Germany is rebuilding its military capability with determination, breaking historical taboos that for decades defined its foreign and defense policy. Under the narrative of the Zeitenwende, it is rearming its army, reactivating its defense industry and redefining its place in Europe. The Spanish government, on the other hand, remains anchored in an ambiguous attitude, configuring in external security Structures and trapped in indecision in the face of the new geopolitical order. The difference is not only budgetary: it is strategic.

German rearmament is not a one-off gesture, nor a conjunctural response. It is a structural transformation of Germany's role in Europe and of the very meaning of its state. The Zeitenwende - that "epochal change" proclaimed by Olaf Scholz after the Russian invasion of Ukraine - has gone from being a solemn speech to becoming a political compass under Friedrich Merz. In just a few years, Germany has gone from being a power reluctant to talk about defense to aspiring to lead European rearmament.

We are not just talking about expense. Although that figure alone is compelling: Berlin has already exceeded 2 % of GDP in defense, will reach 2.4 % in 2025 and aims at 3.5 % in 2029, according to Reuters and the German Executive itself. It will be, de facto, the continent's largest military budget , with an estimated expense of up to 150 billion euros per year if these forecasts are met.

The Bundeswehr is being reformed from the ground up: the issue of soldiers is being increased, air defense is being strengthened, investments are being made in mobility and ammunition production is being multiplied.

In addition, Germany is activating a new defense technology-industrial ecosystem. Companies such as Rheinmetall are expanding artillery plants in Germany and Spain. Hensoldt is leading in defense electronics. Helsing, a startup born in 2021, develops artificial intelligence applied to the battlefield and is valued at more than $12 billion, according to the Financial Times, with Spotify co-founder Daniel Ek as chairman of its committee.

Moreover, at the political level, Germany has been able to generate consensus. The Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, a Social Democrat and one of the most popular figures in the country, has managed to consolidate a rearmament policy without internal fractures, even with the support of traditionally skeptical sectors such as The Greens, who perceive him as a pragmatic and configurable figure.

In the meantime, Spain remains anchored in a subsidized defense model , without a defined strategy or clear ambition about the role it wants to play in the new international context.

The government of Pedro Sánchez, without a General State Budget that would facilitate a sustained reinforcement of defense investment, and conditioned by coalition partners with divergent priorities, faces serious difficulties in making a structural turnaround.

Criticism has not been long in coming: at the recent NATO summit in The Hague, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly expressed his displeasure at Spain's low budget effort.

In the Trump era, confronting the United States and its transactional logic has consequences: from the imposition of tariffs to diplomatic isolation or a loss of influence vis-à-vis those NATO partners that have increased their defense expense .

In this context, the political narrative that the Spanish government repeatedly uses in the domestic sphere is insufficient in the international arena. When it comes to military expense , speeches are no substitute for commitments. And figures, when they do not add up, end up having a price.

It is not a question of comparing ourselves with Germany, but of understanding the strategic moment Europe is going through. The war in Ukraine remains without a clear resolution, while the Middle East is entering a new spiral of violence with global implications. Uncertainty about the US commitment forces a rethinking of the role to be assumed by European states and calls for a more balanced distribution of efforts within the alliance. In this scenario, the expectation of a greater European commitment is evident, and the Spanish government has been particularly exposed and isolated.

Spain has unique strategic advantages, such as the military instructions of Rota and Morón, essential for NATO's operational projection on the southern flank and towards Africa. Beyond their symbolic value, these facilities act as critical logistical platforms: in the recent US offensive against Iranian nuclear targets, they were used by various military support and transport aircraft, confirming their tactical relevance and the Degree integration of Spain in the allied military infrastructure.

Spain also has industrial capacity, talent and committed international partners. But, unlike Germany, it has not clearly defined the role it aspires to play in the new geopolitical balance. While the German government has been able to confront the difficult taboos of its past to advance its defense and foreign policy, the Spanish government remains in alarming ambiguity and rhetoric, which contrasts with the growing expectation of co-responsibility within NATO and the EU.

History does not wait. The future of European defense is being written now. And each country must decide whether it wants to be part of that story as a protagonist, a figurant or a spectator.