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States as protectors and violators of human rights: The detention of Maduro by the US

Estados como protectores y violadores de los derechos humanos: La detención de Nicolás Maduro por parte de los Estados Unidos

ESSAY

February 19, 2026

Texto

When the international legal order cannot guarantee protection, powerful states assume the dual role of human rights enforcers and lawbreakers, deciding for themselves when intervention is justified and in what way.

In the picture

Transfer of Nicolás Maduro after his removal from Venezuela, in DEA custody [US Gov]

1. Context and Introduction

During the early hours of January 3, 2026, the government in Caracas denounced a "military aggression" by the United States after explosions were reported—leaving several areas of the country without electricity—and foreign aircraft were observed flying over the capital and other parts of Venezuela.Following this, US President Donald Trump asserted his authority over the intervention through his social average , Truth Social, which he named Operation Absolute Resolve, stating that its objective was to detain Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, due to being indicted by the US Department of Justice and the Southern District of New York.[3] Along with that, they have been criminally accused of international drug trafficking into the US and narco-terrorism because of an assumed link to the Cartel of the Suns along with some minor accusations of money laundering.[4]

Following the operation, in the press conference on January 4, President Trump publicly framed the intervention as necessary to “bring Nicolás Maduro to justice” and to protect US national security by confronting alleged narcotics networks linked to Venezuela. Trump stated that the United States would "run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition," suggesting an ongoing administrative role and collaboration with Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, whom he described as a partner willing to cooperate with US officials.[5] It was later confirmed that it would be framework , Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, who would be designated to help in the task of running the country.[6] Trump also later invoked an expanded version of the Monroe Doctrine, which he referred to as the" Donroe Doctrine," emphasizing sustained US influence in the Western Hemisphere and endorsing the involvement of large US oil companies to "fix the badly broken oil infrastructure" and generate revenue, remarking on his already characteristic America First rhetoric. During his remarks, Trump repeatedly tied the intervention to broader strategic goals, including energy control and regional stability.[10] These statements were complemented by comments from US military officials highlighting the scale and planning of the operation, and by rhetoric from the Justice Department regarding pending prosecutions of Maduro and his wife.[11]Internationally, responses to this framing were sharply divided between supporters who saw the action as liberatory and critics who characterized it as an unlawful occupation.[12]

On January 5, 2026, the UN Security Council convened to address the US operation in Venezuela after a request made by Venezuela for a meeting, accusing Trump's administration of carrying out a series of actions that violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which forbids the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation and asserts the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter to "safeguard its population, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." Because of that, Venezuela called on the Council to condemn the US aggression and to hold it accountable for such acts.[13] Statements reflected deep divisions over the legality and human rights implications of the intervention. Secretary-General António Guterres emphasized that respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the UN Charter is essential to international peace, warning that unilateral military action risks undermining these principles and setting a dangerous precedent.[14] Several delegations condemned the operation as a violation of Venezuela's sovereignty and international law, urging peaceful dispute resolution through multilateral mechanisms rather than force.Other representatives explicitly denounced the capture of President Maduro as an affront to customary protections for heads of state and as contributing to instability and insecurity in the region. A minority of voices in the Council acknowledged the need to address human rights abuses in Venezuela, but emphasized that such efforts must be pursued within the framework of international law and collective action.

In the days that followed, a series of international developments further fueled discussion the legitimacy and motivations of US actions: from Washington's intensified claim over Greenland, which has put the European Union and other NATO members on the defensive,[18] to the celebrations among segments of the Venezuelan population following the removal of their socialist dictator.[19]

Although states are in theory the ultimate guarantor of legal order and the well-being of its citizens, they can act as both a protector and a violator of human rights. Yet, in some cases when a state exercises power both within and beyond its own territory, as in the case of the US military capture of Nicolás Maduro, that duality is intensely strained. Because of that, this case provides an opportunity to reflect on the role of states in state sovereignty, international legality, and human rights from conflicting perspectives. Along with this, the case directly reflects on the concept of state sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force, where the tension between legal constraints and political power was identified as a central weakness of the international system, as it will be analyzed.

