The geopolitics of residual dependence: Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy and strategic realignment in the post-Soviet era

The foreign policies of Central Asian republics are generally characterized as ‘multivector’—a term first used by Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev in May 1992 to describe the newly independent nation’s approach to international relations.[1] In addition to its engagement with Russia and China, Kazakhstan has pursued close relations with the EU, the US, and India. Despite its outward emphasis on cooperation, interdependence, and the role of international norms and institutions, it is often analyzed through a neoclassical realist framework as a form of hedging. What makes ‘multivectorism’ distinctive as a post-Soviet variant is its operation within a context of structural interdependence with a former metropolitan center, and its institutionalization as explicit foreign policy doctrine, since hedging is typically seen as an implicit foreign policy strategy.

Multivectorism could be classified as a distinct form of hedging specific to states that share a post-Soviet legacy and regional structural constraints. As newly independent states, they had to navigate a completely new regional geopolitical context: build relations with other newly independent post-Soviet republics and approximate the most advantageous positions between the major centers of power while accounting for the constraints most of them share. To a degree, multivector foreign policy represents what might be called residual-dependence hedging or post-imperial hedging—the hedging strategy of states that were constituent parts of a dissolved empire rather than colonized territories, while sharing many similarities as well as significant differences with the former. The lack of a strict extractive-periphery model combined with the inheritance of Soviet-era elites as well as strongly institutionalized bureaucracies post-independence are some of the differences. Whereas Southeast Asian hedgers typically balance between competing external powers (the United States and China), post-Soviet states must simultaneously manage dependence on a former hegemon while cultivating alternative partnerships, or ‘backward-facing hedging’ against residual influence as opposed to rapture/revolutionary movements typically observed in post-colonial states. The deep structural ties linking post-Soviet states to Russia, such as energy grids, pipelines, supply chains, military infrastructure, and bureaucratic norms, represent sunk costs that constrain foreign policy options. As in the case of Ukraine's "failed hedge,"[2] the costs of entanglement with a former hegemon raise barriers to diversification that purely strategic calculations cannot fully explain. Another prominent example of this is Kazakhstan—Russia’s neighbor to the south with which it shares its longest land border. However, the context and constraints Kazakhstan faces are substantially different.

Following Nazarbayev’s 1992 articulation, the term ‘multivector’ was adopted by Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov (1996–1998) to describe Russia’s post-Cold War posture straddling East and West.[3]Subsequently, Central Asian states developed multivectorism into a more comprehensive doctrine grounded in two principles: diversification of partners and geographical balance in their distribution.It has been reconceptualized as ‘co-alignment’—the simultaneous alignment with different great powers enabled by a mechanism termed ‘issue splitting.’ This involves segmenting relevant policy areas into constituent parts, allowing each segment to be ‘auctioned’ separately so that no single great power captures an entire policy domain. There are four variants of multivector diplomacy based on the interaction of system-level and unit-level variables: 1 mitigating exclusive dependence to preserve autonomy and sovereignty; 2 marshaling alternative sources of legitimation for regime survival; 3 diversifying natural resource export routes; and 4 promoting partner development through infrastructure integration.

I propose that the three conditions are present when post-Soviet states adopt multivectorism as an external policy strategy: first condition is simultaneous dependence on and proximity to multiple great powers; second, institutional and structural legacies from Soviet integration that limit autonomy; and third, domestic elites who rely on external balancing to maintain regime stability. The first condition reflects basic geopolitical logic. Kazakhstan, for instance, shares a 7,644-kilometer border with Russia and a 1,783-kilometer border with China—the two non-Western great powers. This geographic position would create what regional security complex (RSC) theory would predict: heightened security interdependence with proximate major powers.[6]Borrowing from the gravity model’s logic of time-distance decay, such proximity generates greater economic exchange and, consequently, deeper dependence on adjacent great powers. The second condition distinguishes ‘post-imperial’ from post-colonial states. Where former colonies inherited extractive institutions designed to channel resources to distant metropoles, Soviet successor states inherited integrative institutions designed to bind them into a unified economy centered on Moscow. The resulting infrastructure created path dependencies that persist three decades after independence. These represent the ‘institutional lock-in’ that shapes the feasible set of foreign policy options. The third condition concerns domestic politics. Post-Soviet authoritarian regimes typically emerged from Soviet-era power structures, with elites seeking external validation to supplement thin domestic legitimacy. The neopatrimonial character of Central Asian regimes elevates regime survival to a national interest, heightening sensitivity to normative pressures on human rights and governance. Multivectorism allows these regimes to offset criticism from Western partners with validation from Eurasian organizations while extracting material benefits from multiple directions.[7] It also helps to have a rentier economy that allows for lower taxes, which reduces public pressure for political representation or accountability.[8]

