C.22 - 22 Stabbing Case
"Manuel L.S., who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, characterised by a delirium of jealousy and persecution, assaulted his wife Josefa with a kitchen knife "stabbing her thirty-five times in various parts of the body, which caused as many incised stab wounds affecting the thorax, abdomen, right upper limb and left lower limb, one of them involving the heart", a very serious and potentially fatal wound. Manuel reported the incident to the police and Josefa was admitted to the Red Cross Hospital in Seville, where the wounds were sutured and treated with haemostasis, as well as intravenous transfusion of serum and blood. Leandro C.D. went to the room where Josefa, in a state of unconsciousness, was accompanied by her sister, looking for the cardwhich accredited that Josefa, as a Jehovah's Witness, did not want blood transfusions. While the sister went to fetch the nurse, Leandro removed the catheter, pressing his hand on her arm to stop the bleeding. "As a result of all of the above, Josefa died that same afternoon from hypovolemic shock, which was contained by the blood supply she was receiving".
STS 27 March 1990; pte. Moyna Méndez; RJ 1990, 2626.
Who killed Josefa, Manuel or Leandro?
I. From the facts described, it is worth noting the following: Manuel, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, stabbed Josefa, his wife, 35 times with a kitchen knife, one of which struck her heart. Manuel went to the police and told them what had happened. She was admitted to the hospital, where the wounds were treated with sutures and a blood transfusion. In this status, while she was unconscious, Leandro, who claimed to be a Jehovah's Witness, presented himself at the hospital, as Josefa, so that according to his creed, she refused to receive blood transfusions. Taking advantage of the fact that Josefa's sister went out to fetch the nurse, Leandro proceeded to remove the transfusion catheter but put pressure on the wound to prevent bleeding, which, however, could not prevent death.
II. We are asked to analyse the criminal liability of Manuel, Leandro and the sister. If the account of the facts is as follows, the following can be understood from these participants:
II.1. Los tres sujetos llevan a cabo conductas humanas en cuanto que muestran ejercer autocontrol, dado que emplean cursos certeros (puñaladas que aciertan a dar…) y precisos (con medios eficaces…), reiterados, lo cual exige volición de la persona sobre esos procesos en los que se ve inmersa. Además, no concurre ningún factor que pueda excluir la conducta humana: ni siquiera en el caso de Manuel, al asestar aquellas puñaladas en una situación de intenso arrebato, cabe hablar de que desaparezca la acción, debido a que se mantiene un mínimo de libertad, el mínimo que consiste en tener una opción a su actuar.
II.2. Manuel, al asestar 35 puñaladas, interpone un factor causal de la muerte de Josefa. Lo que no está tan claro es que el resultado de muerte sea imputable a esta conducta. Mediante la fórmula heurística de la condicio sine qua non, Manuel, con sus puñaladas, aporta un factor causal, pues suprimidas mentalmente no se desencadenaría el resultado de muerte. Su conducta crea diversos riesgos típicamente relevantes (muerte, lesiones, daños, etc.); sin embargo, de estos riesgos, el más grave (art. 138) no se realiza en el resultado porque se interpone un factor distinto, ajeno, que es la conducta comisiva de Leandro (desconectar el catéter). Esta conducta es causal, igualmente por la fórmula de la condicio, y crea a su vez un riesgo típicamente relevante de muerte, que sí se realiza en el resultado. Cabe afirmar por tanto que la conducta de Manuel constituye una tentativa de homicidio (art. 16); y la de Leandro un homicidio consumado (art. 138). Junto a este riesgo, cabe entender que dichas puñaladas despliegan también riesgos relevantes a efectos de otros tipos (malos tratos, lesiones, etc.), pero todos ellos quedan absorbidos (mediante el llamado concurso aparente de normas o de leyes) por el tipo de homicidio intentado.
De la conducta llevada a cabo por Manuel, cabe inferir la presencia de dolo pues, en virtud de las reglas de experiencia que cualquier persona ha adquirido mediante el cotidiano proceso de aprendizaje (¿quién no se ha cortado con un cuchillo alguna vez?), se percibe la virtualidad lesiva de un cuchillo de cocina empleado repetidamente con incisiones en una persona viva. No cabe hablar de un error, ni por ausencia de reglas de experiencia, ni por falta de actualización, ni por defecto de cálculo. La presencia de un trastorno paranoico con delirios por celos no excluye el dolo –por error (suponiendo que su enfermedad le llevara a tener representaciones defectuosas de la realidad)–, sino que puede servir más bien para afirmarlo, pues precisamente por los celos le aflige este mal a Josefa. Debemos concluir que su conducta es dolosa. Algo semejante puede afirmarse de la conducta de Leandro: precisamente porque conoce el remedio de la transfusión de sangre, y el carácter vital de esta, ya que es testigo de Jehová, al desconectarla, está aplicando un riesgo (interrumpiendo, más bien, un curso salvador ajeno: la transfusión sanguínea) del que se representa su concreta peligrosidad: tiene reglas de experiencia adquiridas, que le permiten anticipar la consecuencia (la muerte) de su conducta (desconectar). Que apretara la herida para evitar la muerte, no es óbice a la presencia del dolo, aunque pueda serlo a la presencia de intención. Sin embargo, el dolo no es intención, por lo que es compatible el representarse el peligro con una intención de no matar. La conducta de ambos es dolosa.
