"Vulnerability not only delineates a decisive aspect of the human condition, but can also be understood, in a certain sense, as the horizon and point of origin of moral projects". This was stated at the University of Navarra by Ignacio Quepons, professor at the Universidad de la Salle (Mexico) and member of the Latin American Circle of Phenomenology.

The expert gave the seminar 'Vulnerability and moral feelings: a phenomenological research ', organized by project 'Emotional culture and identity' of the Institute for Culture and Society. This group of research is supported by Zurich Seguros.

From agreement with Professor Quepons, "the central core of the phenomenology of emotions, especially in relation to the development of value consciousness, coincides with the cognitive theories of emotions, particularly with the evaluative-cognitive option held by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum".

In his presentation he showed some of the scope that a comparison between the phenomenological theory of emotions and Nussbaum's theory has for a philosophical consideration of the relationship between vulnerability and the constitution of identity staff in the moral context.

He also highlighted how Husserlian phenomenological analysis offers a possibility of systematization of the intentional Structures of emotional life consistent with Nussbaum's approach to the cognitive character of emotional life, but with an emphasis, not hitherto envisaged by Nussbaum, on the non-thematic forms of intentionality, which Husserl calls horizonal.

On the other hand, and returning to Nussbaum's approach, she explained that in her Philosophy there is not only a clear coherence with what was suggested by Husserl concerning the intentionality of emotions, but it is also remarkable the role that the American philosopher gives to vulnerability both in the origin and in the very meaning of emotional life.

All this complements and allows a more integral articulation, as well as assemblages not foreseen by Husserl's systematic approach, within a phenomenology of emotional life, from agreement with Professor Quepons.

Finally, he pointed out that "the relative lack of control over the things that matter to us, and that are decisive for our well-being, according to Nussbaum, reveal our condition as vulnerable".