Naval Modernization and Budgetary Disagreement in Spain

On September 30, 2026, Russia warned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through a diplomatic “ grade ” issued by its embassy in Ireland, that it would be prepared to use its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, if NATO countries attempted to isolate Kaliningrad from the rest of its territory. Moscow claimed that the Alliance was preparing an air and naval blockade of the enclave, an accusation that NATO has not confirmed. University SecretaryMark Rutte responded by stating that NATO is a defensive alliance and that Russia must cease its nuclear threats. Regardless of its actual scope, the episode illustrates the deterioration of the Euro-Atlantic security environment and brings back to the forefront an issue that has plagued the Alliance since its founding: how the cost of collective defense is shared among its members.

This discussion —known as“burden-sharing”—has taken on unprecedented intensity following the 2025 Hague summit, at which the allies committed to investing 5% of annual GDP in defense by 2035. Spain has been the grade outlier. Its government refused to accept this goal and argued that meeting the agreed-upon capability targets was sufficient, while in 2026 it remains at the minimum threshold of 2%. Added to this external discrepancy is an internal one: Spain has not had a new general budget since 2023, which forces it to finance expense defense spending through amendments to credit approved by the Executive Branch itself.

This analysis highlights the importance of maritime power for Spain—and, by extension, that of its Navy—and then goes on to illustrate the challenges associated with the renewed Euro-Atlantic effort to increase the “ expense ” in defense and the Navy Plan 2050, which embodies those ambitions in the maritime domain.

Spain and the Importance of Naval Power

The origins of the “ development ” of maritime power and naval power as a strategic and influential factor in the rise and fall of civilizations date back to around the 5th century B.C., when civilizations such as the Greek and Phoenician realized that control of the seas was vital to protecting their territories and trade routes. Although systematic study of this subject did not begin to take shape until well into the 19th century, from that point on we find a long list of authors—from both military and civilian backgrounds—who, for decades, have drawn on centuries of historical experience as source a source of strategic lessons for the present. One of the most enduring examples is that of the American Alfred T. Mahan, who argued that control of the seas through trade and a strong naval force was the decisive factor in a nation’s rise to world power status. His study of history led him to conclude that the rise and fall of empires depended, to a large extent, on the ability to sustain a “virtuous cycle” in which maritime trade—as a source s of economic prosperity—serves to finance the navy that protects it, thereby maintaining a steady flow of economic revenue.

In this context, Spain is a country that is deeply dependent on the sea. Its territory, which includes the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and two archipelagos, along with its location on the Strait of Gibraltar—one of the world’s most Issue maritime traffic chokepoints—makes Spain a country whose security and prosperity are inextricably linked to control over its waters. This privileged position provides a natural strategic advantage, but it must be matched by sufficient investment in the foundational elements of maritime power: a merchant marine of adequate size, appropriate port infrastructure, and a navy to protect its own trade and the maritime routes that pass through the vicinity of its national territory. This is precisely one of the major problems plaguing Spain: insufficient investment in its naval forces, which not only limits the Navy’s ability to monitor and protect these areas but also makes the country dependent on third parties to guarantee its own security—and thus renders it a player lacking sufficient strategic autonomy to assert its national and security interests.

The most recent national effort to increase resources in this area is the Armada 2050 Plan, a plan that, despite its grand promises, clashes with Spain’s budgetary reality, which hinders its medium- and long-term prospects.

Navy 2050

In December 2024, the Spanish Navy presented the document “Armada 2050,” which sets out a long-term vision for adapting the Spanish naval force to the geopolitical challenges of the mid-century. The plan calls for a gradual evolution divided into three phases.

First, there is a recovery phase, designed to address the institution’s long-standing structural resource deficit. Its goal is to provide the entire Navy with a minimum level of capabilities before making the leap to more advanced technologies. The second is the modernization phase, focused on a thorough update of existing systems, fleets, and infrastructure. The third and final phase is the evolution phase, during which new operational concepts and state-of-the-art platforms will be incorporated.

To ensure the viability of the project, three conditions are essential: a stable budget , a consolidated national defense industry, and strong social and institutional support, underpinned by a robust defense culture. It is precisely in these three areas that our country sample currently faces its greatest shortcomings.

