C.17a - Case of the mallet

I. The facts describe how Cándido suddenly and repeatedly assaulted his wife in various ways: i) he grabbed her by the hair; ii) he hit her on the head with his hands; iii) he also hit her on the head with a mallet (bruise); finally, iv) he fell head first against a car door (another bruise). It is added that Cándido acted "having his Schoolsof knowledgeand will completely and utterly disturbed as a result of an epileptic seizure, an illness that was diagnosed after these events". If the facts are as described, the following can be affirmed with regard to Cándido's possible criminal responsibility.

II. First of all, the question arises as to whether Candide is engaged in human conduct. To be able to affirm this, it is necessary that he has self-control over the process in which he is immersed. Since we are told that Candide acted "when his Schoolsof knowledgeand his will were completely and utterly disturbed as a result of an epileptic seizure, an illness which he was diagnosed with after the event", we have serious doubts about the existence of self-control. Certainly, Candide exercises a great deal of choice over the contextual circumstances in which he finds himself: he grabs him by the hair, makes him get out of the caravan they were in, chooses a metal mallet, hits him precisely on the head... All this is incompatible with the existence of an act of the man. On the contrary, they are evidence of self-control, a minimum of options, which the agent chose. However, the information provided on the cognitive and volitional Schools("completely and utterly disturbed"), as well as on the seizure and the epileptic disease, make us doubt that Candide is engaged in human behaviour. It could be a case of unconsciousness ("Schools... completely and utterly disturbed"), or of irresistible force or even reflex movements ("epileptic seizure"). However, I do not think that we are in any of these cases, but that self-control is maintained, however minimal it may be. However, the presence of this disturbance of health will be relevant for other purposes, in terms of guilt.
As far as unconsciousness is concerned, I understand that there is no such status, as the processes that the agent deploys are sampleof volition or self-control, however minimal they may be; furthermore, his psychic Schoolswere disturbed, even completely and utterly, but this does not mean that he was deprived of them, as in effect he maintains a minimum - and more than a minimum - of discernment about the most efficient objects he can use (metal mallet), the direction of the blows (to the head), the direction of his steps (getting out of the caravan), etc. Therefore, consciousness does not disappear.
As to whether Candide is the prey of a reflex movement, I understand that this is not the case either, since the movements of his arms, hands and feet are not the product of a merely neuronal impulse, but show the interposition of consciousness: he can choose means or instruments, he repeats and strikes correctly, all of which shows that there is a minimum of self-control over the processes.
Nor does it seem to me that he is the object of an irresistible force, since nothing is said of an external physical factor sufficiently relevant to cancel out his capacity to resist; on the contrary, it is clear that it is he who deploys a series of movements that have their origin in him.
Thus, Candide is engaged in human behaviour. However, the question remains as to the effects of the epileptic disease mentioned above. Epilepsy has various facets and symptoms: the seizure phase that it can produce is not the same as the so-called epileptic "aura", which is the subjective sensation of the person who is about to have a seizure. As I understand it, when epilepsy manifests itself in seizure episodes, self-control and thus human behaviour would disappear, because a kind of reflex movements (seizures) would be operating which the subject cannot control at that moment; in other words, he would be a patient rather than an agent. As the facts are written, it seems that Candide retains a minimum of control over the processes in which he is immersed.

Secondly, on the criminal nature of the conduct. At the level of goal, several offences can be referred to: a minor offence of vexation and an offence of assault and battery. Clearly, the blows are causal for what happens afterwards, as if they are mentally suppressed, these effects disappear. Furthermore, pushing someone, hitting them and making them leave violently is a clear sampleof annoying and disrespecting them, which has not been consented to by the victim: this offence is a mere activity, so it is not necessary to analyse the third step, that of whether the risk is realised in the result, and so I would conclude my study here: it would be objectively typical for the purposes of the offence of minor vexation, which can be understood to be integrated (concurrence of rules: by consumption) in the offence of injury which I will now go on to analyse. In fact, as far as the injuries are concerned, the causal factors used by Cándido display a high probability of damaging health: because they are blows, because they are in relevant areas, because some of them were struck with a mallet, so that they constitute a typically relevant risk; this risk is realised in the result, as there is nothing additional in the essayof proven facts to which we can attribute it, and because the visible wound (the bruises) are produced precisely in the place where it is seen to have been struck. Therefore, Cándido's conduct fulfils the elements of the subjectgoal of the crime of injury (art. 147-148): it is objectively typical.
On the subjective level, let's see if there is datawhich allows us to affirm that Cándido knows the risk involved: he knows where the blows are aimed, he knows where to push, he chooses the injurious means of a metal mallet... All of this shows that he acted with knowledge, knowing that he was creating high risks and risks of injury. If he continues with his actions, we can only affirm that he acted with malice aforethought. His conduct therefore also fulfils the subjective subjectof the aforementioned offence of causing injury.

Thirdly, there is nothing in the account of proven facts to cast doubt on the unlawfulness of her conduct (nothing is said about previous assaults by her on him, etc.). Therefore, his conduct is typically unlawful.

Fourthly, it is necessary to consider the argument concerning Cándido's culpability for this typically unlawful conduct. In effect, the laryngeal illness he suffered from (even if not yet diagnosed) may affect his normal motivation by the law in the specific case. It seems that this pathological statushas had some influence, because although he controls the processes (there is self-control, as we said), he does not allow himself to be motivated by the duty to respect others: we could say that there is no absolute self-control in terms of the decision to respect the rules. We are also told that "his Schoolsof knowledgeand will are completely and utterly disturbed", so it seems to be a question of a relevant psychic alteration for the purposes of imputability, which is a condition for guilt. Depending on the intensity of this alteration, imputability could be completely excluded (art. 20.1.ª: mental derangement and transitory mental disorder); if not, at least it could be reduced (via incomplete exoneration: art. 21.1.ª, by reference letterto art. 20.1.ª). In the absence of more data, I am inclined to think that the agent is not guilty due to lack of the motivational normality that would allow him to choose to respect the Law (in goodness, justice, respect for people...), so that he would not be criminally liable. In final, Cándido would not be guilty of the crime of injury.

III. That he/she is not guilty or means that he/she is not managercivilly liable for the damages caused. In addition, it would be possible to impose a safety measure of a therapeutic nature aimed at curing or alleviating his illness (art. 101).