The future of constitutional democracy in Spain is discussion between myths, transformations and erosions, disloyalties and claims of a constitutional project adapted to the times. Moving the general question of the workshop is Spanish constitutional democracy an illusion? or how to bequeath to the following generations a model of strong constitutional democracy? The answer in desiderative terms is that the future must be more and better constitutional democracy; but this will require revising, correcting and update structural elements, but also and fundamentally operative ones, especially with regard to the control of power.

Some elements of this crisis are common to the evolution of constitutional democracies which, after two centuries of profound social transformations, have hardly been reflected in the architecture of powers; some constitutional mantras of two hundred years ago are preserved as incontestable when they are close to becoming hollow formulas; others have been precipitated as a consequence of what Lasalle referred to as "real factors of power" or by the integration in supranational entities and others are the result of the erosion generated by a constitutional praxis deteriorated or openly contrary to the spirit of the constitutional rule . Having already analyzed in previous interventions the question of liberal democracy from the perspective of the demos or the subjects of the political process, some considerations are made here on the how, the procedure and the organization and control of power proper to liberal democracy.

A first observation reveals a deviation on two levels of the theoretical model and internship of powers. The classic organizational structure of the division of powers into Legislative, Executive and Judiciary has been blurred at the functional level for decades, especially in the first two elements of the triad. The organic distinction and the attribution of functions between Parliament and Government, theoretically clear in the texts, has a internship of confusion in reality; the social transformation and the party system and the evolution of the parliamentary government system -from partnership to confusion of powers in the party State-, limits the differences to decision-making procedures in different seats, but not to different real subjects of the decision; and from the confusion, the risk, if the control and procedural elements are annulled, degenerates into systems of concentration.

On the other hand, the traditional sources have been joined by new ones, produced at the supranational level or adjusted to soft law. In the whole, without space for the development of the idea, a gulf is perceived between the reality of the sources and the constitutional design . This is evident in the creation of legal norms, but also in the decisions of supreme political administration in all its dimensions. As far as the legislative function is concerned, apart from the well-known tendency, which has become more acute in recent times, to resort to government by decree, can it be denied that it is the Executive which de facto leads the legislative function of the Parliaments and chooses the way of presenting the initiative according to the route of procedure that is of interest? At this point, the reflection that is necessary is to rethink the system of creation of legal norms, based on the principles that should inspire the creation of quality norms, but that are adjusted to the reality of the 21st century.

If the above is a point of reflection that leads to update the sources of creation of Law, avoiding confusion and the concentration of power in the Executives, there is no lesser risk that the Government, in addition to being the "lord of the sources", will try to become the "lord of Justice". Jurisdictional control and the independence of the judges are inalienable principles, the seal and guarantee of constitutional democracy. Today they present their own risks, namely: the lack of judicial independence, either by lack of official document, compositional interference or interference in the governing bodies of the parties in such a way as to compromise or annul it, through arbitrary interference in the function or its effects, for example, through the use of the misunderstood right of pardon. Spanish constitutional democracy has recently been warned by Europe of the risk of compromising judicial independence and of the need to protect it in order to avoid a drift incompatible with constitutional democracy itself.

Finally, constitutional democracy is articulated in a sophisticated system of division of powers andchecks and balances. Previously, the first division, in addition to the functional one, is the distinction between constituent and constituted power. framework The control of constitutionality (defense of the Constitution) that effectively and timely ensures that the powers act in accordance with the Constitution is vital for the survival of constitutional democracy. Silence, delayed or forced interventions of those who are entrusted with the function of defending the Constitution (Constitutional Court) leave constitutional democracy adrift from the political winds. A missing, late, unexercised or impeded control is, inevitably, a sure mechanism of erosion of constitutional democracy. Other controls (prior, optional, technical, political-parliamentary and, of course, jurisdictional) are key to constitutional democracy.

The liberal illusion will be in the positive sense of hope and continuity if it succeeds in designing an appropriate distribution of power among different bodies or instances (also territorial) appropriate to the times, and if the control systems remain operative and effective in terms of oversight. If these requirements are not met, constitutional democracy will pass from illusion to illusion.