External Dissent: Spain and NATO

On February 12, 2026, at the Alliance’s “ meeting ” meeting of defense ministers held in Brussels, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense (for the Army) for Policy Elbridge Colby presented the so-called “NATO 3.0,” a concept through which Washington aims to profoundly transform the Atlantic Alliance. Colby presented it as a break with “NATO 2.0”—that is, with the “ model ” of the decades following the Cold War—and as a return to the logic of that era, “NATO 1.0.” Under this “ outline,” European allies would have to rebuild their military capabilities and assume primary responsibility for their own conventional defense. According to the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), NATO 3.0 envisages “a substantial reduction in U.S. forces and assets assigned to the defense of Europe, so that European members assume primary responsibility for conventional deterrence and defense, while the U.S. nuclear umbrella is maintained.” On June 18, at a subsequent “ meeting ” meeting of NATO defense ministers, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth confirmed that the allies were already aware of the magnitude of the planned cut in Washington’s contribution to NATO’s Force model .

Spain, however, entered this new scenario with a well-established position of dissent. In June 2025, on the eve of the Hague summit, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez informed Alliance “ University Secretary ” Mark Rutte in a letter that Spain would not commit to the 5% GDP “ goal ,” as it considered it unreasonable and potentially counterproductive. In the end, Spain signed the Hague Declaration, although it understood that its commitment was to meet the capability targets set by the Alliance, regardless of the percentage of GDP that this would require. Rutte denied that there was an opt-out clause and maintained that Spain would have to allocate 3.5% of its GDP to meet those requirements.

Colby’s vision, which has guided the United States’ new national security and national defense strategies, has played a decisive role in the U.S. perspective on “global shifting” and “burden sharing.” Both concepts illustrate that the U.S. is no longer in a dominant position and underscore the need to prevent any other power from establishing regional hegemony in another region. Given that China is currently the only actor capable of doing so in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. considers containing Beijing to be its top strategic priority, even above the protection of its own national territory. Consequently, Washington has increasingly pushed its regional allies in Europe and the Middle East to shoulder a greater share of the military burden in their respective regions.

Internal Disagreement: Spain Without a Budget

Spain’s disagreement with NATO also has a domestic dimension: the country lacks a budget approved by Parliament. The current General State Budget (PGE) is the 2023 budget, which has been extended for the third consecutive year in 2026. Throughout this legislative session, the government has not submitted a budget “ project ” to the National Court ( congress)—neither for 2024, nor for 2025, nor for 2026.

In the absence of new budget bills, the Executive adjusts the budget —which has been extended—through amendments to credit , primarily through budget increases and transfers authorized by the government itself and which, in many cases, are not voted on in the congress. Defense is part of this process. In the first quarter of 2026, the Ministry of Defense was the fourth department with the most amendments, totaling 2,280 million euros, linked to the commitment to NATO to reach 2% of GDP. In fact, that same goal of 2% had been reached in 2025 through a 10,471 million euro plan C approved by the committee of Ministers, without the congress ever voting on it.

Here, internal dissent intersects with external pressures. Naval modernization is, by its very nature, a multi-year process. The program for the five F-110 frigates, valued at 4,325 million euros, has a payment schedule spanning from 2019 to 2032. In the case of the S-80 submarines, approximately 2,000 million remained to be paid during the 2027–2032 six-year period. A long-term vision such as that of the Navy 2050, with programs spanning a quarter-century, requires stable expense commitments backed by Parliament. It cannot be sustained by “ credit ” modifications decided on a year-to-year basis by the Executive Branch regarding the 2023 budget. Without budgets, Spain cannot offer its allies the predictability that NATO 3.0 demands, nor can it provide itself with the planning that its own Navy requires.

From Paper to Reality

The Spanish case reveals that burden-sharing in NATO is not just a matter of how much is spent, but of how it is measured and who decides on that expense. Spain signed a commitment in The Hague that it interprets in terms of capabilities, while the Alliance measures it as a percentage of GDP. That disagreement was tolerable when the United States shouldered the bulk of European defense. With NATO 3.0, it is no longer so, because every ally that remains at 2% leaves a gap that no one guarantees will be filled. The case sample also shows that external commitments depend on internal circumstances: a country without approved budgets cannot offer its allies a stable contribution.

Under these conditions, the Navy Plan 2050 suffers from certain shortcomings that undermine its viability as a project, even though its objectives are attractive. Its design is coherent, but its first condition—a stable budget —is not met. Programs such as the F-110 frigates or the S-80 submarines entail payments spanning more than a decade, and a twenty-five-year timeframe cannot be financed through annual credit amendments to the 2023 budget. For the Navy 2050 plan to move from paper to reality, defense must become a matter of state policy, with budgets approved by Parliament and a sustained consensus that endures beyond each legislative term, regardless of who is in government.