As the last U.S. soldier crossed the border into Kuwait in December 2011, the Iraqi nightmare seemed to be over. An honorable but unsuccessful ending. The United States was leaving Iraq with a bittersweet taste after years marked by violent uprisings, civil war and terrorism. By the end of 2011 it seemed that the country was on the road to reconciliation and development. Obama was more than willing to sell the fragile progress made in order to turn the page without having to utter the words defeat or failure. The idea was to leave with his head held high.

The Maliki government, however, has missed every opportunity in recent years to ward off the specter of sectarian strife. To begin with, it prevented a small issue of US troops from staying in Iraq to carry out anti-terrorist operations, train the Iraqi army and deter any attempt at armed revolt. Maliki in turn multiplied measures and gestures that constituted a clear affront to the Sunni population. Maliki, a Shiite, did not hesitate to base his legitimacy on the support received from the Shiite community, the majority in Iraq. However, the Sunnis have shown that they are not willing to stand idly by while they are marginalized in the new power sharing. The Kurds, for their part, have spent the last few years working on the sidelines with the idea of building a state of their own, autonomous from Baghdad.

Obama meanwhile ignored the problem. Iraq was descending into chaos while Washington insisted that these were domestic issues that only the Iraqis themselves could resolve. Obama had put an end to the war and any appearance of meddling in Iraq's affairs would have undermined the credibility of his election promise to leave Iraq. With the U.S. absent, Iran and Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to shift their fighting-already present in the Syrian civil war-to Iraq. Along with Syria, Iraq was becoming the new chessboard for Middle East supremacy, pitting Sunni and Shiite, secular and Islamist, against each other. In the face of Obama's passivity, the game has been won by the Shiites (Assad remains in power, Iran increases its influence in the region) and the Islamists (the Sunnis, defeated and persecuted, decide to throw themselves into the arms of the most fanatical groups).

If Obama does not act clearly in Syria to stop Assad's killings he will be seen as complicit in his actions in the Middle East, further radicalizing the Syrian civil service examination . The feeling that America has betrayed and abandoned them will increase among the Sunni community. If Obama does not give support and cover to the moderate Sunni civil service examination groups, the leadership of the Sunni resistance in Iraq and Syria will be taken over by the Islamist organizations. If Obama does not intervene to stop the advance of Islamists in Syria and Iraq, there is a risk that a large territory will be established in which terrorist groups can train and prepare for future attacks in the West. If Obama does not force Maliki to change policies that marginalize Sunnis, the civil war in Iraq will continue. In the event that Maliki refuses to change course, it would be necessary to force his resignation and establish a government provisional of national unity.

The result of doing nothing will be the prolongation of the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, as well as their possible extension to other countries such as Lebanon or Jordan in a spiral of violence and sectarian fanaticism. Obama must abandon domestic political calculations and assume the role of the United States in the region. After the fiasco of the announced and at the last moment cancelled intervention in Syria, the credibility of the United States was called into question. Clear action in Iraq will encourage the moderates, rein in the radicals and prevent a prolongation of the sectarian war.