Haiti is moving toward elections amid street violence

Haiti is attempting to overcome its status as a failed state through a two-pronged effort: restoring institutional order through elections—the first in over a decade—and regaining territorial control by revamping the fight against the criminal gangs that have taken over the country. Without a legitimate authority, the second purpose is difficult to achieve, but with extreme violence in the streets, there can be no reliable elections to enable the first. In late 2025, the UN approved a new mission statement security mission statement , with a one-year mandate during which the August elections (with a runoff in December) should be held and a new government formed. There is no guarantee of success.

As 2026 begins, Haiti finds itself in a status goes beyond a traditional political crisis. The country faces a prolonged weakening of its institutions that has called into question its ability to exercise effective sovereignty over its territory. For decades, factors such as structural poverty, external economic dependence, natural disasters, and political instability have undermined the functioning of the state. However, in recent years these problems have accumulated to status Haiti is considered a failed state.

The vacuum of authority has now become part of everyday life. In large areas, especially in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the government exercises no real control, and power lies in the hands of armed groups. Ninety percent ofthe capital is controlled by criminal gangs. The population lives under a regime marked by violence, internal displacement, and a lack of basic services. In this sense, the Haitian crisis is not merely a problem of governance, but a crisis of sovereignty, in which the state retains international recognition but has lost its effective capacity to govern.

The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 marked a point of no return. Although Haiti was already a fragile state, his death exacerbated political instability and left the country without a clear authority. Since then, transitional governments have struggled to consolidate power, organize credible elections, or regain territorial control. The lack of strong institutions and the weakness of the national police force have prevented the establishment of a stable order.

International indicators reflect this decline. Haiti ranks among the world’s most fragile states, and its economy has been in decline for several years. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been on a downward trend for the past ten years, while much of the economic activity stems from remittances rather than the domestic economy. From a theoretical standpoint, the model the modern state—based on the legitimate monopoly of force and control over territory—is only partially fulfilled in the case of Haiti.

Armed groups

One of the most visible aspects of the crisis is the rise in the power of armed gangs. Although these groups have existed for years, their influence has grown significantly in recent years. They control much of the capital and several strategic routes, which allows them to interfere in the Economics the daily lives of the population. Their control extends beyond the capital, as they also hold sway in the department Artibonito and the area the Cabaret commune.

Some alliances between gangs have reached a level of organization that goes beyond that of mere criminal groups. The alliance known as Viv Ansanm, led by Jimmy “Barbacoa” Chérizier, reflects this radical shift. These groups combine criminal activities with political rhetoric that appeals to social exclusion and the state’s withdrawal . They have managed to manipulate the narrative in their favor. In neighborhoods where the government has never provided basic services, this subject speech generates some support.

In the internship, the gangs have taken on functions typically performed by the state. They control the transport of goods, regulate access to fuel, collect illegal tolls, and, in some cases, illegally manage essential services. Their complete control over strategic infrastructure, such as ports and distribution centers, allows them to directly influence the Economics .

This status led to fragmented sovereignty. Haiti continues to be recognized as a state, but actual control is divided among various actors. The National Police, weakened by a lack of resources and staff, can barely protect a few government buildings. By 2026, it is estimated that more than 1.1 million people will be living under the direct control of gangs. Haiti is a unique case because the gangs do not evade the state; rather, there is a substitution of sovereignty in which they replace the state in matters of security and economic order.

International Missions

In response to the rise in violence, the international community has sought to intervene to prevent a total collapse. In 2023, framework the UN, the mission statement Security Support mission statement in Haiti (MSS) was established to support the work of the Haitian police, but its results were limited due to a lack of resources and the weakness of local institutions.

With a change in wording, the United Nations committee approved a new initiative in September 2025: the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Unlike its predecessor, this is not a UNmission statement ,” as its mandate is not to ensure peace in the country but to directly combat gangs. With a 12-month mandate and approved at the urging of the United States, this 5,550-strong force purpose collaborate with Haitian authorities to neutralize gangs, protect infrastructure, and facilitate humanitarian access.

However, the intervention faces significant challenges. Furthermore, there is mistrust of foreign involvement due to past experiences that failed to resolve the underlying problems. For this reason, international intervention may reduce violence in the short term, but it does not guarantee long-term stability without domestic reforms.

Elections and the Legitimacy Problem

With the hope that at least some of the violence can be mitigated in the coming months, the country is moving toward holding presidential, legislative, and local elections. These elections were approved by Haiti’s committee Transition committee (CPT), the body that has led the country for the past two years and which, last February, acknowledging its inability to continue managing the status, was dissolved, with power passing to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who is backed by Washington.

The elections are scheduled for August 30, with a runoff on December 6 for the presidential race. In recent weeks, some 280 political parties and coalitions have registered for the elections. However, it is not certain that the elections—the first presidential elections since 2016—will actually take place.

Haiti does not have a reliable voter registry, as there are more than half a million displaced people and turnout in the last election was a mere 21%. Given the current level of terror, any election runs the risk of being sabotaged by criminal gangs. Furthermore, holding elections in a territory occupied by paramilitaries does not restore legitimacy; it will only create a government without real authority, perpetuating its curse of legitimacy without sovereignty. Everything will depend on whether GSG’s new administration manages to control the violence.

Economic dependence

The political crisis is compounded by an Economics fragile Economics . Haiti relies heavily on financial aid and remittances sent from abroad, which account for 16% of GDP. These resources are essential to the survival of millions of people and represent a significant portion of the national income.

This dependence limits the country's autonomy and increases the influence of external actors on decision-making. In internship, Haiti functions as a dependent state, whose stability depends on resources it does not fully control.

Sovereignty or permanent protectorate?

The question of whether Haiti can once again become a sovereign nation is a complex one. Without financial aid and imported security, the country will face widespread famine; currently, millions of people are suffering from acute food insecurity.

The inequality gap is one of the widest in the world; the economic elite controls the importation of basic goods, maintaining a symbiotic yet tense relationship with gangs. Haiti is on track to become a permanently under-development state. This is not a temporary crisis, but a chronic condition in which sovereignty is a luxury the country cannot afford. Success will not be measured in terms of democracy, but rather by whether the international system manages to prevent Haiti from collapsing entirely.