Somehow the self-coup that Alberto Fujimori planned and executed on April 5, 1992, in connivance with his all-powerful advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, continues to this day modeling the development of Peruvian institutions. Somehow, in spite of the years, the self-coup extends its influence in the political culture of the Andean country, prone to extol the image of the popular caudillo.

By mimicking this tradition, Fujimori and Montesinos' maneuver was supported by more than 70% of the Peruvian population. Today, twenty years later, April 5 is celebrated by one sector of the population as the beginning of the "Peruvian miracle" while for another it is a motive for opprobrium and condemnation. The disparity of perceptions is conditioned by the subsistence of Fujimorism. The last electoral process showed that the Fujimorist restoration has the support of almost a third of the electorate. In the second round (ballotage), Fujimorism is a tough opponent to beat. Humala won the presidency by a narrow margin and Fujimorism, although defeated, renewed its prominence. A second generation of Fujimoristas is working to consolidate the party shogunate around the founder's family. Thus, Keiko Fujimori and her brother Kenji are the natural heirs of the paternal leadership and, due to their youth, may reach the government if the dispersion of the center and the right (liberal-conservatism, aprismo, Christian democracy and toledismo) is repeated in the next election, something likely given the precariousness of coalitions in Peruvian politics.

Twenty years later, surveys affirm that 49% of Peruvians would again support Fujimori's self-coup in the event of a serious economic crisis. Sixty-nine percent defend a similar measure if corruption is detected in the congress and 51% would not hesitate to applaud the destruction of checks and balances in the event of an institutional impasse, all with the aim of creating a more effective Executive. The causes that led to the emergence of Fujimori's autocracy are still present in the Peruvian reality. The population favors governmental action over the formalism of polyarchies. Primum vivere deinde philosophari.

Was it possible to remove Peruvian politics from the self-coup of April 5? Yes, it was possible. This required the unity of all the democratic forces under a government of national cohesion, around a president shielded by the civil service examination. Something difficult, but possible. In the end, there was a lack of generosity, vision and commitment to the system. Peru has only managed to overcome the totalitarian temptation when, throughout its history, opposing but democratic forces forged alliances around realistic objectives, for the good of the Republic.

Was Fujimori the only one to blame for April 5? No, not at all. The Fujimori autocracy became strong at a specific juncture. The political intransigence, the partitocratic hatred, the inability to dialogue, all of this, when transformed into public action, generated a social climate capable of strengthening Caesarism. "El Chino" was the product of the inability to reach agreements and the suicidal absenteeism of the moderate forces. As these evils survive, Fujimorism has not been liquidated and enjoys good health.

Who is interested in the subsistence of Fujimorism? The fujimoristas, obviously, but also -paradoxes of power- a sector of the left. The left personalizes all the vices of politics in Fujimorismo and legitimizes its existence by presenting itself to public opinion as the only dike capable of preventing the return of Montesinos' corruption. This is, of course, a biased analysis. The fall of Fujimorism was produced by numerous factors, endogenous and exogenous. The coalition that helped dismantle the first Fujimori shogunate was not exclusively composed of progressive cadres. They also fought against the Fujimori kleptocracy, from open and heterogeneous parapets, citizens of the center, liberals, conservatives, apristas, Christian democrats. All played a relevant role in the return of democracy.

The conversion of Fujimorism into a democratic force is possible, but to consider that only a Fujimorist party is capable of capturing the popular center-right space is a self-serving fallacy. The last elections prove it. There is an important vote that responds neither to Fujimorism nor to the populist left. This vote, that of millions of people, also counts for the future of Peru.