C. Raja Mohan argues that American power is in terminal decline

The first Winter Round Table Conference of the Center for Global Affairs and Strategic Studies brought together three speakers—Professor C. Raja Mohan, Professor Salvador Sánchez Tapia, and journalist Pablo Díaz—on November 27, 2025, at the University of Navarra, to discuss the evolving international system and the contested future of the liberal international order. Moderated by Prof. Shahana Thankachan, the discussion centered on three core topics: the distribution of power in the international system, the structural pressures facing liberal democracies, and the capacity of the West—particularly Europe—to defend the liberal order in an era of geopolitical fragmentation.

The discussion both analytical differences and shared concerns. While participants disagreed on whether the world is moving toward multipolarity or returning to bipolarity, they agreed that the liberal order faces profound structural and ideological challenges.

Professor Raja Mohan, who participated in the discussion, opened by challenging what he described as a widespread but misguided assumption: that American power is in terminal decline and that the world has entered a genuinely multipolar era. In his view, the problem is not declining U.S. power but rather how the United States chooses to exercise it. He pointed to two recent developments. First, the U.S. approach toward the World Trade Organization, particularly during the Trump administration, which illustrated Washington’s willingness to undermine one of the central pillars of the postwar economic order. Yet, rather than witnessing a global rally in defense of multilateralism, most actors opted for bilateral negotiations with Washington, demonstrating the enduring leverage of American market power. Second, he cited a recent resolution in the United Nations Security Council regarding Gaza, which passed with overwhelming support despite its controversial framing. For Mohan, this episode further underscored that U.S. influence remains structurally embedded in global governance mechanisms.

From this perspective, the emerging system does not resemble a multipolar world but rather a concentration of power primarily in two actors: the United States and China. The central challenge is therefore to manage this bipolarity and prevent the erosion of core principles such as territorial integrity and rules-based conflict resolution.

Professor Salvador Sánchez Tapia offered a complementary yet more pessimistic structural assessment. He agreed that the system is in transition and predicted that it will likely consolidate into a bipolar order between the United States and China. However, he argued that the change will not merely be adaptive but “radical in depth.” The liberal order’s foundational norms—the rule of law, peaceful transfer of power, human rights, free trade, and respect for borders—are under sustained pressure from both internal weaknesses and external challengers.

Professor Sánchez Tapia then identified three main threats to the liberal system.

First, liberal democracies are facing a decline in credibility. The 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, rising inequality, unsustainable welfare systems, an aging population, and technological disruption have eroded public confidence. He cited polling data suggesting that a significant portion of younger generations view authoritarian systems as potentially more effective at delivering stability and prosperity. In his view, the appeal of illiberal solutions stems less from ideological conviction than from perceived shortcomings in performance.

Second, revisionist powers, particularly China and Russia, are increasingly challenging liberal norms. Russia’s attempt to alter borders by force in Ukraine directly challenges the principle of territorial integrity. Meanwhile, initiatives such as the BRICS’ development institutions suggest that parallel structures are emerging outside Western-dominated frameworks.

Third, the United States itself has shown signs of a partial retreat. Although not fully isolationist, recent administrations have prioritized the Indo-Pacific and reduced their willingness to act as the “international policeman.” This shift has profound implications for European security and global institutional stability.

Journalist Pablo Díaz enriched the discussion a long-term perspective drawn from two decades of reporting in China. Recalling the optimism of the post-Cold War period, often associated with Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, Díaz described China’s transformation from integrationist globalization to assertive strategic rivalry under Xi Jinping. The abolition of presidential term limits, the launch of “Made in China 2025,” the trade war with the United States, and the tightening of domestic controls marked a decisive shift.

The COVID-19 pandemic, he argued, exposed both the vulnerabilities of global supply chains and the risks of heavy reliance on regimes with divergent political values. China’s strict lockdown policies and lack of transparency regarding the virus’s origins illustrated, in his view, the limits of authoritarian crisis management despite initial successes in containing the outbreak.

