C.141 - siblings but not "cousins".

I. On the basis of these facts, it is worth noting the responsibility of the defendant Bernardo A.S.:

II.

II.1. It is described how Bernardo enters his brother's house and seizes a moped. And nothing is stated that could cast doubt on the fact that these verbs are the carrying out of a conduct. It is possible that a sleepwalker entered the house, but nothing is said about this. In final, Bernardo carries out a human process (not man's) and susceptible of self-control insofar as nothing is said about an irresistible physical force that would force him to enter. Bernardo is engaging in human conduct.
II.2. It is then necessary to analyse whether this conduct constitutes the subject goal of a criminal offence (objective imputation). Specifically, the question arises as to whether his conduct fulfils the subject of theft, given that, by entering through a door that was open and not addressing his brother, there is no force in things or violence or intimidation to persons, respectively (types of robbery, on the other hand). For theft, a causal link must be established between the conduct in question and the seizure (more specifically, as required by case law: seizure with availability even potential seizure of the thing). The causal link between Bernardo's conduct and José's seizure cannot be doubted, as the only factor mentioned in the Facts is Bernardo's intervention, so that, if this is mentally removed, the result disappears. But the subject of theft also requires other elements (movable thing, profit motive). The motorbike is considered a movable thing. The profit motive is inferred from the incorporation of the thing into one's own patrimony beyond a certain period of time (if the period of time were short, it would be possible to understand that it was a theft of use: Art. 244). In this case, it is also not stated that the seizure was temporary or for use, so it is understood that it is definitive, and thus that the agent cannot act without the intention of making a profit. In other words: entering someone else's home and taking possession of the motorbike for a prolonged period of time without returning it, involves a typically relevant risk constituting theft: among the risks that the legislator wishes to prevent with the subject of theft is clearly one such as this. Moreover, as the only factor mentioned in the facts is Bernardo's conduct, it can be said that this risk is realised at result. Therefore, Bernardo's seizure is imputable to his conduct in taking the motorbike. The subject goal of theft is fulfilled, which admits two graduations (over 400 €, art. 234.1; equal or less, art. 234.2 (at the time the facts were judged, the law referred to 40,000 pts. as the limit between crimes and misdemeanours, respectively).
The question arises as to whether the fact that Bernardo and José are brothers to each other would make the offence disappear (in other words, that there is no theft between brothers). But the penal code does not distinguish between the active subject of the theft (grammatical arg.) and we know that there is a circumstance modifying liability, but not exempting, such as kinship, which includes that of the brothers (systematic arg.). The fact that they are siblings does not make the offence disappear, although this will be raised again later, in another place.
Having passed the filter of objective imputation, we have to check whether we can subjectively impute this to the accused subject goal . It is a question of analysing whether his conduct of seizure is also intentional. From the rules of experience that a normal person like Bernardo (it is not said that he suffered a cognitive or socialisation deficit) would possess, it can be inferred that if he enters someone else's house, takes the motorbike and disappears for a long time without returning it, he knows that he is making the thing his own. And he who knows that he is taking someone else's property and does not stop in its execution knows that he is stealing. Therefore, there is the malice aforethought inherent in the subject of theft. Moreover, as already mentioned above, he acts with a profit motive. Therefore, the subjective subject (malice) of theft is fulfilled. Cf. L.6.

status Art. 305.1 CP: "Anyone who ... defrauds the Public Treasury ... provided that the amount of the amount defrauded, ... exceeds one hundred and twenty thousand euros shall be punished with the penalty of ..., unless he has regularised his tax liability under the terms of section 4 of this article. [The status tax shall be considered to have been regularised when the taxpayer has proceeded to the full recognition and payment of the tax debt, before the Tax Administration has been notified by the Tax Administration of the commencement of verification proceedings or research".

