C.81 - Five Shots Case

I. From the events described, it is worth noting how, at first, Jesus frightens Luis with a knife, after having had an argument. Shortly afterwards, Jesús frightens him with a pistol, with which he also fires a failed shot at Luis. Luis took possession of the gun, with which he fired two shots at Jesús, causing him to fall to the ground. Once on the ground, he continued to intimidate Luis, this time with a knife. It was then that Luis fired three more shots at Jesús. All five shots hit Jesús, who was seriously wounded in different parts of his body.

II. We are asked to analyse the criminal liability of both Jesús and Luis. Assuming that the proven facts are those, and are not susceptible to modification, we can point out the following.

II.1 . At the beginning of the case, after an argument, Jesus frightens Luis by showing him a knife. Both arguing and uttering verbal and gestural expressions are human processes that are susceptible to alternatives, because there is self-control: one never argues by the effect of an uncontrollable force, but by communicating words and gestures. This makes it impossible to deny the existence of human behaviour, since the human, and not merely human, component of these processes is evident, i.e. they are susceptible to self-control. The same could be said of the second moment of the case, in which Jesus again frightens Luis. In both moments of the case, both carry out human behaviour. From here, it is useful to distinguish the analysis of each moment and agent.
II.2. In the first moment, the conduct of Jesús displays a risk typically relevant to the crime of threats, in that he wields a knife against Luis, and utters intimidating phrases. These acts display a sufficiently relevant risk ex ante against the victim's freedom of decision, and in effect restrict the victim's freedom of decision ex post. From the context, the previous incident, the use of the weapon..., it can be said that they are credible, serious, effective in conditioning the freedom of the person who perceives them. The goal aspect of subject of threats (art. 169) is therefore fulfilled. This offence is also committed intentionally, as nothing is stated to cast doubt on the knowledge of the risk: every person knows the meaning of wielding a weapon in front of another adult person to whom an evil is announced. The evil announced, in view of the weapon, the background, the context..., is one of injury or death; and, in spite of everything, Jesus announces it. The conduct of Jesus in the initial moment objectively and subjectively realises the subject of threats (art. 169).

Vim vi repellere licet, we read in the Digest (D. 43.16.1.27; Cassius-Ulpianus): It is lawful to repel force with force, and since then it has been recognised in the various legal systems School to defend oneself against force even by using force (United Nations Charter, 1945, art. 51).

En este primer momento del caso, también Luis actúa, como hemos dicho. Veamos si dicha conducta es típica. Los hechos nos dicen cómo Luis «tuvo que propinarle [a Jesús] una patada y azuzar el perro que llevaba contra él». Dicha conducta constituye el riesgo propio de un delito leve de maltrato de obra (art. 147.3), por ser ex ante idónea para afectar de modo leve a la integridad, y producir ex post en efecto dicha afectación. La conducta realiza el riesgo objetivo de tal infracción, y cabe deducir que subjetivamente también. Sin embargo, a la vista de que ha sido objeto de una amenaza por parte de su oponente, hay que preguntarse si entra en juego una posible situación de justificación. En concreto ¿quedan justificados por legítima defensa la patada y el azuzar el perro contra Jesús? Para ello sería preciso que existiera –primero– una agresión ilegítima, lo cual se da, puesto que, como ha quedado dicho, la conducta inicial de Jesús realiza objetiva y subjetivamente el tipo de amenazas. Además –segundo– se precisa que la reacción sea necesaria en términos racionales, esto es, que sea necesario defenderse, en abstracto, y que además lo sea en concreto: ante una amenaza que parece seria, con un cuchillo, considero necesario en abstracto defenderse, pues nadie tiene por qué tolerar una intromisión antijurídica de tal entidad; defenderse con una intromisión leve, como es la patada y el azuzar el perro contra él, no supone ningún exceso, sino algo ajustado a la entidad de la agresión. Nada se dice –tercero– de una provocación previa a Jesús por parte de Luis. Por tanto, la conducta de Luis en este primer momento quedaría justificada por legítima defensa.
En el segundo momento, llegamos, en cambio, a otra conclusión. Ahora Jesús pasa a atemorizar con una pistola, con la que incluso llega a disparar contra Luis, sin alcanzarle (las posible amenazas quedarían absorbidas o consumidas en el desvalor de este hecho). Dicha conducta puede entenderse típica, objetiva y subjetivamente, a efectos del delito de homicidio en tentativa, pero para ello necesitaríamos más datos (sobre la dirección del disparo…); en su defecto, podría constituir, al menos, delito de lesiones (art. 148.1.º) en tentativa, pues lo que sí se dice es que disparó contra Luis («efectuó un disparo contra éste»).
II.3. Dicha conducta no queda justificada, pues constituye una reacción contra la patada y el verse amedrentado por el perro, y ya hemos dejado dicho que esto último estaba justificado por legítima defensa. Y si estaba justificado, no cabe reaccionar a su vez en legítima defensa, pues no constituye una agresión ilegítima. Por tanto, el disparo de Jesús no está justificado. Frente a él sí cabe, en cambio, defenderse legítimamente. Luis se defiende: forcejean y se apodera del arma. Esto (forcejear y apoderarse de la pistola) quedaría justificado, por cuanto es necesario en abstracto y en concreto. A partir de entonces, Luis efectúa diversos disparos contra Jesús con el arma de este. Estos cinco disparos no quedarían ya justificados. La razón es clara: falta ya la necesidad en abstracto de defenderse (no hay necesidad de defenderse) frente a quien, desarmado de la pistola, está en el suelo. Obsérvese cómo Luis dispara dos veces y, estando su oponente ya en el suelo, sigue disparando. Hubiera bastado para defenderse con salir corriendo con el arma, o amenazarle con disparar, o disparar incluso al aire, pero no el disparar una y otra vez contra Jesús. Y ello, aunque este siguiera, desde el suelo, amenazándole con el cuchillo. Disparar cinco veces contra una persona despliega un riesgo objetivo de homicidio, abarcado, sin duda, por el dolo; puesto que no se realizó dicho riesgo en el resultado, se tratará de un homicidio en tentativa. La conducta de Luis en el segundo momento del caso no queda, por tanto, justificada, sino que es típicamente antijurídica: homicidio en tentativa.
II.4. Por lo que se refiere a la culpabilidad, sabemos que Luis «era adicto a las substancias estupefacientes… y padece un trastorno límite y antisocial de la personalidad, que aminora ligeramente sus facultades volitivas». El consumir drogas no es por sí solo un motivo para disminuir o hacer desaparecer la culpabilidad (en concreto, la imputabilidad), como tampoco lo es padecer determinada perturbación psíquica, sino que es preciso constatar en ambos casos que el consumo, o la adicción, o la alteración, produce un efecto de pérdida de la capacidad de acceder a las normas o, conociéndolas, de dirigirse conforme a ellas. La ligera aminoración de las facultades volitivas puede abonar la conclusión de que era parcialmente inimputable, pero no contamos con datos suficientes sobre el efecto de tal alteración en el proceso de motivación del agente mediante normas. No me parece, en cualquier caso, que la adicción o el trastorno sean de tal entidad que haga desaparecer dichas facultades, ni siquiera que permitan apreciar la eximente como incompleta. Su culpabilidad puede verse afectada, pero solo para dar lugar a una atenuación ordinaria (art. 21.2.ª o 3.ª).
En cuanto a Jesús, nada se nos dice de su posible falta de culpabilidad, por lo que habrá que afirmar que es culpable.
II.5. Aparte de la tentativa, nada se dice de otros posibles factores que afecten a la punibilidad de ninguno de los dos sujetos.

