In the picture
Cover of Javier Gil Guerrero’s book *The Shadow of the Ayatollah: A History of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Madrid: Ciudadela, 2025), 285 pp.
The timing has given *The Ayatollah’s Shadow* particular visibility: the desire to understand the key reasons behind the outbreak of a new global war has found an explanation that is both concise and in-depth, one that hit bookstores not long before the United States and Israel launched their sustained attacks against Iran on February 28. Javier Gil, researcher the University of Navarra and professor of Middle Eastern studies, has been closely following the Islamic Republic for some time and knew that the so-called “Twelve-Day War” in June 2025 neither eliminated the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions nor constituted the final word from Netanyahu and Trump. Javier Gil’s work spans from the triumph of the revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979—including the necessary account of the end of the Shah’s monarchy—right up to the bombings of nuclear facilities nearly a year ago; his insights, however, shed light on what has happened since and what may still unfold regarding Iran.
This historical account examines the reasons behind the fall of Reza Pahlavi; Khomeini’s maneuvers to steer the new order toward a political and judicial system controlled by the highest ranks of the Shia clergy; the causes and lasting consequences of the long war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (1980–1988), and the inner workings of the struggle between reformists and conservatives (or principlists) that has dominated the succession of the country’s presidents and their governments, as well as their relations with the Supreme Leader (upon Khomeini’s death in 1989, he was succeeded by Ali Khamenei, who remained in office until his death in the Israeli bombing on February 28). It also details the construction of the “axis of resistance”—the groups funded by Tehran to extend influence in the region and pressure Israel and other enemies—and its collapse between 2021 and 2025: the U.S. assassination of Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guard’s special forces (referred to in the book by its common Iranian nickname, “Pasdaran”); the annihilation of Hamas in Gaza; the fall of Assad in Syria; the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon (the assassination and death of its powerful leader, Nasrallah)...
In his concluding chapter, Javier Gil reflects on what may have been the greatest strategic mistake of the Islamic Republic’s leadership: having employed such aggression against its neighbors and the West—both rhetorically and physically through its proxies—that its stockpile of ballistic missiles and its progress toward acquiring nuclear weapons became unacceptable; its deterrence strategy for self-defense turned into a catastrophic demand. Faced with growing international pressure, Khamenei and the hardline faction came to view the nuclear program as the sole guarantee of the regime’s survival and squandered opportunities to reach some subject agreement, until Netanyahu’s insistence met with Trump’s willingness to bang his fist on the table.