Yes, it is true: we cannot waste a good crisis, because it is a great opportunity to learn and change. In this crisis we have learned many things, of course, but most of them were not new. What happened is that those who learned those things were not at our side when the problems exploded in our hands.

And it is not enough to learn the theory. It is one thing to know that the stock market can fall 20% in a few minutes, and quite another to feel in the pit of your stomach an indefinite pain when you watch the fall on your computer screen, and you realize what is happening in that market, in your business, in your work space, in your bonus and in your professional degree program . The bad news is that what you learn today will not be useful to you until many years from now, when that will no longer be your work.

There are fast learners and slow learners. When, in the midst of a crisis, one does not learn, it is because one does not want to learn. Some time ago, commenting with a colleague on how US bankers were returning to the practices that led us to the crisis, including high-risk operations and millionaire remunerations, we came to the conclusion that they had not learned anything. But, now I am not so sure. Those bankers know that previous practices are no longer correct, and that society and governments do not accept them. But this does not lead them to change their behavior, because that is their way of doing the banking business, and the source of their income; and because the others in the sector do not want to change either, and because the Government will not force them to change their behavior, on pain of having to bail them out again.

Falling from the top rung

Let me tell you some of the things I have learned from the crisis. The importance of imbalances: a little inflation, or public deficit, or external debt is not significant, but a lot of those little evils is very serious. I read the moral many years ago in a good book Education: if you don't want to roll down the stairs, don't trip on the top step. And this applies to countries, companies and families.

It is also true for everyone that this is a balance sheet crisis. The core topic of the origin of the crisis is not in the income statement, but in the balance sheet and, specifically, in the excess of debt; because when sales fall or you have difficulties to get paid, the important thing is how much debt you have, what is its monthly cost and how you are going to get rid of it. In other words, what happens on the balance sheet (the level of debt, the lack of capital) determines the income statement and survival - in the case of a family, it explains the part of its income that is compromised by debt service, what is left for free consumption and the level of its constraints.

If you prefer, I'll put it another way: this crisis underscores the importance of thinking about the long term deadline, and of having a realistic view of what can go wrong, which, according to Murphy's law, will go wrong. Another way of putting it is to stress the importance of flexibility. On the business, this means the possibility to quickly contain costs or to put everyone to work for liquidity because in the crisis, cash is the king. At the macroeconomic level, it is the possibility of quickly correcting imbalances, which depends on the flexibility of the economic structure.

And on the level of economic policy, pragmatism - and I know that some economist colleagues will not like this. Is this the time for Keynesians or Austrians, I have sometimes been asked. It is the hour of realism: we must know the causes of our problems, and apply the solutions of agreement with the diagnosis. "Keynes would have done it differently" is to assume that Keynes was going around the corridors of the British Government with his prescriptions written down since before meeting. This we have not yet learned, and I suspect we never will: the schools are too heavy.

Flexibility is not so desirable when it comes to principles. We have not learned this either in this crisis, but I hope we will soon. Principles should be few, solidly established, published and repeated and, as far as possible, not ideologized or politicized. For example, when the deficit began to soar, taxes had to be raised, and then speed and convenience prevailed over principles (neutrality, efficiency, transparency...). Now we have to backtrack and, as they say in the Army, order plus counter-order equals disorder.

In the end, and as Arie de Geus published, the conditions for the survival of organizations, which have been validated by the recent crisis, are clear: financial conservatism (reduced debt), a strong sense of identity (knowing our business very well and being very attached to it), tolerance towards eccentrics and experimenters (innovate), and high sensitivity to changes in the environment (do not stop asking yourself: what if the price of oil doubles or an earthquake leaves me without raw materials for a month...)?