Building on the concept of issue splitting, post-Soviet multivectorism operates through ‘domain differentiation’—the deliberate distribution of alignments across security, economic, and diplomatic domains to prevent any single power from achieving comprehensive influence. This produces a distinctive pattern of ‘multi-layered hedging’ in which different great powers predominate in different functional areas. For Kazakhstan, this has manifested as: moderate Russia-leaning security alignment through CSTO membership, arms procurement, and intelligence cooperation, albeit with gradual diversification, as well as a strong economic orientation toward China and the West; and diplomatic/institutional engagement distributed across SCO, EAEU, the Turkic Council, and various Western frameworks. This domain differentiation serves multiple functions: it prevents any single partner from leveraging dominance in one area to extract concessions in others; it also creates competitive dynamics among partners, potentially raising the price each must pay for cooperation; as well as providing fallback options should relations with any single partner deteriorate or if costs of maintaining relations with any of them rise, with the exception of the former hegemon.

A complete theory of post-Soviet hedging must incorporate temporal dynamics. We may distinguish between ‘soft’ or declaratory multivectorism, such as maintaining multiple partnerships while remaining structurally substantially dependent on the former hegemon, and ‘hard’ or substantive multivectorism—actively reallocating alignments away from the former hegemon in response to changed threat perceptions. This continuum is of theoretical significance due to the unique historical context of post-Soviet hedgers described above. Unlike most post-Soviet republics, which maintained distinct national identities and limited Russification, Kazakhstan experienced substantial population transfer; by 1989, ethnic Kazakhs constituted only 40% of the republic's population, with ethnic Russians at around 38%. The Russian language dominated education, administration, and urban life due to Soviet-era Russification policies aimed at homogenization and suppressing any nationalist sentiment. Economic infrastructure, such as pipelines, railways, and electricity grids, siphoned northward toward Russia.

Despite declaring its intention to pursue a multivector foreign policy in 1992, Kazakhstan's actual behavior in the 1990s reflected the 'dilemmas of dependence' inherent in its post-Soviet transition.[9] In 1990, interstate trade accounted for 20.8% of Kazakhstan's GDP, with up to 90% of its total trade being conducted within the Soviet internal market.This legacy constrained early foreign policy options. By 1995, the country's real GDP had dropped to 61.4% of its 1990 level. For the first few years after independence, around 90% of Kazakhstan's industrial products, such as aluminum, basic electronics, and agricultural equipment, were exported to other former Soviet republics. At the same time, the country imported nearly all of its consumer durables from Russia, as the Soviet division of labor designated Kazakhstan as a raw material "grain basket" rather than a manufacturing hub. This Soviet designation still affects Kazakhstan’s economy; for example, in 2024 and 2025, the energy sector, including crude oil, petroleum, and coal, accounts for 51.7% to 53.5% of total exports. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is the primary export artery for Kazakhstan, routing approximately 1.4 million barrels of crude daily from the Caspian Basin through 1,500 kilometers of Russian territory to the Black Sea terminal at Novorossiysk.[11] With the CPC handling over 80% of Kazakhstan’s national crude shipments to global markets, this represents one of the world’s most concentrated export dependencies for a major producer, creating a single point of failure in non-sovereign territory.

Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, disruptions have become more frequent with infrastructure damage and political shutdowns causing an approximate increase of 40% in production volatility.[12] During the 1990s through early 2000s, multivectorism was largely declaratory: despite official doctrine emphasizing balanced partnerships, structural dependence on Russia continued to dominate all strategic and security domains. This 'soft' phase was hedging as rhetorical positioning more than actual diversification.

While the United States' presence was B large-scale energy sector investments, these early entries were tolerated not through formal diplomatic alignment, but through a model of ‘collaborative extraction’ that emerged during the systemic collapse of the 1990s.[13] Rather than a structured state policy, the entry of Western capital was facilitated by a spontaneous convergence of interests between Western oil majors, international financial intermediaries, and post-Soviet nomenclature. These actors utilized opaque Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) to monetize aging assets, ensuring that while the capital was Western, the ‘rents’ were shared among the regional elite.[14] Moscow’s acquiescence was effectively bought through this model, as Russian firms were integrated into consortiums and the oil remained tethered to Russian-controlled transit infrastructure. Consequently, the Western vector in this era functioned as a financial life-support for the existing nomenclature, reinforcing rather than challenging the structural hegemony of the Russian state.

