Henrique Capriles has before him the historic dilemma of accepting the triumph of the Chavista state machinery or denouncing a fraud that has been slowly built throughout three lustrums of Bolivarian power. The logical effect of rejecting the result is to mobilize the civil service examination and take to the streets to the last consequences. Chavismo, which was born under the protection of the gun, will not hesitate to use gunpowder, and it is this fact that the leaders of the civil service examination must calibrate. However, if the denunciation of fraud is limited to the formal sphere ("we want an audit to recount the votes") it is likely that the Chavista machinery will be able to easily respond to the claims of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (Democratic Unity Table). Chavismo controls electoral power. The revolution of the 21st century has had plenty of time to prepare its response to the eventualities of a close vote. Therefore, if Capriles does not capture the street, his chances are weakened.

Something similar happened during the death throes of Fujimorism. When the shared rule of Alberto Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos won re-election by fraudulently using state resources and persecuting opponents through the media, Alejandro Toledo led a coalition that took to the streets and denied Fujimori's victory. This, in time, was decisive for the recovery of democracy. Populisms are paper tigers, they collapse when faced with an organization with clear objectives. Chavism has violated all electoral laws, its own Constitution, the principles that guarantee the balance of powers and the independence of State agencies. Peaceful resistance is more than justified.

On the other hand, the praetorian wing of Chavismo, led by Cabello, previously controlled by the leader's personalist barrier, today acquires greater relevance. Chavista praetorianism is not happy with the results and aspires to take over the movement. This is understandable. Maduro has carried out one of the worst campaigns in Venezuelan history. Nobody expected an outpouring of charisma comparable to that of the founder. But a certain electoral syndéresis was expected. Maduro's outbursts have passed invoice to Chavismo.

All in all, the new de facto president has an extremely complicated internal front. Capriles consolidates his leadership (it would be a mistake to think of replacing him) and civil service examination advances. Furthermore, the pact between Maduro and Castroism may become a factor that may play against Madurismo if the praetorians demand a more nationalist policy, a return to the instructions, an autarchic Chavism. The corrupt satellites of Chavism know that Baltazar's feast will not last forever and they have already started their rapprochement with the nationalist wing.

Let us not forget that, in Latin America, the military are institutionalists, their relevant role in the construction of nationalities has created in them the perception that they are the real class leader, patriotism in arms, the "Socratic guardians", if we use a recent expression of Ollanta Humala. Peronism has persisted because of its popular entrails but also because of that praetorian origin that influenced its organizational capacity. If the Bolivarian revolution manages Chávez's inheritance well in the middle of deadline we will have a tropical Peronism capable of achieving alternation in power, if not outright hegemony. We are not facing a dystopian scenario. However, Lula, Correa, Mujica, Dilma and the long etcetera of usufructuaries of the Bolivarian revolution support the perpetual plundering of the Venezuelan State. Only audacity will save the civil service examination.