II.3. Podría plantearse si dicha conducta, objetiva y subjetivamente imputable, queda justificada por el hecho de que autor y víctima sean hermanos entre sí. Pero dicha relación de parentesco no hace desaparecer la antijuridicidad, porque esta se refiere al hecho y el parentesco a la condición de las personas (arg. teleológico). No se ve afectada la antijuridicidad de la conducta.
II.4. Tampoco hay indicios para pensar que la culpabilidad se vea afectada (nada se dice que permita dudar de su inimputabilidad, o de que le sea inexigible obrar de otra manera; como a cualquier persona, se le puede atribuir el conocimiento de que hurtar está prohibido incluso penalmente). Por tanto, la conducta de Bernardo es típicamente antijurídica y le es imputable además como culpable.
II.5. En cuanto a la punibilidad de la conducta de hurto, surgen dos cuestiones. En primer lugar, el hurto se sanciona en función de si la cuantía de lo sustraído supera o no los 400 euros: si se entiende que este dato es elemento del tipo, debe ser abarcado por el dolo (al menos eventual; si no, pena atenuada del art. 234.2); pero si se entiende que es una mera condición objetiva de punibilidad, no es preciso que la cuantía sea abarcada por el dolo (bastaría con que Bernardo al obrar supiera que se llevaba algo). Entiendo que los elementos del tipo no incluyen la cuantía sino solo los datos del verbo típico («tomar las cosas muebles ajenas), y la cuantía opera solo para modular la sanción. Con otras palabras, esta cuantía no aporta nada a la valoración de la tipicidad, y sí a la de la necesidad de castigar en más o en menos.
En segundo lugar, el propio código penal prevé que ciertas relaciones de parentesco entre autor y víctima dan lugar a la impunidad en algunos delitos patrimoniales (básicamente, si no se hace uso de violencia o intimidación): art. 268. La razón de ser de dicha previsión es evitar el efecto de la pena en los parientes, por entender que la menor gravedad del delito y la posibilidad de resocialización del autor, hacen innecesaria la pena. Se trata de una excusa absolutoria (circunstancia del autor del delito preexistente a este y que hace innecesaria la sanción, por razones de política criminal: evitar una «pena indirecta» para los parientes víctimas, que se verían castigados en el pariente autor). Se trata de un factor subjetivo-material (es decir, que afecta al sujeto en quien concurre, con independencia de que realice o no una conducta: basta ser pariente que reúna esas condiciones). Siendo así, ¿es aplicable esta excusa absolutoria cuando los hermanos no viven juntos? La cuestión fue debatida. Por un lado, la letra de la ley afirma claramente para los parientes afines o cuñados (pero no para los hermanos): «si vivieren juntos» (arg. gramatical, a contrario). Además, el texto vigente hasta 1995 afirmaba que la exención operaba para «los hermanos y cuñados, si vivieren juntos», art. 564.3.º (arg. histórico, a contrario). La circunstancia mixta de parentesco, que también se refiere a los hermanos, nada añade sobre el requisito de que convivan o no (arg. sistemático, a contrario). Pero, por otro lado, ¿no habrá por el contrario una razón de peso, basada en el sentido y finalidad de esta excusa absolutoria que haga aconsejable la exención también a los hermanos que no viven juntos? (posible arg. teleológico). No cabe olvidar la razón de ser de tal excusa absolutoria: evitar que la pena cause males mayores, además del delito cometido, en el seno de la familia. Pues bien, el mero dato del parentesco entre autor y víctima no es bastante para poder satisfacer esa finalidad, pues cabe pensar que los hermanos pueden hallarse enfrentados y enemistados entre sí, de manera que la exención no tendría entonces sentido. Es más, sería paradógico que a la enemistad entre ellos se sumara la impunidad del autor de un hurto contra su hermano. La exención tendría en cambio sentido cuando viven armónicamente y la pena reportara en las relaciones familiares un mal mayor (una «pena indirecta» para los parientes víctimas). Es más, la razón que ha llevado al legislador de 1995 a suprimir la mención a la convivencia entre autor y víctima es la de evitar una «patente de corso» para delitos patrimoniales entre parientes, y reducir la excusa absolutoria a aquellos casos en que efectivamente la pena sea innecesaria (por lo que los arg. gramatical, sistemático e histórico adquieren nuevo sentido a la luz de este dato teleológico). Poco se dice sobre ello en el caso. Si vivieran juntos –aunque no se dice en los hechos, cabe pensar que no es así (el autor entra desde el exterior a las 4 horas)–, sería posible que Bernardo, quedara amparado por la excusa absolutoria por el hurto efectivamente cometido contra su hermano, José. Lo cual no haría desaparecer la responsabilidad civil (con restitución, reparación o indemnización de daños y perjuicios, en su caso) de Bernardo, a favor del propietario víctima, por el delito efectivamente cometido.

Case law, on the other hand, understands that the sibling relationship between perpetrator and victim, whether or not they live together, gives rise to impunity for the brother perpetrator: cf. in STS 20 December 1999.

III. In conclusion, if test is established that the perpetrator and victim lived together, it is possible to defend Bernardo's impunity on the grounds of the excuse of acquittal provided for in article 268. If they did not live together, this excuse of acquittal would be meaningless, as seems to be inferred from the facts. This exemption of criminal liability does not affect civil liability, which would be binding on the perpetrator.

Cf. also C.111 and C.143.

As we have seen, the relationship of kinship between perpetrator and victim is not an element that affects in this case the unlawfulness of the conduct or the culpability of the agent. It is true that in some cases, kinship can be an element of unlawfulness, such as when a child is injured or killed, in which case it would be a more serious act in terms of its unlawful content. Kinship in C.141 is a factor that prevents the imposition of a penalty, as it is preferred that Criminal Law does not intervene in the family sphere, as the effects could be worse. Note that the conduct is still unlawful and the offender is still guilty, and it is considerations of expediency that lead to not imposing a penalty. In this case, out of consideration for the family institution. In other cases, the considerations respond to mere utility in terms of the effects it produces in terms of avoiding new offences: this is the case in C.142.