The early 2000s marked a transition to substantive foreign policy diversification, catalyzed by surging global commodity prices and a renewed great-power interest in Central Asian energy reserves. The new environment provided the financial autonomy and external demand necessary to challenge the established reliance on Russian-controlled export infrastructure.[15] A pivotal development was the construction of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, completed in stages between 2003 and 2009, which constituted Kazakhstan’s first major hydrocarbon export route bypassing Russian territory.[16] Moscow predictably opposed the project, recognizing its implications for Russia’s role as Kazakhstan’s primary energy transit gatekeeper, but was ultimately unable to prevent its realization. In parallel, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, although not directly involving Kazakhstan, demonstrated the technical and political feasibility of non-Russian export corridors, providing an important precedent and strategic template for diversification.

China’s economic footprint in Kazakhstan expanded rapidly during this period, particularly within the strategically vital energy sector. Chinese state-owned and quasi-state firms acquired substantial stakes across the oil and gas value chain, including approximately 24% of Kazakhstan’s oil production, full ownership of AktobeMunaiGaz and Southern Buzachi, and 50% stakes in MangystauMunaiGaz and the Shymkent refinery.[18] These investments were complemented by major acquisitions in uranium mining, positioning China as a central actor in sectors critical to Kazakhstan’s long-term development. For a landlocked state historically constrained by Russian-oriented infrastructure, Chinese capital and pipeline connectivity offered alternative sources of financing and market access that reduced, though did not eliminate, structural dependence on Moscow.[19] While these developments raised concerns about substituting one source of dependence with another, they nonetheless laid the material foundations for more credible multivectorism by expanding Kazakhstan’s external options and bargaining leverage. Kazakhstan effectively navigates the informal Sino-Russian division of labor by outsourcing its economic diversification to Beijing while maintaining its core security alignment with Moscow through the CSTO.[20] The strategic alignment between Beijing and Moscow allows Kazakhstan to pivot toward China with less immediate geopolitical friction than a pivot toward Western-led corridors might incur.

At the same time, Kazakhstan deepened engagement with Western institutions in non-economic domains. Participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace provided a framework for limited military modernization and interoperability without entailing alliance commitments.[22] Similarly, Kazakhstan’s 2010 chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—though criticized by Western NGOs for the country’s domestic human rights record—conferred the international legitimacy necessary to frame Astana as a ‘responsible stakeholder.’ Together, these developments establish an early pattern of domain differentiation: China emerged as the primary source of infrastructure and economic growth, Western actors supplied diplomatic and institutional validation, and Russia retained a central role as a security guarantor.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea transformed threat perceptions across the post-Soviet space. For Astana, the precedent of a neighboring state’s territorial integrity being violated on ethnic grounds was particularly alarming, given Kazakhstan’s own demographic profile in its northern provinces.[22] Kazakhstan proceeded to intensify domain differentiation. Economically, China surpassed Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner, with trade volumes reaching approximately $41 billion (representing 20% of total trade). The 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in Astana positioned Kazakhstan as the ‘buckle’ in China’s transcontinental connectivity vision. Simultaneously, the state pursued symbolic nation-building projects—such as the transition to the Latin script and the promotion of a pre-Russian historical narrative—to signal a cultural and political distance from the 'Russkiy spanish medical residency program(Russian World) ideology.[23]

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 precipitated Kazakhstan’s most pronounced rebalancing to date. President Tokayev’s public refusal to recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics signaled a significant deviation from traditional post-Soviet solidarity.[24] This diplomatic distancing was matched by material shifts; Kazakhstan appears to have increasingly enforced sanctions-related restrictions, resulting in significant logistical bottlenecks at the Russian border—including a 2025 customs crackdown that left over 5,000 Russian-bound freight trucks stranded at the border to prevent the re-export of dual-use goods.[25] The economic pivot has accelerated dramatically. Trade with Russia declined by 3.7% in 2023 (to approximately $26 billion) while trade with the United States increased by 30% (reaching $4.1 billion). The acceleration of the Chinese vector reached a quantitative milestone: according to Griffith University and Beijing green finance center analysis,[26] Kazakhstan received approximately $23 billion in BRI-related investment and construction contracts in the first half of 2025 alone—nearly 20% of China’s total BRI spending for that period. This shift was further institutionalized during Xi Jinping's September 2024 visit to Astana, which culminated in the launch of position operations via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR).[27] Explicitly positioned as an alternative to Russia-transiting routes, the "Middle Corridor" reflects Kazakhstan’s success in exploiting a window of geopolitical permissiveness to decouple its export infrastructure from the Russian northern route.[28]

