Tanks vs. Drones: The War in Ukraine and Gaza—Countermeasures Against New Enemies

In 2022, the Russian military invaded Ukraine in what many believed would be a quick victory, with Russian forces waging a lightning war and ending it in a matter of days or weeks. However, a war of attrition quickly took hold, and contrary to expectations, the tank—considered the dominant force on the modern battlefield—was outmatched by new, smaller, and cheaper drones. One year later, on October 7, 2023, the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas launched a devastating attack on Israel. The Israeli Defense Forces then began a grueling campaign in the Gaza Strip to flush out the terrorist group. In the brutal urban combat that followed, the IDF’s “Merkava” tanks suffered losses at the hands of Hamas drones, as tactics similar to those employed by Ukraine against Russian tanks were used.

These events demonstrate that tanks and other conventional weapons are facing new challenges on the modern battlefield due to the emergence of cheaper weapon systems. These challenges require new approaches and countermeasures to ensure that modern militaries can adapt to the ever-changing battlefield and not only survive but defeat the enemy. The following article seeks to analyze the use of drones against tanks in the war in Ukraine and in Gaza, as well as the countermeasures taken by the Ukrainian, Russian, and Israeli militaries to address this threat. We will also examine the measures NATO members and other countries have implemented to counter drones or are currently developing.

Background: Basics of Armored Warfare

To understand the current situation, we must understand the tank and its role on the modern battlefield. Most tanks, such as those of the US, Europe, Russia, and Israel, were designed to be used in combat against other tanks or as a support weapon for infantry. These concepts gained prominence following the lessons learned from World War II, where tanks such as the M4 “Sherman” were used to provide fire support for infantry rather than engage other tanks. The mission of engaging tanks was left to specialized vehicles known as tank destroyers. During World War II, this approach was found to be severely flawed, as tanks faced threats from landmines, anti-tank guns, man-portable anti-tank systems, and enemy tanks. All of this meant that tanks could not operate alone without infantry and required them to be prepared to counter these new threats. Another threat that emerged for tanks was aircraft, which could target armored vehicles in open terrain with little opposition if anti-aircraft weapons were unavailable, as the German experience during and after the Normandy campaign demonstrated, when their ‘Panzer’ IV and ‘Tigers’ fell victim to American P-47 ‘Thunderbolts’ and British Hawker ‘Typhoons’.

The only defenses against the threat posed by these anti-tank weapons were infantry units accompanying the tank, which could escort the vehicle and neutralize threats in areas the vehicle could not reach. The only defense the tank itself could employ was improvised armor. These were makeshift measures taken by crews in the field, who used wooden planks, tank tracks, cement, sandbags, metal plates, and anything else they could find to add additional armor to the tanks. The effectiveness of these measures was so controversial that General George S. Patton banned most forms of improvised armor on “Shermans,” arguing that it increased the tanks’ weight without providing protection and also impaired their mobility.

These lessons influenced tank designs during the Cold War, which were developed to provide fire support to infantry in combined-arms operations and to engage other tanks. During this period, as seen in the Yom Kippur War, the greatest threat to tanks was anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The ATGM itself was an evolution of the anti-tank missiles developed during World War II, such as the“M1 Bazooka”or the German “Panzerfaust.” ATGMs became more common in the 1970s, grew more portable, and advanced with the introduction of better guidance systems such as the Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile ( TOW).

The heavy losses suffered by Israel during the Yom Kippur War led the British and Americans to develop Chobham armor as a countermeasure against this new weapon. Chobham, better known as “composite” armor, consists of multiple layers of plates made from different materials, including metals, ceramics, and plastics. This technology has been the primary focus in the development of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from the 1970s to the present day. Another advancement came in the form of reactive armor. First developed by the Soviets and gradually adopted by Western militaries, the idea was to place a series of brick-shaped explosive charges on the tanks with the aim of detonating incoming projectiles before they struck the tank, thereby deflecting shrapnel and molten metal away from the vehicle and protecting the crew.

Throughout the Cold War, strategists believed that one of the major threats tanks would face on the battlefield was the threat posed by aircraft, as armored vehicles tend to have weaker armor in the turret and upper sections. As mentioned earlier, a well-placed shot from an anti-tank rocket, missile, or even cannon rounds powerful enough to penetrate armor can neutralize tanks. It was anticipated that in a full-scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, massive tank battles would take place, with ground-attack aircraft such as the Fairchild Republic A-10 “Thunderbolt” destroying tanks and ground forces using a combination of missiles, rockets, bombs, and cannon fire. This view was validated during the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, when A-10s conducted airstrikes against Iraqi armored units.

