Many so-called authoritative voices argue that bringing Vladimir Putin and his associates before a criminal court is a pipe dream. Realpolitik and the fact that Russia is a nuclear power makes it immune to sanctions imposed by any criminal court in the world.

If the two fathers of the international Criminal Law , Raphael Lemkin and Murray Bernays, had given up in the face of the quasi-unanimous criticism that their respective thesis received in their day, we would be far from having the international criminal justice system we have today. Our task, from the academy, should not be that of doomsayers of a supposedly factual status quo lacking in ethics and justice, sustainable only through the bestiality of force. We must (de)value and amend it in pursuit of a duty to be that is (increasingly) a guarantor of the observance of and respect for human rights.

We must insist that Putin can indeed be held criminally responsible . et al and development five keys to addressing this issue:

The horrors we have seen in recent weeks, such as the massacres of civilians in Bucha, the siege of the city of Kiev, the shelling of Mariupol, among so many other atrocities perpetrated by the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, could undoubtedly constitute war crimes... To try to deny this would be an exercise in unforgivable foolishness. But beyond their status as acts contrary to the Geneva Conventions, they are something more serious: they constitute criminal acts of war which are absorbed by the most serious of the typical figures of the International Criminal Law : the crime of aggression or war of aggression, or, as originally formulated in Nuremberg, the crime against Peace.

This is not a war, it is a heinous crime of the international Criminal Law - the worst of them all. Therefore, the actions deployed by the army of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine and against its citizens do not derive from a war (even apparently). They lack, ab initioThey lack any semblance of legitimacy or justification, either legal or ethical.

The crime of aggression or crime against peace, in its original formulation in Article 6 of the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, is based on two extremes, designed by Murray Bernays: conspiracy ( sui generis co-perpetration based on a criminal agreement consisting of launching an illegal war against another state) and membership (individual responsibility for carrying out a role within an organisation or institution aimed at executing the criminal plan). That is, in order to be a perpetrator of the crime, Art. 8 bis of the Statute of the International Criminal Court requires that they enter into the criminal pact or agreement , which means that only those individuals who have sufficient capacity (factual and legal) to prepare, initiate or carry out the acts of aggression can be perpetrators. framework This is the reason why, rather than individual criminal acts, their criminal interest lies in their potential to destabilise the international legal order, such as in destabilising the international security of humanity (by displacing the charge of a real competition of homicides, murders, injuries, sexual crimes, etc.).

Not only Vladimir Putin, but every leader of the Russian Federation and its ally Belarus, insofar as they control or partially direct the political or military action of the state, who have not renounced or opposed to intervening in the armed conflict, have been involved in the conclusion of this criminal pact or agreement . This pact does not require an express agreement , but is verified through the readjustment of the political and military institutions of the state, orienting them towards the preparation, initiation or carrying out of acts of aggression. This produces a real reconfiguration of the structured field of interaction partner-political, aimed at the consummation of the international crime (the war of aggression). (e.g. soldiers, civil servants, journalists from public agencies, etc.) in pursuit of the iniquitous goal (although always disguised under a pseudo-legitimising mantra or speech , such as the supposed fight against "Nazi elements").

The fact that Russia is not a member of the International Criminal Court and has not acceded to its statute is not an obstacle to the above. The United Nations Security Council committee may decide to establish a Tribunal for this pu rpose, or it may refer the case to the International Criminal Court. ad hoc for this purpose, or it could refer the case to the International Criminal Court. It will be argued that such an approach is chimerical to say the least, given the possibility of Russia's veto. However, there is significant doctrine that questions the legitimacy of a veto of a resolution on atrocity crimes by any of the permanent members of the Security Council committee . Their main argument against the employment veto in such cases is that it comes at a cost in human lives.

It is also necessary to consider the pronouncement of the International Court of Justice, from which certain doctrine deduces that the power of veto conferred by the UN Charter must be used in a way that is compatible with the norms of international law . jus cogens (such as the Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Principles, etc.), and in no way undermining the duties of any member of the Security committee to respond appropriately to any serious violation of these norms and of international security.

The internationalCriminal Law is not based on international courts but on national courts. Any state, whether party to the Rome Treaty or not, can have jurisdiction and skill to prosecute and punish these crimes.

Nor could they be protected by general or special privileges or amnesties. For these cases of responsibility for atrocious crimes, such institutes are inapplicable.