2. Legality vs illegality of the Absolute Resolve operation

Prohibition of the use of force and state sovereignty

The question of whether it was a legal action or not should be answered in accordance with contemporary international law, which strictly prohibits the use of force by one state against another, and includes the necessity to respect the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.[20] There are only two recognized exceptions to this prohibition, namely the use of force authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution[21] or the inherent right of self-defense in response to an armed attack.[22]

In the case of Operation Absolute Resolve, neither exception appears to apply. The operation was conducted without prior Security Council authorization,[23] and the Security Council meeting of January 5, 2026 revealed deep divisions rather than any endorsement of the US action.[24] While the United States asserted that the intervention was necessary to protect its national security, no evidence was presented of an ongoing or imminent armed attack by Venezuela against the United States that would meet the threshold required to trigger lawful self-defense or to convince the international community that the US had a real and honest belief about that.[25] As such, the military capture of a sitting head of state on foreign soil constitutes a 'prima facie' violation of Venezuela's sovereignty and of the prohibition on the use of force under international law.

Apart from the violation of territorial integrity, this operation also raises serious concerns regarding customary international law principle of staff , more specifically ‘immunity ratione personae’, a right afforded to heads of state while in office.[26] This staff is deeply rooted in the principle of sovereign equality among states[27] and in customary international law, and supported by international treaties,[28]which protect heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers while they are in office. The reasoning behind this is straightforward: while a leader holds office, they cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of foreign courts,[29] for either official or private acts, precisely to ensure they can carry out their responsibilities without the risk of arbitrary detention or external coercion. This privilege is not granted based on staff or electoral legitimacy,[30] but as a mechanism to preserve international stability and communication between States, ensuring that diplomatic relations and international negotiations are not paralyzed by external criminal proceedings.[31] To balance this privilege, there exist the exceptions that we explained before regarding the power of the UNSC to authorize actions against a government. Because of that, a country shall not act by itself. Therefore, the forcible arrest and transfer of President Maduro to New York directly challenges this protection, which is intended to preserve sovereign equality between states and prevent precisely such unilateral exercises of coercive power.

The historical precedent of Manuel Noriega

Although the intervention in Venezuela represents a serious breach of the international legal order in itself, it already has its own historical precedent, namely that of Manuel Noriega. The US operation bears striking similarities to the 1989 invasion of Panama and subsequent capture of General Manuel Noriega, who was apprehended by US forces and later tried in the United States on drug trafficking charges.[32] In both cases, the United States justified its actions through a combination of arguments ranging from national security concerns, criminal prosecution narratives, and claims of protecting democracy and human rights.

The Noriega case, much like the arrest of Maduro, relied on a very expansive interpretation of self-defense and the extraterritorial enforcement of domestic criminal law and its validity.[33] In Panama, the US government framed its intervention as a necessity to combat narcotics trafficking and to protect US citizens and its interests, arguments that closely mirror those used in relation to Venezuela. However, the legality of the Panama invasion was widely contested at the time, with many states viewing it as a clear violation of international law despite its surprising subsequent political acceptance.[34]

The relevance of the Noriega precedent for the present case lies not in its legality, but in what it reveals about the functioning of international law in practice and the social response to it. Both cases illustrate how actions that are widely regarded as unlawful can nonetheless become normalized through political success, lack of enforcement, and social or moral acceptance by powerful actors and segments of the international community that can manipulate the discourse. Rather than strengthening international legal norms, such precedents risk hollowing them out, signaling that sovereignty and legal protections may be overridden when sufficient power and narrative control are exercised.

Narratives of crime and the claim of legal justification

In an effort to try to align Operation Absolute Resolve with international legal standards, the US relied heavily on criminal and security-based justifications, especially those coming from Attorney General Pam Bondi.[36]Central to this narrative was the portrayal of Venezuela as a major source of narcotics and cocaine entering the United States, with President Trump repeatedly invoking the Cartel of the Suns and other transnational criminal groups such as Tren de Aragua as existential threats to US security.[37] US officials, including the Attorney General and senior members of the administration, framed the intervention as an act of self-defense aimed at preventing the harmful effects of drug trafficking on American society.[38]

However, this justification given by the American government is deeply problematic from a legal perspective. International law does not recognize drug trafficking, if an attributable armed attack to the country is absent, as grounds for the unilateral use of military force that is desired. The extraterritorial prosecution of criminal offenses, even with serious ones such as narcotics trafficking or narco-terrorism, does not create a lawful basis to back an armed intervention or regime capture.Moreover, widely cited data on global cocaine flows indicates that Venezuela plays a relatively minor role in the overall supply of cocaine and a non-existent one in the supply of fentanyl entering the country, casting further doubt on the proportionality and necessity of the response.

