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C.24 - intro

C.24 - Carpetana Case

"On 5.9.1998, at around 0.30 a.m., on the Vía Carpetana in Madrid, an argument took place between Imanol, with National Identity Card issue 000, who was 29 years old, born on 7.12.68 and Blanca. In the course of the argument, the former pushed the latter, causing her to fall to the ground. Claudio helped his girlfriend Blanca to get up, at which point Imanol hit Claudio against a parked car and, taking out a sharp object from his clothes, stabbed him with it with great energy from below and from left to right in the lower left dorsal region, at the level of dorsal 11. Imanol stabbed him in the back. Claudio suffered a penetrating wound to the thorax, breaking his 10th rib, which caused hypovolemic shock. He died at 8 p.m. the same day at the Gómez Ulla Hospital. The injuries caused by the stab wound were not fatal, but led to Claudio's death, due to the time elapsed from the moment of the aggression until the thoracic CAT scan".

(STS 28 January 2005; pte. Martínez Arrieta; RJ 2005, 911).

C.24_NB-AZUL

Is it correct to say that the injuries were not life-threatening but led to death, and what is this expression intended to mean?

C.24_soluc

Of the proven facts it is worth highlighting: Imanol, during an argument, pushes Blanca so that she falls to the ground. Claudio financial aid helps Blanca to get up, at which point Imanol hits Claudio against a parked car and stabs him in the back with a knife in the thoracic region, resulting in hypovolemic shock. The time that elapsed between the attack and the time it took for a chest CT scan to be carried out at the hospital to which he was taken prevented his death. We are not considering Imanol's possible responsibility for pushing Blanca. We focus on the stabbing.

I. There is no doubt about the existence of human behaviour on the part of Imanol. test of this is the argument he has with Blanca (in order to have an argument it is necessary to be conscious, to speak, to admonish an adversary..., all of which require consciousness). Nor can it be doubted that the stabbing was the product of a reflex movement or the expression of an irresistible force. Indeed, we read in the statement of proven facts how it was inflicted from the bottom up, precisely after he had pushed him against the car and without anything happening between the two events. These data support the presence of self-control on the part of Imanol, both for the argument and for the stabbing. For all these reasons, we conclude that the process in which Imanol is immersed constitutes human behaviour.

II. With regard to the objective nature of this conduct (stabbing), let us analyse whether the subject goal of a crime is fulfilled. Firstly, given that if the stabbing is mentally suppressed, the subsequent death disappears, we affirm that the stabbing is the cause of the subsequent death. Secondly, we consider that stabbing constitutes a relevant risk capable of killing and injuring; moreover, a risk that anyone can understand as a means of committing homicide, murder and injury, at least. This can be deduced from data: that it was a knife, that the stab was delivered from behind, that it was in the thoracic region, where vital organs are located, and with great energy (it fractured a rib). All this evidence supports the grade of this causal factor as a typically relevant risk for the purposes of homicide (or murder) and injury. Thirdly, we ask ourselves whether it is these two risks that are realised in the result. Some doubts arise at this point. In the period of time following the stabbing, he did not receive a hospital treatment test that could have prevented his death. When the facts tell us that "the wound was not fatal", they mean that it did not immediately cause irreparable damage to a vital organ; but this does not mean that a wound of such magnitude and characteristics should be disassociated from the creation of a risk of homicide, which goes as far as causing hypovolemic shock. However, the risk carried out by Imanol is not reflected in the result, as a novel factor appears on the scene, such as the delay in carrying out a CAT scan by the health services. It seems that the death could have been avoided had it not been for the time that had elapsed between the aggression and the performance of the thoracic CT scan. Therefore, the risk-risk relationshipresult is affected by an (omissive) intervention by a third party of some relevance (in the health establishments of a civilised country, it is to be expected that the appropriate tests of an emergency department will be carried out). If this is accepted, then we cannot impute to Imanol the result of Claudio's death. But this does not prevent his conduct from constituting attempted murder (arts. 16 and 138), as he at least created a risk to life. Given the danger created and the advanced Degree of execution, the attempt can be said to be completed. Attempted homicide and not completed injuries, since there is sufficient data (weapon used, direction and place of the blow, manner of the stabbing) to affirm that the risk created is greater than the risk of injury. Thus, his conduct fulfils the subject goal of the crime of attempted murder Degree . For the rest, we do not have data to judge the possible criminal liability of the persons who delayed carrying out the test of the CAT scan.

III. From the facts we can continue to infer data that show us how the agent represents the risk he is taking: it is indisputable that anyone of Imanol's age knows that a sharp object, which is his, which as a knife is deployed by the person who has it in his hands..., can injure a person if it is thrust with great energy into the body. Anyone, moreover, knows through the daily learning of life that at the level of the stab wound there are vital organs which, if damaged, will cause serious injury or even death. The fact that Imanol acted in the heat of the argument does not make malice disappear, although it could affect culpability to a certain extent. However, what is essential for malice is present: the knowledge of the risk of the conduct itself. He acts with malice, therefore. In other words, the conduct also fulfils the subjective subject of the crime of homicide (or murder, as the case may be) in Degree of attempt. Also in terms of objective imputation, it is perceived that the subject is that of attempted murder and not mere injury (the agent represents all those elements that allow us to affirm the seriousness of the risk involved).

IV. Nothing is said in the facts to call into question the unlawfulness of Imanol's conduct or his guilt. Little is said in the facts to argue that he acted in an obsessive manner, so that it is not possible to mitigate the sentence on this ground. Nor can there be any doubt as to the punishability of his conduct. Given that attempted murder is subject priority over injury, which would be subsidiary to the former, the latter are displaced (concurrence of norms): the penalty for attempted murder is sufficient to cover all the disvalue of the agent's conduct.

For all these reasons, we can conclude by saying that Imanol is manager of the crime of murder (art. 138) in Degree of completed attempt (arts. 16 and 62), for which his sentence will be reduced by Degree.