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Juan Carlos Orenes Ruiz, Doctor in Law, University of Navarra, Spain

The TC vs. the SC

Tue, 10 May 2011 10:59:31 +0000 Published in Navarra Newspaper

The judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court in the Bildu case, in which the judgment of the Special conference room of the Supreme Court is annulled, is but another milestone in a relationship marked by disagreements between the two Courts. Already in 1994, within the conference room 1st of the Supreme Court, the possibility of addressing the King appealing to his role of moderator and arbitration was contemplated. The conflict reached its maximum intensity on the occasion of a judgment handed down in 2004 by the same conference room 1st of the Supreme Court in which it condemned eleven magistrates of the Constitutional Court for civil liability for gross negligence.

The articulation between the two bodies is not easy. The nature of both is substantially different: the Constitutional Court is a body that is not integrated into the Judiciary, it is a constitutional body whose main mission statement is the control of constitutionality of laws, according to a model of concentrated control, acting as a kind of negative legislator. In addition, it is entrusted with another subject of functions, among which the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens through the resource of amparo stands out. For its part, the Supreme Court is the highest jurisdictional body in all orders except for the provisions, precisely, in subject of constitutional guarantees, in which the Constitutional Court has the last word.

It is the resource de amparo that allows the Constitutional Court, when faced with the allegation of a violation of a fundamental right, to review the actions of the organs of the ordinary jurisdiction, including the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court itself, in establishing the extent of its review work, has pointed out that it does not simply verify the evaluation of the fundamental rights carried out by the ordinary courts, but that it itself carries out the weighing of the fundamental rights at stake without having to rely on the evidence available to the courts, even if it is necessary to use criteria different from those used by the ordinary courts. Understood in this way, mission statement, the tension with the Supreme Court is inevitable, which is why there have been warnings for some time about the possibility that the Constitutional Court could become a third written request overflowing the limits of resource of amparo. This conflict was presented in all its crudeness in the Preysler and Alcocer cases; after a hard struggle between both courts, the Constitutional Court not only annulled the sentences handed down at first by the Supreme Court, on the understanding that the appellants' right to privacy had been violated, but in both cases it also handed down a subsequent sentence in which it revised the amount of the compensation subsequently set by the Supreme Court.

The effects of this status are certainly negative; citizens are perplexed by these judicial battles, which has a negative impact on the image of Justice. From a purely institutional point of view, these are two fundamental bodies in the structure of the Democratic State and it is essential to articulate some mechanisms to grease a relationship that has been creaking for many years. Especially now that the controversy seems to extend to the heart of the Constitutional Court itself: in the dissenting opinions of the Bildu ruling, the dissenting magistrates consider that the Constitutional Court has overstepped its constitutional functions, pointing out that the amparo procedure is not a new written request to re-evaluate the evidence already analyzed by the Supreme Court nor a "sort of super-case".