III. Conclusion: Jesús is manager of the crime of intentional threats (art. 169) and of the crime of attempted injury Degree (arts. 148.1.º and 16.1), in real competition, without the concurrence of circumstances modifying liability. Luis is manager of the crime of attempted murder Degree (arts. 138 and 16.1), with mitigation of sentence (art. 21.2 or 3).

Cf. C.103 and also C.71.

However, the status of self-defence only occurs if the status balancing of the status quo to a fraudulent aggression that is unlawful under criminal law. This does not cover all the cases that may occur, as it is also possible to speak of non-intentional aggressions, non-criminal aggressions, minor intrusions..., in which it seems excessive to grant broad Schools to act in favour of the injured party. This is what happens, on the other hand, in situations of state of necessity. Now the starting point status , the status quo The initial equilibrium is altered, destabilised, by a factor which is either unlawful but not as serious as in self-defence, or merely natural. It is necessary to distinguish in the state of necessity between cases in which the destabilisation comes from a human agent, even if this does not create a criminal risk, and cases in which the threatening danger comes from mere nature. In the first case, group , we speak of a state of necessity. defensivebecause of its proximity to self-defence. And this is because here too there is an aggression coming from a third party, although it is not the aggression that gives rise to legitimate self-defence: the subject who acts under the protection of the possible cause of justification does so in a certain way in self-defence. In a second group of cases, we speak of a state of aggressive necessity, to emphasise that the person acting under the protection of this cause of justification is attacking the interests of others, and is therefore allowed very little to safeguard the interest in danger; but he is allowed to do something. For this reason, the differentiation in the starting status between the two cases of state of necessity also leads to differences in the margin of the Schools margin of action: in the defensive state of necessity there is more power to act than in the aggressive one, given that in the former there is a certain destabilisation of the status quo anteIn the second case this is not the case, and very little is allowed. In other words: those who act in status out of aggressive necessity are allowed to act in a very limited way, because their conduct easily destabilises the status quo.

In C.82, it is easy to see that the evil that looms over a person in danger comes neither from an unlawful criminal aggression of an intentional nature (which does not give rise to self-defence), nor from a non-criminal or non-intentional aggression (which does not give rise to a state of defensive necessity), but arises from an illness, it has a natural origin. Therefore, since nature does not carry out unlawful conduct, it does not destabilise status. If anything, the one who acts to avoid the status of necessity is the one who risks destabilising the balance of interests. Therefore, he is allowed to act only to a very limited extent: specifically, as long as his conduct is limited to causing a harm that is significantly minor. Let us look at it.