C.84 Aizpuru case

I. In the account of proven facts, the following facts stand out data: four people break the window of a vehicle and find themselves "bridging" the electric ignition system; the owner and three other people react but are repelled by José Carlos (who stabs one of them 8 times with a machete, who suffers injuries) and José Enrique (who stabs another one with a stiletto, who suffers injuries).

II. If these were the facts, and without modifying them, the following analysis could be made. For the legal-criminal analysis of the case, it is appropriate to distinguish two sequences: the action on the vehicle and the reaction of its owner, on the one hand, and, on the other, the "reaction to the reaction" carried out by the initial aggressors.

II.1. First of all, let us analyse whether the requirement of human conduct is met by all the participants. We can affirm that there is sufficient evidence in the facts data to affirm that all the participants have self-control, that is to say, that they act with a minimum of volition or control over the processes in which they are immersed. Thus, on the part of José Carlos, Millán, José Enrique and Iván, the breaking of the window, the manipulation of the wiring, taking out a stiletto, wielding it, wielding a machete and striking someone eight times with it..., are data which support self-control over the course of the process. On the other hand, the other four subjects, Luis Carlos, Pablo, Pedro Jesús and Luis Ángel, also show signs of self-control over the process: they leave the pub, they surprise the others, three of them accompany the first one. Therefore, all of them meet the minimum requirement for criminal responsibility: human conduct.
II.2 . Secondly, let us examine whether these conducts are typical, both in terms of goal and subjectively.

II.2.a) Objectively, in the first sequence, José Carlos, Millán, José Enrique and Iván operate on the vehicle by breaking the window and manipulating the wiring. Their actions on the vehicle are causal for the fracture and manipulation of the wiring (according to the heuristic formula of the condicio sine qua non, the following would disappear if we mentally suppress them); furthermore, the fracture and manipulation display risks for the purposes of several types: i) pecuniary damage (arts. 263 and 625.1 PC, depending on the amount), and this is because breaking a window is the clearest way of destroying its integrity, and a fractured window is the same as being rendered useless because it is broken; and this risk is realised in result as there are no other factors that can be taken into consideration. And ii) theft for the use of vehicles (art. 244 PC), in that the bridging of another person's vehicle, at that time of night, after having broken the window, can only be understood as theft of a vehicle (in the absence of more data, I understand that it is a theft of use and not of possession); this risk, however, is not realised in result, as they cannot continue with their action in view of the fact that they are surprised by the owner: it would therefore remain in the attempt phase (unfinished).
In the second sequence, once they are surprised, José Carlos and José Enrique confront the other four, attacking two of them. The conduct of José Carlos, by striking eight blows with a machete against Luis Ángel is the cause of the injuries suffered, without it being necessary to argue much, as the mere mental suppression of the blows with the weapon makes result disappear; furthermore, this factor constitutes a typically relevant risk for the purposes of the crime of injury with dangerous means (Art. 148 CP) (we do not have data on the place of the wounds to be able to affirm that the risk is that of homicide); and this risk is realised in the result, as there is no other risk factor that mediates between action and effect. So the conduct of José Carlos fulfils the subject goal of the offence of dangerous injury. The same could be argued for José Enrique, as far as the stabbing of Pedro Jesús with the stiletto is concerned: José Enrique can objectively be charged with the subject of dangerous bodily harm.
II.2.b) Subjectively, in both sequences there is data to subjectively impute the types. In the first, they use force and skill guide , so they must know that they are applying it to the glass and cables, which requires precision from the agent, and precision, knowledge; if, in addition, we all know, like any adult, what happens to the glass when it is hit, we can affirm that they know the risk of their conduct; as for the manipulation of the cables, not everyone knows how it works, but we can attribute this to them knowledge at least because they are accessing the use of another person's vehicle by an absolutely unusual route. In the second sequence, any person with a minimum of life experience knows the damaging capacity of a knife and a stiletto, especially when used repeatedly, and against a living person. Therefore, it would be subjectively imputable as intentional, both the crime of theft of use of vehicles, as well as the crime of dangerous injuries.

