In the picture
The LNG carrier 'Cadiz Knutsen,' flying the Spanish flag [Anave]
People often talk about the transatlantic bond, but its maritime aspect is not always explicitly highlighted. In fact, the term itself already suggests the maritime component of that relationship, with the Atlantic serving as the link between the two continents, but in this case we will delve a little deeper into the status of maritime power on both sides of the Atlantic.
To that end, we will examine the importance of the transatlantic partnership in wartime scenarios, and then take a closer look at the status of the allied naval forces in the Euro-Atlantic region, highlighting one of the key structural problems: the status of our merchant fleets.
As an introductory clarification, I would like to point out that there is a difference between maritime power and naval power, and that, although the two terms are often used interchangeably, it is important to keep reference letter in mind. Maritime power reference letter set of instruments a state reference letter to exploit the sea and its resources for its own benefit. This includes the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, the navy, recreational boating, the industries associated with all of these, and activities aimed at extracting resources from the marine environment. Naval power, on the other hand, is the military component or pillar of this broader framework, comprising the navy, its instructions shipyards, and the entire industry that supports it.
When these terms are used in the collective imagination, the image of warships—large aircraft carriers or destroyers launching missiles—inevitably comes to mind. But in reality, the central and most important element of the entire equation of maritime power is trade. Trade is the engine of the Economics ; it has driven the globalization that defines our society today. And since more than 80% of world trade is carried out by sea, this gives the ocean even greater significance.
And this is even more true in times of war. During the two world wars—but also during all the wars that have taken place with belligerents on both sides of the Atlantic—trade and maritime lines of communication have served as a lifeline. When the Germans realized they were not in a position to challenge British control of the seas through large-scale battles between battleships, they turned their attention to attacking those lines of communication between America and Europe with their submarine campaign. These were lines of communication on which England and its allies depended entirely to sustain their war effort—and indeed, their very national survival. And had it not been for the enormous effort of the convoys that kept that route open despite suffering heavy losses, Europe today would be a completely different place.
For this reason, it is worth report great naval thinkers report history, who have reminded us that, while wars are ultimately decided written request land (which is where we live), what happens at sea has been a very important determining written request throughout the centuries. Thus, in most cases, powers that have been strong at sea have triumphed over those that were not.
This leads us to examine the status of the Atlantic Alliance from this maritime and naval perspective. And in doing so, we find a rather bleak picture. Setting aside political issues and relations among allies, it is worth recalling that the strength of the Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic bond has been determined, from its very origins, by the strength of its members at sea. Without control of the seas, that bond is faltering. And today, we find the central pillar of that maritime power severely weakened.
The navy’s earliest origins lie not as an instrument of war, but as a tool protect a nation’s own commerce and ensure that it proceeds normally in the face of any eventuality. Although there are nuances that need not be addressed at this time, without a merchant marine to protect, the navy loses much of its raison d’être. And today, the merchant fleets of the Alliance countries are in a state of serious decline. In the case of Spain, for example, it is telling to note that our fleet has shrunk to fewer than 100 ships flying the national flag. A figure that stood at more than five hundred several decades ago has declined dangerously.
In the case of other allied countries—albeit to varying degrees—the status similar, including that of the United States. And one of the reasons contributing to this decline stems from the profound changes that maritime trade underwent beginning in the mid-20th century. The accelerated process of globalization and internationalization by the period of relative stability that followed World War II, resulted in a process of increasing global interdependence. Merchant fleets ceased to be exclusively national in ownership and came to include a mix of different nationalities among their shipowners, crews, and, above all, in the cargo they carried. As a result, most of the goods that ships unload at a port are not destined for the country where that port is located, but are instead distributed from there by land to other countries.
As a result of these changes, another current issue has arisen: flags of convenience. When operating a merchant vessel, it is usually necessary to distinguish between its flag, shipowner, and operator. The flag defines the vessel’s nationality and the laws that govern it; the shipowner is the manager and legal manager of the vessel; and the operator is responsible for the management and commercial operation of the cargo space. Many ships have a different nationality for each of these aspects. Added to this is the fact that the crews working on these ships are increasingly international, and the cargo being transported is destined for a wide variety of countries.
When a vessel belonging to the Spanish merchant marine operates under the Panamanian flag, we are dealing with a case of a flag of convenience: in Panama, operators pay lower taxes, have cheaper insurance, and, final, benefit from a more lenient and permissive tax regime. This phenomenon, which is so widespread today, gives rise to various liability issues, especially in the event of an accident. While this internship pose major problems a few decades ago, it has become a threat or structural weakness in today’s world.
And finally, the other major deciding factor has been the gradual rise of the shipbuilding industry in Southeast Asia, led by three countries: China, South Korea, and Japan. For years, these nations have been strengthening their shipbuilding industries, evolving from competitors of Western countries to undisputed leaders. By the mid-2000s, they had surpassed European countries in annual Issue ; today, these three countries account for around 90 percent of global shipbuilding. This status is replicated almost identically in the military shipbuilding sector.
* Text prepared for an event organized by the Franklin Institute. Gonzalo Vázquez is researcher GASS and a contributor to the Center for Naval Thought at the Naval War College.