In the picture
Protest in Ceuta led by the president of the autonomous city, on August 9, 2026 [City of Ceuta]
Last Thursday, July 30, Spain faced the worst migration crisis in its history, as approximately 80,000 people entered the autonomous city of Ceuta, many of them after swimming 3 kilometers from Fnideq (in northern Morocco). Ceuta’s president, Juan Jesús Vivas, has estimated that between 8,000 and 11,000 migrants remain in the city. So far, the death toll stands at 141, according to the NGO Caminando Fronteras. Amid the chaos, the Civil Guard detected, via cameras deployed along the border perimeter, the presence of agents linked to Moroccan intelligence services who had infiltrated the migrant group, in an operation that, according to sources from the Civil Guard’s General Staff, “could hardly have been carried out without the intervention of Rabat’s intelligence services.”
This latest incident is a perfect example of what is known as the “instrumentalization of migration,” a recent term that describes a new form of hybrid threat based on the deliberate use of mass migration from one state as a tool to destabilize, coerce, or gain political advantage over another state, without resorting to direct military action. These subject strategies fall under the umbrella of so-called “gray-zone operations,” understood as actions that fall below the threshold of conventional armed conflict, and whose authorship, though often evident, is difficult to prove or legally sanction.
It is also important to remember that this is not the first time Morocco has used mass migration as a tool for political pressure. In 2021, Brahim Ghali, University Secretary of the Polisario Front, arrived in Spain to receive treatment for COVID-19. Rabat responded by encouraging at least 8,000 people to cross the border between Morocco and Spain, while relaxing border controls—an explicit demonstration of its ability to turn migration into a weapon of diplomatic coercion.
On this occasion, everything points to the fact that this new development—which erupted precisely on the anniversary of Mohammed VI’s accession to the throne—is a response to the diplomatic rapprochement between Algiers and Spain, the most recent milestone of which was the July 20 “ meeting ” between Pedro Sánchez and Abdelmadjid Tebboune, even though the official version refers to trafficking networks “exploiting” the Supreme Court’s ruling against immediate deportations. Furthermore, in 2026, Algeria has once again become Spain’s main gas provider , following nearly four years of virtually frozen relations in the wake of Spain’s policy shift in March 2022, when Madrid recognized the Moroccan autonomy plan as “the most serious, realistic, and credible basis” for resolving the Western Sahara conflict.
This standoff with Spain comes at a time when Morocco is enjoying its strongest international diplomatic position in decades. On October 31, 2025, Rabat achieved what is so far its greatest diplomatic victory: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797 ( committee ), which for the first time states that “genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty could constitute the most viable solution” to the Western Sahara conflict, thereby effectively removing the option of a referendum from the diplomatic agenda ( internship).
Far from being an isolated incident, this resolution is part of a broader trend toward Morocco’s diplomatic consolidation, driven by its integration into the so-called Abraham Accords—the result of the process of normalizing relations with Israel—and by its growing status as partner strategic partner of the West in North Africa. This position not only strengthens Morocco’s capacity to exert influence but also acts as an important buffer against potential reactions from its Western partners, who are reluctant to jeopardize a cooperative “ framework ” considered strategic for the stability of Europe’s southern flank.
A good sample of this new bold move is that, in the midst of the crisis, Morocco’s own Minister of Justice, Abdellatif Ouahbi, has once again openly asserted Moroccan sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, stating that Rabat “continues to assert our territories” and that the issue “is on the table” in every meeting with Spanish authorities.
How does this wave differ from the one in 2021? The most intuitive answer would be its scale: in a single wave, the city received a number of people equivalent to more than 80% of its usual population. Another possible answer would be the international media attention it has generated, compounded by the reaction of European allies such as Finland, Denmark, and Italy, which has led to a de fac fail tion of the Schengen agreement with Spain until August 15. But neither of these factors alone explains the political upheaval unleashed in Spain. Unlike in 2021, Spain and Morocco now share a high-profile, fixed- project : the joint bid to host the 2030 World Cup. That bid gives the Spanish political class a concrete and actionable lever with which to translate outrage into political demands.
Vox, Podemos, and Sumar have already demanded that Morocco be excluded from organizing the 2030 World Cup in the wake of the Ceuta crisis. A similar phenomenon has occurred in Portugal, with the environmentalist party Livre and the far-right Chega also joining this demand. Public opinion supports this demand almost unanimously: according to ElectoPanel, 91.1% of Spaniards support formally calling for Morocco’s exclusion, including 62.4% of PSOE voters.
This raises the question: How do the Spanish people feel about this? An NC Report “ survey ” survey conducted for La Razón immediately after the crisis indicates that 77.3% of Spaniards believe Morocco behaves like an “enemy country,” compared to 16.1% who disagree and 6.6% who did not express an opinion.
A breakdown by party, however, reveals that this hostility is far from evenly distributed: it affects 97.6% of PP voters and 98.3% of Vox voters, but drops to 32.5% among PSOE voters and 21.7% among Sumar voters. At first glance, the divide seems insurmountable. But the relevant figure is not the distance between the blocs, but the common ground: one-third of the Socialist electorate and one-fifth of Sumar’s—voters who, on any other issue, would be on the opposite side from the PP and Vox—already share the perception of Morocco as a threat. It is precisely this shared common ground—rather than the majority consensus on the right—that makes Morocco fertile ground for a narrative capable of transcending the left-right divide.
With protests growing in the autonomous city, pressure on the government is expected to continue to mount. If the People’s Party manages to capitalize on this public sentiment, it could determine Spain’s political future: the successive corruption scandals that the PSOE has managed to weather so far could be overshadowed by a crisis that, if handled skillfully, offers the PP the historic opportunity it has long been waiting for.
This opportunity is built on an already favorable foundation. The PP has been the leading party in the polls for more than two years, and the combined support for the PP and Vox leads the left-wing bloc by about twelve points. But that margin, despite its persistence, has not been enough so far to result in an immediate change in government. What could alter this equation is precisely the erosion of the one-third of the socialist electorate that already shares the perception of Morocco as a threat. In any case, there is also the possibility that the People’s Party might decide to pass up this opportunity. In that case, a well-executed campaign by Vox could alter the PP’s calculations, forcing it to make greater concessions and accept restrictions on its decision-making leeway.
There remains, however, one final factor that the current Spanish political landscape should not rule out: the black swan—that event of infinitesimal probability and massive impact that no actor anticipates until it occurs and changes everything. In the current scenario, that black swan would amount to the remote possibility that the PSOE—despite the deep influence exerted by the Moroccan lobby within its ranks—might decide to preempt the PP and seize the growing cause of “ civil service examination ” to Rabat in Spain. If this strategic twist were to materialize, the Socialists would not only break the mold of the “ civil service examination,” but they would also manage to turn the polls upside down and, who knows, emerge victorious once again.
* An abridged version of this text was previously published in the *Diario de Navarra* under the degree scroll , “No one has yet understood what happened in Ceuta.” The author is pursuing a Master's Degree ’s degree in International Relations at Renmin University (Beijing, China).