Trump and Petro: A rocky relationship that the calendar has prevented from getting worse

Since the beginning of the century, Colombia and the United States had maintained a fruitful strategic relationship, characterized by close trade ties and close cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking and armed groups. This took a turn in January 2025, when Donald Trump returned to the White House. The issues Trump has focused on—drugs, organized crime, and migration—directly affect Colombia, but the friction has been caused primarily by the personalities of both presidents. The international calendar and the electoral processes in both countries, however, have helped mitigate the risks of escalation.

With his “America First” policy, President Trump has placed an emphasis on strengthening U.S. security, which he views as threatened by migratory pressure, the influx of drugs, and the activities of criminal groups—all of which originate in neighboring Latin American countries. Warnings to Mexico—regarding fentanyl trafficking, which has caused so many deaths in the United States, and cartel violence—began as early as the election campaign; Venezuela was the focus of the Trump administration’s first year, and the spotlight has now shifted to Cuba. In this survey of the immediate hemispheric environment, Trump has turned his gaze toward Colombia on several occasions; rather than trying to avoid this attention, President Petro has thrown himself into the controversy.

Conflicts

The clashes began shortly after Trump took office. Bogotá responded to the new U.S. administration’s initial moves to deport illegal immigrants and return them to their countries of origin or to third countries. Petro refused to accept the arrival of a plane carrying deported Colombians, citing the attention of having them arrive in handcuffs. Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Colombian products, prompting various economic sectors to mobilize in an effort to reach a diplomatic settlement.

One of Washington’s primary concerns has always been drug production in Colombia—particularly cocaine—and its export, mainly to the United States. To address this problem and the issue of organized crime that goes hand in hand with it, the two countries collaborated on Plan Colombia (2000–2016), which received significant U.S. funding. The end of that program and changes in certain policies following the 2016 agreement with the FARC led to an increase in coca cultivation and production, especially during the final years of Petro’s term. In 2023, agreement the UN, potential cocaine production in Colombia rose by 53%. The Trump administration cited this data to announce in September 2025 that Colombia would be included, for the first time in 30 years, on the list of nations that do not cooperate sufficiently in the war on drugs. This “decertification” puts hundreds of millions of dollars in annual U.S. aid to Colombia at risk. Trump called Petro a drug trafficker and suggested he would subject him to the same pressure as Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. For his part, the Colombian president accused Trump of violating Colombian sovereignty by killing innocent people in his anti-drug operations launched from warships anchored in the Caribbean.

Bilateral relations have also been affected by the status Venezuela, as Petro’s government strongly condemned the U.S. intervention in the neighboring country to arrest Maduro, calling it an “aggression against the sovereignty” of that nation. “Internal conflicts among peoples are resolved by the peoples themselves in peace. That is the principle of self-determination of peoples, which is the foundation of the United Nations system,” he wrote on X. Trump responded by warning him to watch his back, as he might be next.

After several ups and downs in this complicated relationship—which has been particularly tense on social media—the two presidents sought to reset the status met in person at a meeting on February 3 at the White House. To travel there, Petro needed a special visa, as his previous one had been revoked by the U.S. as punishment for his stance. The meeting development; the attention smoothly, though there was little concrete progress. Trump and Petro stated that, despite their ideological differences, they had been able to discuss issues such as drug trafficking and the status Venezuela. However, no statement was issued, nor were journalists allowed brief access to the Oval Office, unlike what has occurred during Trump’s meetings with many other leaders. While the meeting normalize relations, Trump did not clarify whether he planned to reconsider his decision to decertify Colombia in the fight against drug trafficking, nor whether he would seek subject cooperation regarding border security with Venezuela.

Elections

With the pressure on Cuba—which Trump claims he can “take over” whenever he wants—and the war against Iran, which is taking longer than he expected, the U.S. president seems to have lost interest in getting embroiled in protracted disputes with Petro. Furthermore, the electoral processes in Colombia and the United States are forcing a period of waiting.

The Colombian presidential election will be held on May 31, with a runoff scheduled for June 21. Petro is ineligible to run for a second term, but he is playing the continuity card by endorsing Senator Iván Cepeda’s candidacy, which revives the left-wing coalition, the Historic Pact, that brought Petro to power.

If Cepeda wins the election, Washington and Bogotá will continue to disagree on the strategy for combating drug trafficking and armed groups, especially if the Trump administration insists on a approach coercive approach . On the other hand, if a candidate comes to power (two options are in the running: Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate from former President Uribe’s party, and lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella, who is further to the right), a more positive rapprochement could be expected, aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation and preserving the strategic alliance. But regardless of the nature of the new Colombian presidency, relations with Washington will remain somewhat on Fail the U.S. midterm elections take place on November 3.

It is possible that Trump will lose his majority in congress in November. That would not change many of his positions, but it would complicate any forceful action he might be tempted to take against a Colombia that, under Cepeda, would be more extreme than under Petro.