There is a general agreement among historians in considering the Cuban Missile Crisis as the moment of greatest risk of nuclear war in the 20th century. Also, this crisis was one of the moments that taught the most about management international relations to the two great protagonists of the Cold War and their allies. This is largely due to the fact that decisions were taken that contributed to making things worse when they were intended to fix them. It is almost a miracle that they finally managed to get out of the extremely dangerous imbroglio into which they got into, and hence it is considered that President John Fitzgerald Kennedy reinforced in those days his image as a leader capable of overcoming adversity, adversity born in part from his own decisions.

The chain of inanities can be traced back as far as one wishes to the relationship between the United States and the island of Cuba when it was part of the kingdom or the Republic of Spain, which it was both. The idea that Cuba should be subject to U.S. political designs in the Caribbean, very widespread among continental leaders, proved to be a mistake B when it led them to act with an arrogance that eventually proved to be foolish: one cannot treat a nominally sovereign subject in this way without committing an injustice that will come back as a political problem sooner or later.

This was complicated by two precedents closer to the facts: the Cuban revolution led by Castro and the U.S. reaction to it were a growing cause for confrontation, which was further fuelled by the arrival of Cuban exiles in the United States. The decision to support their attempt to disembark in Cuba to depose Castro, by the same means he had used to come to power, proved disastrous. The failed attempt in April 1961, C by JFK, but which also came to nothing because of his decision not to give military support to the operation, complicated things enormously: it strengthened Castro in power, and made the Kennedys, both the president and the attorney general, Robert, take the relationship with Castro as an issue from then on staff. This explains why they did not stop the CIA's unlawful attempts to take out Castro.

The worst, however, came from the other side: in 1961 Khrushchev decided to secretly send medium-range nuclear missiles and more than forty thousand support men to Cuba. No one could consider that as a defensive maneuver except perhaps Khrushchev. Moreover, the maneuver, because it was secret, appeared even more dangerously offensive.

When the Americans became certain, on October 15, 1962, of the deployment of those missiles within 150 km of their territory, status became explosive. Kennedy formed the executive committee to advise him on the response to be adopted and found that almost all the military, and some civilians, were in favor of a forceful and rapid military response: raze Cuba and put an end to the threat. That was as much as starting a nuclear war, but they considered it desirable. To do otherwise seemed like weakness to them. Kennedy was reaping the rewards of his close confrontation with Castro.

The attempt to establish contact with the Soviets warning them that they would not tolerate the deployment reaped a resounding failure with a response from the Soviets that looked like defiance. Kennedy, humiliated by the hawks inside, met with another humiliation outside. His leadership seemed to be in decline by the minute.

However, his tenacious determination to avoid the resource by force and to re-establish diplomatic contacts at the highest level, despite the humiliation it entailed, finally bore fruit and made him appear as a statesman of great stature. After thirteen days of mounting tension where anything could happen, a agreement was achieved that averted the risk of war.