C.21 - Rich Uncle Case

I. From the facts described, it is worth noting the following: by means of conduct such as inviting, proposing, convincing..., his uncle to travel by plane, with the far-fetched purposein order to inherit some day soon, A finally achieves his purpose. His uncle dies in a plane crash, and A inherits from him.
II. We are asked to analyse the criminal liability of A. Assuming the facts as described, the following can be understood:

II.1. There is no indication in the account of proven facts to doubt the existence of human conduct in A. Indeed, proposing, inviting, making... his uncle travel by plane is either human conduct or an impossibility. Only by means of human conduct is it possible to think of these processes (proposing, inviting...). A therefore realises a plurality of human behaviours. Let us now see whether they are typical, i.e. whether they satisfy the requirementsrequirements of typicality.
II.2. In the aspect goalA, by making his uncle travel by plane again and again, interposes a causal factor in the death of the latter, since flying in this way is a factor which, mentally suppressed, makes the death in a plane crash disappear. Let us now consider whether, in addition to being causal, it constitutes a typically relevant risk. It is doubtful that a conduct such as travelling in means of transport such as an aeroplane constitutes a typical risk: at least, it cannot be a typical risk of homicide (art. 138), because in that case, flights should be prohibited and the businessmen who promote them could be prosecuted, at least for conspiracy to commit homicide. What is said for the risk of homicide can also be said for the risk of injury, ill-treatment... There is nothing typical in the conduct of making someone board a recognised commercial flight that fulfils the legal technical conditions for this. It is, at final, a risk that is not typically relevant (in qualitative terms), a risk that is socially appropriate. It would be different if the nephew puts his uncle on a flight which he knows will explode because a terrorist has planted a bomb, or which he knows will crash because it does not have a landing system. But nothing is said about this in the facts; if this were the case, the risk would not be socially appropriate, but typically relevant.
This also excludes possible liability for attempt, since attempt requires at least the commencement of dangerous acts within the meaning of subject. And if we have already stated that there is no criminalisation, due to the lack of qualitatively relevant risk, due to the social appropriateness of the conduct, no attempt at any crime is possible. Consequently, A's conduct is not criminal.
On the subjective aspect, the presence of A's intense intention to inherit does not transform a non-typically relevant risk into a typical one. It remains atypical, socially appropriate. A's bad intentions do not make his conduct, although morally reprehensible, typical at Criminal Law.
Due to the above, it is not necessary to analyse the remaining elements of the theory of the offence.

III. Conclusion: A is not managerof any typical conduct at Criminal Law, and therefore impunity must be defended.

Air travel is in any case a risk, as are a multitude of everyday factors which represent dangers, even very high ones. But these risks are tolerated when weighed against what would happen in a society without transport, medicines, buildings, industry, etc. These are permitted activities which do not constitute typically relevant risks. With other factors, on the other hand, we are no longer dealing with qualitatively permitted risks, but with risks that are insignificant in quantitative terms. For example, smoking (C.26): of course it is a risk that can lead to the death of people, but the chance that smoking a cigarette will kill someone is too remote. The risks are therefore not quantitatively relevant.
Once it has been established that the conduct involves a typically relevant risk, it is also necessary to verify that this risk is the one that is realised at result. In other words, that it is not other different risks that have been interposed and end up being realised in the result. This is not necessary in types of mere activity (e.g. breaking and entering, for example), in which there is no temporal difference between action and result; but there is in the so-called crimes of result, because in these averagethere is a spatio-temporal lapse between action and result(e.g. murder, for example). The risks that can follow the perpetrator's conduct can come either from the perpetrator himself(C.22), from a third party(C.22) or from the victim himself(C.23).