The subsequent dismissal and partial withdrawal of allegations relating to the Cartel of the Suns as a real criminal organization further undermines the coherence of the US legal position against Maduro and his government.[42] Rather than serving as a stable legal foundation, the criminal accusations appear to function primarily as a fallacious and legitimizing narrative, designed to bridge the gap between formal illegality and perceived moral necessity. This strategy reflects a broader pattern in which legal discourse is instrumentalized to justify actions that remain, at their core, incompatible with the established rules governing the use of force.

3. Implications for the international community and the authority of international bodies

The erosion of international authority and the operation as legal precedent

The US military capture of Nicolás Maduro sets a significant precedent in international relations. The United States demonstrates that powerful states can circumvent the formal mechanisms of international law by creating moral or political narratives that are persuasive enough, by acting unilaterally and framing the intervention as both protective and legally justified,[43] as happened in the capture of Manuel Noriega in 1989. This reinforces the notion that states may sometimes exploit gaps in enforcement to advance their interests while simultaneously claiming a protective or humanitarian rationale behind their actions.

The inability of the Security Council to enforce Article 2(4), along with the UN’s reliance on consensus-based mechanisms, highlight structural weaknesses of international law.[44] The result is a scenario in which other states may feel brave enough to act extraterritorially under various pretexts created by them, and even potentially invoking humanitarian, criminal, or security justifications, thereby increasing the likelihood of unilateral interventions and undermining global stability.[45]

El efecto dominó en la aplicación de los derechos humanos a nivel mundial

Beyond legality, the operation underscored a broader tension between state sovereignty and the international community’s supposed capacity to effectively uphold human rights. Because when multilateral institutions fail in their job to protect citizens effectively—whether from dictatorial regimes, systemic violence, or organized crime—powerful states may perceive unilateral action as both necessary and morally defensible in case they decide to act on their interest.[46] While this can result in some immediate protective outcomes for populations, it also risks institutionalizing selective enforcement where human rights protection is contingent on the political and military power of intervening states, rather than on universal legal principles.[47]

In the Venezuelan case, the intervention was socially legitimized by many segments of the Venezuelan population, by domestic US audiences, and by some allies who align with those shared security concerns.However, the long-term effect on the international system may also be destabilizing: If powerful states systematically invoke moral or protective justifications to override the sovereignty principle, weaker states lose faith in the predictability of international law and the principle that all states are equally bound by legal norms, which is therefore weakened by these actions.

Lessons for the role of states as protectors and violators of human rights

These dynamics illustrate the dual role of states in the human rights landscape. Firstly, as protectors that intervene (or claim to intervene) as defenders of populations from harm, corruption, or systemic abuses, demonstrating the potential of states to uphold rights beyond their borders.[50] And secondly as violators, because the same intervention can also violate sovereignty, undermine legal norms, and create legal or political precedents that other states may exploit for their own self-interest, creating a systemic risk to human rights globally.[51]

Because of that, the US operation in Venezuela serves as a case study of the fragile balance between protection and violation of human rights by states, and also reveals that the moral authority of a state can, in practice, sometimes override legal obligations. In practice, a state may simultaneously act as both protector and violator of human rights, occupying a morally and legally ambiguous and gray position; the American intervention exemplifies this duality, as it claimed to safeguard human rights while clearly breaching international legal norms at the same time. The simplification of such complex actions into binary categories of "protector" or "violator" is often exploited by other states or political actors to advance their own agendas, crafting narratives that serve their interests and legitimize different particular courses of action.