II.3. In addition, these conducts must be unlawful, for which it is necessary to assess whether there are any grounds for justification. Nothing is said to cast doubt on the unlawful nature of the conduct of seizing the vehicle and the conduct of confronting a person with a knife. The reaction of the owner and his companions is legitimate: in fact, Luis Carlos can resist the person who illegitimately takes his property, such as the vehicle; in his case, it is legitimate to defend the property, as the first offence is already criminal and is putting it at risk of disappearing from his domain (art. 20.4.1 PC); as it is a legitimate or justified reaction, José Carlos and the other three cannot in turn oppose a reaction to repel it. Therefore, the conducts (theft of use and injury) are unlawful.
II.4 . There is nothing in the facts to cast doubt on the guilt of any of the participants. Moreover, on the basis of the normal motivational normality that their actions denote, we can affirm that they are fully culpable. Therefore, José Carlos, Millán, José Enrique and Iván are guilty of the offence of attempted robbery Degree . In addition, José Carlos is guilty of the offence of wounding with dangerous means (art. 148) and José Enrique is also guilty of the (other) offence of wounding with dangerous means (art. 148).
II.5. There are no factors that condition or suspend punishability. Therefore, their conduct is punishable.
II.6. With regard to perpetration, a distinction can be made according to the offences and the persons involved. With regard to the offence of vehicle theft, it can be argued that subject is carried out jointly by the four (José Carlos, Millán, José Enrique and Iván). The fact that the breaking (let's assume) was carried out by only one of them is not an obstacle, nor is the fact that the manipulation of the cables was the work of only one of them: it precisely demonstrates a division of tasks or functions, and the implementation of the actions highlights a mutual agreement between the four of them. Therefore, the offence of theft could be charged jointly to all four subjects. It is different with regard to the offence of assault and battery: in order to be able to charge the four participants jointly, there would have to be a mutual agreement and a consequent division of tasks, which is not the case here: the suddenness of the actions of José Carlos and José Enrique lead us to affirm that they "acted on their own", furthermore, there is a surprise factor in that they were surprised by the other four, and it does not seem easy to find agreement about something unexpected (we do not have data to affirm that they had decided to use their weapons against whoever confronted them).

III. In final, José Carlos is manager of a crime of injury with a dangerous instrument and of an attempt of theft of use of vehicles, in co-authorship; José Enrique, also of another crime of injury with a dangerous instrument and of the same attempt of theft of use of vehicles, in co-authorship; on the other hand, the other two, Millán and Iván, would answer exclusively for the attempt of theft of use of vehicles, in co-authorship.

This case raises an additional question: what would happen if José has a duty to assist and, at the same time, a duty not to drive? For example, an ambulance driver who, having been penalised with a ban on driving ID card, finds himself having to go out to transport a seriously injured person. It is not possible (leaving aside the fact that the sanctioned driver continues to work as such) to fulfil one of the two duties without infringing the other. This is what is known as a "collision of duties", a group of cases of status of necessity with their own rules of weighing up. We then speak of collisionto emphasise that the same agent has two duties that cannot be fulfilled simultaneously: if he fulfils one, he then and at the same time fails to fulfil the other; and if he fails to fulfil one, he also fails to fulfil the other. Whatever the agent does, he is in breach of a duty. The fact that the collision occurs between duties does not detract from the fact that it is still a crisis status : two interests (for which two duties are foreseen) are in conflict. Three possible situations of collision then arise: of two duties to act, of two duties not to act, of one duty to act and one duty not to act.
But let us return to the case. Note that the agent of C.82 He was acting to ward off an evil in the form of a disease that is affecting a person. A disease is an evil of nature; what would happen if his conduct was against an evil originating from other human conduct but without constituting self-defence? The status is possible: certainly, not all defensive reactions give rise to self-defence, as this only occurs in the case of intentional aggressions that are criminally unlawful. What happens if the conduct does not meet these characteristics? Can it be repelled or do we have a duty to tolerate everything? Let us look at C.83.