Another recurring theme was Europe’s strategic uncertainty. Sánchez Tapia outlined two possible paths should U.S. security guarantees weaken: deeper European integration toward genuine strategic autonomy, or fragmentation as individual states seek separate security sponsors (potentially nuclear powers). The latter scenario risks a return to the pre-1945 balance-of-power politics.

Raja Mohan added that deterrence has re-emerged as a central organizing principle in both Europe and Asia. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing doubts about American commitments, European countries are reconsidering their defense spending and even their nuclear arrangements. In Asia, similar debates are taking place in countries allied with the United States. The post-1991 assumption that globalization would render great-power rivalry obsolete has, he argued, been fundamentally shattered.

Díaz emphasized that European societies must recognize the privilege they have long enjoyed under the American security umbrella. Future stability will likely require greater domestic responsibility: politically, economically, and militarily.

In the end, the question-and-answer session shifted the discussion from systemic diagnosis to normative and practical considerations.

One participant questioned how the West can credibly defend the liberal international order given its selective application of human rights and interventionist policies. Raja Mohan responded that the “liberal international order” is better understood as a heuristic framework than as a consistently practiced reality. Major powers have always prioritized core interests over values. What is novel today, he argued, is not selective application but the growing intra-Western ideological divide, particularly transatlantic tensions over liberal norms and the rise of populist movements.

Second, a question from another student addressed why populations facing insecurity and economic hardship might prefer authoritarian alternatives. Sánchez Tapia acknowledged democratic inefficiencies but framed them as safeguards rather than flaws. Deliberation, pluralism, and procedural constraints slow down decision-making but enhance legitimacy and long-term stability. Nevertheless, he conceded that liberal democracies must reform to remain functional and competitive, particularly in the area of technological innovation.

The third question, posed by another student, asked what younger generations can do to restore faith in and the effectiveness of the international order. In response, Díaz emphasized the importance of education and average . He cautioned against fragmented, algorithm-driven information ecosystems and argued that responsible citizenship requires exposure to diverse viewpoints and critical engagement that goes beyond average social media average .

After that, in response to concerns about rearmament, Raja Mohan argued that deterrence has re-entered strategic thinking as a necessary condition for peace. In a world where territorial revisionism has resurfaced, military capability underpins diplomatic credibility.

Finally, questions regarding domestic polarization in Europe led to reflections on dialogue as a core liberal value. Sánchez Tapia reaffirmed that respectful deliberation improves the quality of policy, even if it slows down decision-making. Díaz added that increased polarization partly reflects the democratization and deregulation of information channels, raising difficult questions about balancing free speech and accountability.

The roundtable highlighted three analytical tensions.

First, while there was disagreement about the extent of America’s decline, there was consensus that the structural bipolarity between Washington and Beijing is becoming more entrenched. Multipolar rhetoric may obscure the continued centrality of the U.S.-China rivalry.

Second, the main vulnerabilities of the liberal order are as evident internally as they are externally. Democratic fatigue, demographic shifts, economic stagnation, and technological disruption are eroding confidence from within. The appeal of illiberal governance stems from concerns about performance rather than purely ideological rejection.

Third, the discussion deterrence points to a broader shift in norms. The post-Cold War optimism that economic interdependence could replace hard power has given way to a renewed emphasis on military capability. This does not necessarily imply a rejection of liberal principles, but rather their defense in the face of harsher geopolitical conditions.

In short, the conference did not produce a unified blueprint for preserving the liberal international order. Instead, it offered a sobering assessment: the coming decades will likely be defined by intensified bipolar competition, institutional strain, ideological fragmentation, and renewed militarization. Whether liberal democracies adapt successfully will depend less on rhetorical commitment to universal values and more on their capacity to reform domestically, deter externally, and rebuild credibility through consistent practice. The discussion concluded not with certainty but with a call for intellectual rigor—an acknowledgment that the defense of liberalism in the twenty-first century will require both strategic realism and normative conviction.