4. The acceptance of the intervention by the public and moral illegitimacy in international politics

Why is a large part of public perception on the side of Trump's administration?

Although the US military operation against Nicolás Maduro clearly violated international law, many ordinary citizens accepted or even applauded it, especially Venezuelans.[52] The narrative of “liberating Venezuela from a dictator” and protecting regional security generated popular support, even among those aware of the formal illegality.[53] This is not surprising since the humanitarian rationale and protection of human rights were perceived as morally justifiable, often outweighing legal considerations.

Social contract theory and international authority

Social contract theory helps explain why legal authority functions at the domestic level: citizens accept restrictions in exchange for protection and welfare.[54] In the international system, however, there is no equivalent mechanism: the United Nations is unelected and lacks direct enforcement power since the United Nations Security Council is blocked when it is most important to act.[55] Its inability to act effectively against Maduro opened the door to a realist approach,[56] in which powerful states act according to their own interests but also benefit smaller actors. In such contexts, the public and those related to the small actors often perceive these actions as morally legitimate despite their illegality.

Legal ambiguity and moral superiority in actions

The case illustrates the paradox that sometimes exists between legality and moral perception. An action can be illegal under international law yet socially accepted if it is seen as protecting lives and rights.

Maduro, in addition to being head of state, was an unelected president who had persecuted political opponents,[57] carried out arbitrary detentions[58] and disappearances,[59] subjugated his people, and devastated his country both socially and economically.[60] Popular acceptance is reinforced therefore when the international system fails to ensure justice and safeguard to their citizens.In this case, the welcoming response of Venezuelans to the Americans was not because they wanted to be controlled by them instead of by Maduro, but because they now knew themselves to be free people.

Conclusion

The case of the US military capture of Nicolás Maduro highlights a critical lesson about the functioning of the international system and the role of states in protecting or violating human rights. While the United Nations was initially established to uphold international law and safeguard human rights, this specific episode demonstrates the limitations of the system when its mechanisms, such as the Security Council, are unable to act as effectively as they should. Until international institutions are truly capable of enforcing legal norms and protecting states and populations consistently, unilateral interventions by powerful states will continue to fill the void they left, often operating in a morally ambiguous and gray space between protection and violation.

The operation on January 3, 2026 illustrates that, in practice, realism frequently ends up dictating the logic of international relations.[64] When the international legal order cannot guarantee protection, powerful states, like the United States, assume the dual role of human rights enforcers and lawbreakers, deciding for themselves when intervention is justified and in what way. While such actions may be framed as morally defensible, or even liberatory, for local populations, they remain fundamentally in tension with the principles of sovereignty and the rule of international law.

Moreover, the case reveals that the logic of interventions framed as protective can coexist with the existing strategic and economic interests of those same countries. Trump has emphasized control over Venezuelan oil resources (previously exploited by China, Russia, and Maduro's allies) while the political leadership of the country remains uncertain, with figures such as María Corina Machado and Edmundo González yet to be confirmed in a transitional government. This duality highlights how states can simultaneously present themselves as defenders of human rights while pursuing national advantage in the situation, blending moral rhetoric with material objectives.

Ultimately, this case highlights the fragile balance between legal obligation, moral authority, and practical enforcement in the international system. It suggests that until global institutions can act decisively and fairly, the responsibility (and the burden) of protecting human rights will increasingly fall upon individual states. This, in turn, reinforces the duality inherent in the role of states: simultaneously capable of safeguarding and undermining human rights, depending on their power, interests, and the effectiveness of international oversight.

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[65] Laura Navarro, Daniele Grasso, and José Álvarez, “A visual guide to Venezuela’s oil and why Trump wants it,” EL PAÍS English (January 17, 2026) https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-01-17/a-visual-guide-to-venezuelas-oil-and-why-trump-wants-it.html (accessed January 17, 2026)

[66] Mary Kekatos, ‘Trump says Venezuelan opposition leader doesn’t have the “respect” to govern after Maduro ousted’ ABC News (January 3, 2026) https://abcnews.go.com/International/trump-venezuelan-opposition-leader-respect-govern-after-maduro/story?id=128868550 (accessed January 18, 2026).

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