En cuanto a la conducta de la hermana, al salir de la habitación, cabría entender que es de carácter omisivo. Sin embargo, no es fácil afirmar la presencia de una estructura de comisión por omisión que permita imputar el resultado de muerte por no haberlo evitado. Hay pocos datos en el caso para considerar que se hallaba en posición de garante: podría ser por la asunción voluntaria de las tareas de cuidado de su hermana, pero no hay datos suficientes; el parentesco no es suficiente, pues no parece que existan deberes «legales» de garantía en favor de hermanos (art. 11). Pero aunque así fuera, sabemos que eso no basta para la comisión por omisión; para hacerla posible, exigimos interpretar la posición de garante como compromiso específico de actuar a modo de barrera de contención de riesgos; y es esto lo que puede faltar en este caso: bien podía suceder que estuviera solo en una visita, o simplemente que, estando allí para velar por su hermana enferma, no haya asumido el evitar riesgos como el de la conducta de Leandro. Pero aunque se afirme la existencia de un compromiso de evitar riesgos, necesario para la comisión por omisión, podría defenderse la existencia de un error. En efecto, estando segura de la peligrosidad de Leandro, avisar a la enfermera sería el medio para evitar el peligro para Josefa; por lo que podría hablarse de un error, y por tanto de imprudencia, ya que parece evitable: precisamente por saber de las intenciones de Leandro no debería haberse ausentado de la habitación más allá del tiempo mínimo para avisar a la enfermera. Sin embargo, tampoco cabe deducir de los hechos esta conclusión. Faltan, a su vez, datos suficientes para entender que existe un delito de omisión del deber de socorro cualificado (art. 195.3).
The aphorism Causa causa causae causa causati (the cause of the cause is the cause of what is caused), which Decio takes up(Commentaria in 1 et 2 Digestum...), cannot be applied in Criminal Lawto attribute responsibility: it contains a regression to infinity, and does not allow the factor of penal responsibility to be identified, which must be a causa libera.
II.3. The unlawfulness of Manuel's conduct is not excluded by any cause of justification. It could be argued that Leandro's conduct is in the exercise of a right to freedom of conscience (art. 20.7) Constitutional Law. However, this is not the case: this right must be understood in the logic of the state of necessity (art. 20.5), in such a way that it does not allow the creation of a greater evil (killing another person) than that which is intended to be avoided (acting against one's own conscience): the balancing clause (art. 20.5.1). Therefore, it is not permissible to create risks such as the risk of death for the legal assets of third parties, and even less so when there are doubts about her consent, as Josefa was unconscious. The fact that she was shown a document stating that she was a Jehovah's Witness does not prevent Josefa from wanting the transfusion in spite of everything. The harm caused by acting against fundamental legal rights is always greater: the adequacy clause. Nor is there a legitimate right to intervene in the legal sphere of a third party in this case: this interference in order to safeguard the right to freedom of conscience produces an imbalance of the status, which is substantially greater (the death of a person) than the evil which threatens and is intended to be avoided (freedom of a third party).
Each of the intervening parties acts individually: co-perpetration cannot be defended, as there is no mutual agreement(art. 28.I). Neither is any of the subjects instrumentalised, so there is no perpetration-by-means (art. 28.I).
II.4. The "paranoid schizophrenia, characterised by a delirium of jealousy and persecution" suffered by Manuel can affect his guilt: this illness could lead to mental derangement or transitory mental disorder (art. 20.1.°). Jurisprudence has sometimes considered the exemption from liability in cases of paranoid schizophrenia. This requires that the effect of not understanding the wrongfulness of the conduct or not being able to act in accordance with this understanding at the time of committing the acts is present. There is no datain the case to affirm this influence at that time: we are not told that he assaulted his wife precisely in a statusof paranoia, and that at that statushe was deprived of the understanding of the unlawfulness. If this were the case, we could consider it as a complete exoneration: only in this case would Manuel be unimputable. Failing that, it could be considered as an incomplete exonerating circumstance. There is no datato understand that the imputability of the other participants is affected.
III. Conclusion: Manuel is managerof attempted murder Degree(reduction of the sentence by one or two Degrees: in this case, because of the numerous stab wounds, I think that the sentence should not be reduced by more than one Degree: between five and ten years minus one day); in turn, his imputability is diminished by the presence of an incomplete alienation status, which would allow the sentence to be reduced by a further one or two Degrees: in this case, it could be reduced by two Degrees, as the subject appears to be seriously affected (imprisonment of between one year and three months to five years minus one day). Regarding the resulting sentence, the aggravating circumstance of kinship (art. 23 PC) should be taken into account, as he attempted against the life of his wife; and also the mitigating circumstance of confession of the offence to the authorities (art. 21.5.ª PC). Leandro is manageras the individual perpetrator of the crime of intentional homicide in active commission; the sister is not manager.
Manuel's semi-imputability does not exclude the application of a curative security measure (art. 101.1), which would be applied, under the vicarious system, before the prison sentence. Eventually, the time of the measure could be taken into account to reduce the time of imprisonment or even exclude it (art. 104).