it his own, as in fact he has done since he gave it to submission on the 28th of October. I think that charging a commission for the operation is not test of fraud, as it is something ordinary and accepted in professional operations (you can prove other elements, but not fraud). Nothing can make us doubt Manuel's malice with respect to Alberto's misappropriation.
Therefore, Alberto's and Manuel's conducts are also subjectively typical. Let us now see whether they are also unlawful.

II.3. Respecto a si dichas conductas son antijurídicas o no, nada obsta a su carácter antijurídico. Cabría plantear la cuestión de si la representación que se hace Alberto sobre el significado de su hecho (cree que obra lícitamente) constituye un error sobre la situación fáctica de una causa de justificación, concretamente del ejercicio legítimo de un derecho (el derecho de propiedad sobre el hallazgo). Sin embargo, propiamente Alberto no yerra sobre tal situación fáctica (tal sería si piensa que encuentra una arqueta cuando en realidad es un antiguo bidón metálico o una piedra), no se equivoca sobre la base para la que el Ordenamiento concede una facultad de actuar; más bien, sobre esto no yerra, pues es el descubridor (esto es cierto) y se pregunta a quién corresponde el ejercicio del derecho (lo pregunta a dos personas). Yerra más bien sobre el contenido de la respuesta que recibe, es decir, sobre el Derecho que asiste al descubridor: su error recae sobre un dato referido a la antijuricidad, sea de una norma facultativa (a quién corresponde el derecho sobre el hallazgo), sea de una norma prohibitiva (si comete delito por tal apropiación). En ambos casos, se trataría de un error sobre el sentido antijurídico (de permisión en el primer caso; de prohibición en el segundo) que nos sitúa en el ámbito de la culpabilidad, como veremos. En definitiva, tanto Alberto, como Manuel llevan a cabo conductas típicamente antijurídicas. Veamos sin son culpables de ellas.
II.4. En relación a la culpabilidad de los sujetos, entendemos que todos los intervinientes presentan unas condiciones de normalidad motivacional desde el punto de vista i) de si padecen alguna enfermedad psíquica o intoxicación; todos ellos serían imputables. A todo ellos se les puede exigir, además, ii) obrar conforme a la norma. Distinto es lo que sucede respecto al iii) necesario conocimiento del carácter antijurídico de sus respectivas conductas. En este punto es preciso detenerse de nuevo sobre la representación de Alberto sobre la conducta que llevan a cabo: ellos saben que desentierran la arqueta, que la trasladan, que la entregan…, pero todo eso son datos fácticos sobre la realidad y no dicen nada sobre el conocimiento que deben tener en cuanto a si esas conductas están prohibidas o en cambio están amparados por el Ordenamiento. De hecho, Alberto consulta a un estudiante de Derecho y luego a un abogado, por lo que tiene al menos dudas sobre el contenido de su conducta. Después, se nos dice que «le encargó la gestión de la venta» «en la creencia de la capacidad profesional de Manuel como experto abogado», por lo que sus dudas pasan a segundo plano, sin resolverse, ante el plan de venta y anuncio de ganacias, permitido, no prohibido, de su conducta. Se encuentra en un error sobre el sentido de su acto. Y un error además inducido o provocado por Manuel, el cual, «aun a sabiendas de lo establecido en el Derecho civil sobre los hallazgos, y con el fin de obtener un lucro ilícito», le da una información no concorde con la realidad, se ofrece a intervenir (lo cual generaría confianza en Alberto), para ganar una cantidad respetable de dinero, de la que percibiría una comisión. Sin embargo, acude al mercado ilegal de obras de arte. Ello nos lleva a pensar que aunque Manuel conoce que la conducta va contra Derecho, Alberto yerra en cuanto a ese contenido. De nuevo volvemos a la problemática más arriba señalada sobre la naturaleza del error: si el error de Alberto recae sobre un elemento del tipo (la ajenidad de la cosa hallada), su error afectará a la tipicidad; si recae sobre el sentido de la antijuricidad (la licitud o ilicitud de apropiarse del hallazgo), su error afectará a la culpabilidad. Además de la naturaleza del error, es preciso atender a su carácter vencible o no, como también señalamos más arriba. Argumentemos primero el carácter vencible o no de su error. A mi modo de ver, su error es vencible: tiene dudas y acude a quien piensa puede resolvérselas (un estudiante de Derecho y luego un abogado); pero no me parece suficiente ambas fuentes de conocimiento para que su error se transforme en certeza y sea