The Ukraine War altered Kazakhstan’s strategic environment not only by weakening Moscow’s relative power, but by transforming Russia from a stabilizing partner into a source of systemic risk. Now more than ever, Western sanctions, financial volatility, and reputational exposure increasingly rendered close association with Russia economically and diplomatically costly. For Kazakhstan, whose economy remains institutionally tied to Russia through inherited infrastructure and the Eurasian Economic Union, these shocks produced spillover effects ranging from trade disruption to heightened secondary-sanctions risk. In this context, dependence on the former hegemon ceased to function merely as a constraint and instead became a liability to be actively managed. This shift may help explain Kazakhstan’s post-2022 behavior: rather than abruptly severing ties with Russia, Astana pursued a strategy of accelerated diversification within existing structural limits. Measures such as enforcing sanctions-related trade restrictions, expanding non-Russian transit corridors, and intensifying economic engagement with China, the United States, and the European Union reflect an effort to reduce exposure to Russian-generated risks without provoking direct retaliation.

In theoretical terms, Russia’s war and partial isolation tipped the balance of power and altered the cost–benefit structure of dependence, creating permissive conditions for a transition from soft to hard multivectorism. To add to that, when the former hegemon’s power declines and its external behavior becomes systemically destabilizing, dependence shifts from being a constraint to being a liability. If before the war Kazakhstan seemed to display a dual alignment strategy between Russia and China, its recent behavior more closely resembles hard multivectorism, instituting active reallocation of alignments in response to heightened threat perception. This could be realized due to the newfound permissiveness of the regional geopolitical environment as the important factor decisive in the extent to which a state can actively hedge; Kazakhstan's behavior confirms the theoretical expectation that external shocks (Russia's invasion) create windows for diversification by weakening the former hegemon's capacity to prevent it. Russia's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine, combined with its need for remaining friendly partners, has reduced its leverage over Kazakhstan precisely when Astana has the strongest incentives to distance itself.

The theoretical framework developed here applies most directly to post-Soviet states sharing key characteristics: geographic proximity to multiple great powers, deep institutional legacies of Soviet integration, and rent-appropriating authoritarian structures whose survival depends on both external legitimation and the continuous capture of resource wealth. These can manifest in different ways in each State; following the neoclassical realist framework, the systemic pressures are filtered through domestic or State-specific variables. A critical factor in this filtration is the specific composition of the regional environment—namely, which great powers are in the immediate vicinity and the unique geopolitical dynamics between them. For instance, Armenia, being geographically removed from China and facing immediate security threats from Azerbaijan, has pursued a much more Russia-centric alignment compared to its Central Asian counterparts.

This article has analyzed Kazakhstan’s case as an example of an ongoing and successful multivector hedging strategy. In sum, multivector foreign policy operates through domain differentiation and evolves temporally as threat perceptions and opportunity structures shift. The 2022 Ukraine invasion has accelerated Kazakhstan's trajectory toward hard multivectorism, with dramatic increases in Chinese investment and Western trade combined with distancing from Russia. This analysis suggests the importance of distinguishing among hedging variants based on regional-structural context. The assumption that hedging represents a universal small- or middle-power response to uncertainty obscures significant variation in mechanisms and manifestations. Post-colonial states, post-imperial states, and states without such legacies of structural dependency may all ‘hedge,’ but they do so in qualitatively different ways shaped by their distinctive inheritances and constraints.

For policy analysis, the findings suggest that post-Soviet multivectorism is likely to intensify rather than diminish. Russia’s war in Ukraine has revealed the risks associated with aggressive hedging in non-permissive environments, where maintaining excessive dependence on a destabilized center becomes a strategic liability. As Moscow’s capacity to prevent further diversification wanes, states like Kazakhstan are moving to institutionalize their autonomy before a new regional equilibrium is reached. China's expanding presence provides material foundations for rebalancing, even as it creates new dependency concerns. The United States and European Union offer diplomatic and economic alternatives, though without matching security commitments. In this increasingly fragmented environment, sophisticated, multi-layered hedging represents more than an attractive option; it is perhaps the only viable strategy for preserving the autonomy that post-Soviet states have spent three decades constructing. Ultimately, the transition from soft to hard multivectorism suggests that the "hub-and-spoke" model of the post-Soviet era is being replaced by a more complex, polycentric architecture where regional sovereignty is maintained through the constant, active reallocation of alignments.