Several weeks have passed since the discussion between Ukrainian President Vlodimir Zelensky and Donald Trump on February 28 in the Oval Office and Zelensky has accepted the ceasefire demanded by the United States, paving the way for negotiations to reach a peace agreement with Russia.

Perhaps considering himself vindicated by Trump's rhetoric, and with the upper hand on the battlefield, Vladimir Putin has been reluctant to accept the US proposal for a full cessation of hostilities. For the time being, he has only agreed to halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The Russian president is probably thinking about the possibility of an eventual collapse of the Ukrainian front. Or at least to consolidate his advantage in order to finally negotiate from a position of strength that would allow him to impose favorable conditions that would include at least keeping the occupied territory, keeping his enemy out of Western institutions and avoiding the deployment of NATO countries' forces on Ukrainian territory.

However, even if a negotiation were to give it all this, the underlying geopolitical issue that drove Putin to war would be far from resolved. Russia needs control of Ukraine as the core topic of the territorial glacis it considers essential for its security in the West and, however much it may now appear as the victor, it is far from having achieved what it intended when it decided to invade. A peace that does not fully satisfy its security needs will be, for Russia, a bad peace, and will leave the question open. The corollary is that it is prudent to prepare to avoid a new episode of violence.

Europe, with the exception of brief visits to the White House by a limited issue of its leaders, has been left behind in the negotiating efforts and has not been listened to on an issue which, if only for geographical reasons, concerns it directly. This disregard shows how little the Old Continent counts for its American partner , and confronts the European states with existential questions that they can no longer avoid.

To tell the truth, Russia has no imperialist intentions - although one can never know how it would act if it were to find a clear path to the Atlantic - but it does aspire to restore the security shield it lost at the end of the Cold War. The possibility that, in the future, it may insist on this endeavor if the right geostrategic conditions are met cannot be ruled out, and is a source of concern for the political leaders of the Eastern European states, in particular those of the Baltic republics.

On its own, Europe cannot guarantee Ukraine the support it received from the West when the United States was involved in the effort. From a pragmatic point of view, it has little choice. It will probably accept the U.S. effort to end the war, trying to make itself heard in the process and going so far, should Russia come to accept it, as to deploy military units on the ground to ensure peacekeeping. 

In the meantime, the continent should not let up in the effort it has begun to equip itself with a self-defense capability worthy of the name and which it needs not only as a deterrent, but also as the only way to maintain U.S. interest in a NATO that remains vital to Europeans.

Assuming that there is no way back on the political integration project , Europe needs sufficient, credible and projectable military power if it aspires to remain relevant and heard in an increasingly carnivorous international arena.

This effort to achieve genuine strategic autonomy must be made by cultivating and strengthening the transatlantic link. Neither the United States nor Europe is interested in damaging, let alone breaking off, their relations. If that were to happen, the American nuclear umbrella would disappear, opening the way to a future full of worrying unknowns in which European states could begin to seek a solution to their security problems on their own, which in turn could lead to the end of the European Union, stimulate nuclear proliferation on the continent, degenerate into a rival relationship with America, or a combination of these and other possibilities.

If it continues to accept the sacrosanct value of the sovereignty of states and their right to decide without interference on the path they want to follow; in other words, if it does not give in to the idea that Russia has the right to a security sphere of its own, Europe must prepare itself for a future in which it will have to deal with the Russian "problem" without the unconditional support it has received from the United States up to now. It would do well to maintain the shield it has been deploying to the east since 2014 for deterrence purposes and as a sample of resolve and collective commitment to continental security.

Europe must rise to this historic moment and seize the opportunity to grow as a global actor. But, of course, carefully navigating between the icebergs of the decomposition of the European project , the alienation of the United States from continental security and a final rupture with Russia that would prevent the recomposition of a framework of understanding with Moscow which, if not now, will be fundamental in the future.