invencible, pues no son las fuentes de mayor apariencia de conocer el Ordenamiento jurídico en ese particular caso: más bien parece que se conforma con lo que quiere oír, con lo que desea, que es apropiarse del objeto. Por eso me inclino a pensar que su error es vencible. Pero con esto surge otro problema: resulta que el régimen del error vencible no es el mismo en función de si recae sobre elementos del tipo o sobre elementos de la antijuricidad: si el error afecta al tipo, el de carácter vencible daría lugar a la sanción de la conducta como imprudente, «en su caso» (arts. 10 y 14.1), es decir, si existe tipificada la infracción imprudente, cosa que para la apropiación indebida no, por lo que dará lugar a la impunidad, como el de carácter invencible, según ya hemos argumentado más arriba; y si el error afecta a la culpabilidad, el de carácter vencible conduce a la rebaja de la sanción en uno o dos grados (art. 14.3). Por tanto, las consecuencias son muy distintas para Alberto, en función de la naturaleza de su error. Pienso que no es posible argumentar diciendo que in dubio pro reo o in dubio pro libertate, pues nuestra función es resolver el caso y salir de esa duda, mientras sea posible. A mi modo de ver, el error recae sobre un elemento del tipo (la ajenidad de la cosa, que se exige para el delito de apropiación indebida). Puesto que atendemos a la tipicidad de la conducta, y el tipo exige elementos fácticos (apropiarse) pero también jurídicos (cosa mueble, perdida), ambos grupos de elementos pertenecen al tipo, como ya argumentamos al tratar de la tipicidad subjetiva. No es correcto trasladar a la culpabilidad todos los datos de (conocimiento del) Derecho, sino solo el conocimiento de la norma que rige la conducta en cuestión. Por tanto, al tratarse de un tipo que no cuenta con una modalidad imprudente, Alberto ya quedó al margen del caso por falta de tipicidad subjetiva. En cambio, el peso del caso recae sobre la actuación de Manuel, quien conoce que da una información falsa: sabe que el Derecho no ampara el apoderamiento del hallazgo por Alberto y, sin embargo, le hace creer que sí: «aun a sabiendas de lo establecido en el Derecho civil sobre los hallazgos», se nos dice además que le mueve un afán de obtener un «lucro ilícito». No es, sin embargo, dato que abone dicha conclusión el que Manuel desee obtener una comisión, pues es algo que por sí solo no muestra que conoce el aspecto ilícito. Tampoco el que la arqueta aparezca en un negocio de «venta ilícita de obras de arte», pues desconocemos si llegó allí por Manuel o por un tercero. Pero nos basta con el dato clave señalado en los hechos probados de que obra sabiendo que da información falsa.
II.5. En cuanto al grado de participación de cada uno de los intervinientes, es decir, cómo han de responder los diversos sujetos, de nuevo separamos el análisis de las conductas de Alberto y de Manuel. Pero es fácil lo que se refiere a Alberto: al estar en situación de error vencible que afecta al tipo, y el tipo no prevé modalidad imprudente, no hay responsabilidad por su parte. En cambio, y por ser un error inducido o creado y mantenido por Manuel, es este quien tiene el papel principal, el que tiene en sus manos el curso de acontecer típico: es más, crea en Alberto un error, crea confianza y da apariencia de veracidad a la información que aporta, y se sirve de él para que le entregue el objeto. Podríamos afirmar que Alberto se encuentra instrumentalizado por Manuel, porque crea y mantiene un error sobre un elemento del tipo. De modo que Manuel puede ser considerado autor mediato de la conducta de apropiación indebida, ejecutada por Alberto, quien sin embargo no respondería penalmente. Con todo, nos surge un nuevo problema: Manuel no puede ser autor del delito de apropiación indebida porque no reviste la condición que el tipo exige para ser autor (para «apropiarse» de cosa perdida es preciso ser descubridor, y él no lo es). Pero el precepto del art. 31 permitiría hacerle responsable aunque no revista tal condición, si entendemos que obra en representación del que sí tiene tal carácter, Alberto, si se la ha otorgado.
II.6. La punibilidad no se ve condicionada ni alterada por ningún dato, de modo que podemos concluir diciendo que es punible.

III. At summary, Manuel would be liable as perpetrator (mediate) of a misappropriation offence (art. 253), provided that he acted on behalf of Alberto, who would not be liable for the offence. Neither Luis nor León would be liable either. And we do not have data to pronounce on the responsibility of the subject of the establishment of illicit sale of works of art.