As in Iraq in early 2003, the predominant images in Syria in late 2024 are of statues of dictators collapsing amidst jubilant crowds. In almost every video, the stone or metal of the sculpture kicks up dust as it falls, blurring the view of the scene for a few moments.

Something similar could be said of our ability to appreciate the geopolitical scenario in Syria and the Middle East after the collapse of 61 years of Baath Party dictatorship and 53 years of the al-Asad dynasty in Damascus. We are still in the midst of the cloud raised by the fall of a regime, trying to glimpse the picture we will find once it dissipates.

However, there are certain things that can be confidently surmised. One is that Syria in 2024 may be for Turkey what Iraq in 2003 was for Iran. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and overthrew the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Baath Party, it also unintentionally ended a buffer state that had kept Iran's regional ambitions at bay for decades.

2003 marked the beginning of Tehran's march towards hegemony in the Middle East. The outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 accelerated this process. Iran's regional power grew in parallel to the destabilization of various countries. The Islamic Republic eventually established a direct and indirect presence (through militias financed, trained and armed by Iran) in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Yemen and Iraq.

The well-known axis of resistance was nothing more than the alliance of these factions supported by Iran in those countries. The first touchstone of this incipient hegemony was the land corridor to the Mediterranean: Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon. The second was the ability to threaten the two most strategic straits in the region: Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb (the latter through the Houthis).

When Iran reached the peak of its power

Between 2013 and 2017, the Islamic Republic reached the zenith of its power in the Middle East. The signature of Barak Obama's nuclear agreement with the United States in 2015 granted it international recognition and put an end to the sanctions that manacled its Economics. This expansive phase sought to expel the United States from the region, to force countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf monarchies to maintain a low profile and docile to Tehran's interests and, finally, to weave a spider web around Israel in order to eventually defeat the Hebrew state in a war of attrition.

The triumvirate leading and personifying this successful strategy of Iranian regional domination was composed of Qasem Soleimani, creator of the axis of resistance; Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, father of the renewed nuclear program, and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, manager of development of the missile and drone program.

The maximum pressure campaign initiated by Donald Trump during his first term marked the beginning of the Iranian decline. Soleimani was assassinated in January 2020, and Fakhrizadeh in November 2020. The signature of the Abraham Accords, orchestrated by Trump in September 2020, was another factor that accelerated the decline of the Islamic Republic's power in the region. The destruction of Gaza, the defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and, finally, the fall of al-Assad in Syria have finally dismantled the Iranian strategy and its hegemonic aspirations.

Turkey and its reckoning with the past

Geopolitics abhors a power vacuum. The low tide of one country is the high tide of another. The space left by Iran is being occupied, for now, by Turkey. This should not surprise us: the history of the Middle East between the 16th and 18th centuries is the history of the struggle between the Ottoman and Persian empires. This struggle, in a hidden form, seems to be reviving in the 21st century.

The Syria of the Baath Party and al-Assad was the buffer state of Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey. A Turkey which, like Putin's Russia, wishes to settle accounts with the past. If in Putin's case it is the fall of the Soviet Union thirty years ago, in Erdogan's case it is the fall of the Ottoman Empire one hundred years ago.

It is not that Russia or Turkey intend to regain direct dominion over all the former territories of their imperial past, but they do seek to establish a zone of influence over these territories. This zone of influence would be based on the military occupation or occasional annexation of some border regions (in the case of Turkey, northern Iraq and Syria), the establishment of related governments in adjacent countries and the creation of clientelistic networks through the military and economic financial aid .

Ankara should be cautious in handling the triumph achieved in Syria. Erdogan and other members of his party feel vindicated by the fall of Assad. Along with Qatar, Turkey has been the only Muslim country in the Middle East to maintain an iron grip civil service examination on the Assad regime in Damascus. Even in recent years, when Assad seemed to have survived the civil war and no one saw viable rebel resistance in Idlib, Turkey and Qatar maintained their support for the resistance.

It is logical for Ankara to celebrate the quick and unexpected triumph obtained in December. However, Erdogan should look to Pakistan. A few years ago, the security apparatus of the Pakistani state also congratulated itself on the unexpected and sudden triumph of the Taliban after two decades on the ropes. It escaped no one's notice that, without Islamabad's support, the Taliban victory in Kabul would not have been possible. However, since the seizure of power, friction between the Taliban and Pakistan has been increasing, leading to armed clashes on the border in recent weeks.

While it is to be expected that the Syrian rebels will maintain a deferential attitude towards Ankara, differences and disagreements can be expected to arise in the future. To rescue the country from bankruptcy and misery, Damascus needs much more than what Turkey or Qatar can offer.

In its business quest for regional hegemony, Turkey will have to face not only Iran, but also the third major player in the Middle East that aspires to shape the region agreement to its interests and designs: Saudi Arabia. How these three countries manage to strike a balance will greatly influence the various conflicts raging in the region.

This article was originally published in The Conversation. Read the original.