A century of wars in Eurasia, the geopolitical center of the world

There has been so much talk about the 21st century being the century of Asia that the degree scroll this work may lead us to think that it is more of the same. In reality, the book is not about the present but about the past, as the subtitle clearly states, and from that past, something about the future is predicted. The central idea of Hal Brands, professor at the School of Advanced programs of study (SAIS) in Washington, is that Eurasia has been the center of world geopolitics since the beginning of the 20th century, that is, since the world began to operate with planetary forces: the Great War, World War II, the Cold War... and whatever may come next. Great powers have sought to expand across the supercontinent: Germany at one end, Japan at the other, the USSR on both sides... and now it remains to be seen what China will do. In all cases, the United States, from the other hemisphere, has been the counterweight; the superpower that, by forming coalitions with threatened countries in Eurasia, has neutralized the aggressor, thus also making the 20th century an "American century." Will the United States play that role equally in the future?

The book looks at the history of the 20th century through the lens of geopolitics, following the teachings of Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman, and with a realistic conviction. Applying a chronological order, it revisits the wars of the last century and examines which elements of the principles put forward by these authors were fulfilled. Only at the end, in the last chapter, does it look ahead, attempting to draw lessons from the past. Brands warns, however, that history does not repeat itself exactly, since despite the imperatives that govern the behavior of land powers and sea powers, there is no plenary session of the Executive Council geographical plenary session of the Executive Council , plenary session of the Executive Council but rather, "history occurs at the nexus of impersonal forces and highly personal political decisions."

Brands notes that every country that has attempted Eurasian hegemony has ultimately been crushed. "This is the dilemma facing Eurasian powers: as they become strong enough to dominate their neighbors, they become strong enough to earn the enmity of the world," he writes. The question for the future is not only whether China will be tempted to seek such hegemony, but also whether the United States will once again act as a counterweight. Brands warns that "every effort at balance begins at home," implicitly admitting that the United States is not currently experiencing its best moment internally, although he does not convey any subject regarding the course of the Trump administration, a subject the author does not address directly.

However, if the United States is to come to the rescue of a potentially turbulent Eurasia, it must do so by wisely building broad coalitions. It should be noted that Washington is currently moving in the opposite direction, antagonizing most of the world.

Not taking into account what Trump is doing in this regard ultimately leaves the text somewhat out of date. Perhaps Brands believes that the anomaly of this presidency will be corrected by the next one and that, ultimately, the United States will be able to form coalitions when it needs them. But those final pages speak of a West ruled by "advanced democracies" that no longer exists.