Growing Support for Maduro's Arrest in Countries with the Largest Venezuelan Diaspora

The arrest of Nicolás Maduro during a lightning-fast U.S. military operation in Venezuela was met with mixed reactions across the rest of the Americas. Although there was majority support among the region’s public, the popular outpouring of support in Miami and Bogotá stood in contrast to the more subdued celebrations in Mexico City and Brasília. Setting aside the discussion and moral discussion over the legitimacy of the U.S. intervention, the public reaction had more to do with each country’s direct experience with the Venezuelan exodus.

The main survey a few days after Maduro’s arrest on January 3, showed a 60.1% approval rating for the U.S. military operation across the region as a whole. Conducted between January 5 and 11, with a sample 11,285 people across the Americas, the survey the signature AtlasIntel, in partnership Bloomberg, nevertheless revealed some variations in support depending on the country.

When comparing this data R4V’s records on the nearly seven million Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, it can be concluded that exhibition to the devastating effects of the Venezuelan crisis—as measured by issue neighbors, work acquaintances who have arrived from across the Orinoco—is one of the factors that best explains the willingness of public opinion in each country to view through a positive lens an operation that, in terms of international law, is difficult to justify.

agreement the poll, 60.1% of those surveyed expressed support for the U.S. military operation, and 58% said they supported a U.S. military intervention to oust the Chavista government. However, this support was not uniform, either geographically or ideologically; the nuances between countries reveal both the particularities of each country’s bilateral relationship with the United States and the varying impact that Venezuelan migration has had on different societies.

The Andean Countries

The highest approval ratings were concentrated in the Caribbean (82%); in the Andean bloc, comprising Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia (77%); in Paraguay and Uruguay (72%); and in Colombia (64%). Although the correlation is not perfect, a clear trend emerges: countries that faced greater migratory pressure—or that, even if the numbers were smaller, experienced it with greater discomfort because they are small nations or are unaccustomed to immigration from Venezuela—tended to support intervention more strongly.

The societies that have had the most difficulty coping with the influx of Venezuelans are also the ones that have most fully internalized the narrative that a criminal regime is the direct cause of the exodus (as well as the hope that its demise would reverse that influx). The survey confirms survey from another angle: 73.2% of Latin Americans viewed the Maduro regime as the primary manager the humanitarian crisis causing the record-breaking Venezuelan migration. For those experiencing this migration firsthand, its causes are a tangible reality, unlike for those who view it as a distant phenomenon.

Colombia is a prime case study. The country that has received the most Venezuelans in absolute terms—around 2.8 million, according to R4V as of the end of 2025—has also been the country that has felt the consequences the most: pressure on health and Education systems, urban tensions in border cities such as Cúcuta, and a diary that has spanned several consecutive administrations. The fact that 64% of Colombians approved of Maduro’s capture, despite the Gustavo Petro administration’s critical stance toward the intervention, points to a significant divide between public opinion and the official position.

data the AtlasIntelsurvey

Brazil

That divide between rulers and the ruled is not unique to Colombia. Brazil is another interesting example. Lula da Silva was one of the Latin American leaders who most forcefully condemned the U.S. operation, invoking the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. However, 58% of Brazilians approved of Maduro’s arrest, and only 42% said they agreement their own government’s position on the status, making Brazil the country with the greatest divergence between the official stance and public sentiment, agreement the survey data .

Brazil is home to the third-largest concentration of Venezuelans on the continent, settled primarily in the border state of Roraima, where the steady influx of displaced people has turned cities such as Pacaraima and Boa Vista into the epicenter of the humanitarian response and management assistant. This contrast between federal foreign policy and the day-to-day reality in border regions sample direct exposure to the migration phenomenon can shape perceptions that differ from official diplomatic positions.

Mexico

With just 106,000 Venezuelans on its territory—a issue modest issue for a country of 130 million people—Mexico recorded the lowest approval rating for Operation “Absolute Resolution” among the region’s major countries: 55%. The Estrada Doctrine, formulated in 1930 by Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada, establishes that Mexico must not take a position on the legitimacy of foreign governments, as it considers this a form of intervention. This tradition of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty has shaped Mexican foreign policy for decades, regardless of which party is in power. President Claudia Sheinbaum maintained this stance, condemning the U.S. operation and reiterating the principles of international law. And although a majority of Mexicans approved of Maduro’s capture, a similarly high percentage (44.2%) aligned with her government’s position of rejection. The fact that Mexico is home to fewer Venezuelans than Colombia, Peru, or Brazil is a relevant point, as it means that Venezuelan migration has not permeated everyday life in Mexico to the same extent as in those other countries, and this leaves more room for doctrinal frameworks to prevail over direct experiences.

The Venezuelan diaspora: the factor that tips the scales

No group survey showed figures as extreme as those of the Venezuelan diaspora itself. Among the nearly seven million Venezuelans living outside Venezuela—of whom 1,539 were surveyed—90.8% approved of the military operation, and 89.3% agreement an intervention to remove the government. 93.6% believed that Venezuela is better off without Maduro as president; 95.8% labeled the Chavista political system a dictatorship; and 96.2% said they were convinced that the result of the last election were fraudulent.

This group a proactive player in the Latin American discussion . The millions of Venezuelans in the region have helped shape public perception in their host countries. They are the ones who have recounted firsthand the regime’s repression, shortages, and violence. Their mere presence is, to a certain extent, a living political argument.

Also interesting is the internal comparison between the diaspora and residents in Venezuela. The latter show significantly lower approval ratings (46.7%) and higher levels of uncertainty (27.9% “don’t know”). Fear, surveillance, and the difficulty of accessing free information within the country explain part of that difference. Those who remain in Venezuela do not necessarily support the regime, but they express their views more cautiously or with less certainty about what lies ahead.

The future

The poll also gauged expectations. When asked what would be the most viable path to restoring democracy in Venezuela, 38.3% cited U.S. military intervention. 24.1% opted for diplomatic negotiations, and 22.1% for social protests and internal negotiations. 55% of Venezuelans living in the country believed that a new presidential election under international observation would be a good solution.

With Delcy Rodríguez serving as acting president, Venezuela’s transition faces its own uncertainty. 66.1% of Latin Americans said they do not trust her to lead that process. Among Venezuelans living in the country, 51.6% would prefer María Corina Machado—a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and opposition leader—as president, compared to 13.7% who would choose Rodríguez. The diaspora is even more decisive: 81% expressed confidence in Machado to guide the transition.

Seven Million Arguments

The intervention on January 3 is difficult to justify under classical international law. No treaty currently in force authorizes one state to invade another to arrest its president. The formal condemnations issued by Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Brazil are not without legal basis.

However, it is clear that most Latin Americans welcomed this development. Not because they are unaware of international law, but because, in many cases, legal norms are an abstraction that feels less tangible than hearing firsthand how that Venezuelan neighbor crossed the Andean moor on foot with his children, or about the work after fleeing his country, the refugee camps, and the people begging for employment the streets.

Seven million Venezuelans on the continent are seven million living examples. They have humanized a crisis that would otherwise risk being reduced to headlines and press releases. And in doing so, they have tipped the scales of Latin American public opinion toward a position that their own governments, in many cases, did not uphold with the same determination.

The region has not abandoned its anti-interventionist tendencies—Mexico and the Estrada Doctrine are test their vitality. But it has also become clear that sovereignty loses credibility without democracy. In the absence of democracy, the figures reveal that, this time, Latin Americans opted for pragmatism.