In the 2000s, particularly during the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq—Operation “Iraqi Freedom”—the Coalition identified two new threats to tanks: the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and the car bomb, formally known as the Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). The IED and VBIED caused severe problems for Coalition forces in Iraq during the invasion and subsequent insurgency, damaging several Abrams tanks. The most effective way to deal with IEDs was through the use of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel to disarm bombs or preemptively detonate them before Coalition forces approached. In the case of the VBIED, the only defense was to destroy them with gunfire before they reached the tank.

Ukraine and Gaza: A New Threat

In Ukraine and Gaza, tanks must contend with the conventional threats they were designed to counter, as well as the rise of small commercial drones that have been modified to drop mortar shells on enemy positions or converted into suicide drones. In Ukraine, First Person View (FPV) drones have been used extensively as kamikaze attackers against infantry, vehicles, and tanks. These drones are controlled using an onboard camera, which allows them to operate deep behind enemy lines, carrying out precision strikes on unsuspecting enemies.

Troops in the field have few defenses against drones. With an average speed of 37 mph and thanks to their small size, FPV drones are very difficult for advanced systems to detect, and the Russian military has lost a significant number of troops and vehicles to them. The whole world has been surprised by the ability of small, commercial drones to take down some of the most powerful tanks in the world, such as the “Merkava” in Israel or the U.S.-supplied “Abrams” in Ukraine.

In Gaza, Hamas has employed similar tactics, using small, commercial drones to drop grenades on the upper sections of IDF “Merkava” tanks, putting several units out of action. Furthermore, suicide drones launched by Hamas caused damage to sensitive targets such as observation posts near Gaza during the October 7 attack. Houthi rebels have used suicide drones—most of them of the Iranian “Shaheed” model —to strike deep into Israel in large numbers, with a handful of them breaking through the “Iron Dome” and Israeli Air Force fighters attempting to shoot them down.

The rise of drones has had serious implications for tanks in Ukraine, as drones have become just as much of a threat as the man-portable “Javelin” anti-tank missile, which inflicted heavy losses in the early years of the war. Until 2022, the only drones that posed a threat to tanks were larger military drones equipped with missiles and bombs to neutralize armored vehicles, such as the American MQ-9 “Reaper”—which had already been tested in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—and the Turkish “Bayraktar” TB2. In the early stages of the invasion of Ukraine, “Bayraktar” drones helped Ukrainian forces halt the Russian advance.

The introduction of FPV drones has changed the situation. FPV drones are cheaper and easier to operate than larger UAVs, but no less effective. In Israel, as mentioned earlier, FPV drones were effective in targeting IDF assets such as guard towers, or in striking tanks on their upper sections—their most vulnerable spot. In terms of attacking tanks, FPV drones follow in the footsteps of combat aircraft, as seen during operations in the Middle East. In this regard, FPV drones are no different from aircraft; however, their size and speed make it harder for tank crews to spot them and take evasive action. Furthermore, drones make less noise, making them stealthier than fighter jets, leaving crews unable to counter them.

As of 2025, drones have surpassed tanks as the primary combat asset in Ukraine, with most of the casualties on both sides of the war being caused by drones.

Countermeasures

The events in Ukraine and Gaza sent shockwaves through defense ministries around the world. Western defense analysts were gripped by fears that such drone attacks could happen to them. In the US, NATO, Israel, Ukraine, and Russia, measures have begun to be devised to counter drones and protect tanks from attacks. Some of these measures are improvisations carried out in the field by crews to increase their chances of survival. Other countermeasures are standardized by the military. As a result, these countermeasures range from advanced technological systems to improvised rudimentary devices created from materials found in the field.

Anti-drone nets or cages

Following the emergence of FPV drones in combat, a peculiar sight emerged from Ukraine and Gaza. Russian, Ukrainian, and Israeli tanks appeared to be covered with what looked like small metal roofs on their turrets. Others appeared to resemble entire cages placed around the turrets or large sections of the tanks. These cages are designed to act as a shield, causing the drone to destroy the cage instead of the tank by detonating prematurely. In Israel, “Merkava” tanks heading to Gaza appear to have more standardized caging, improved to defend against FPV drones and explosives.

The cages or anti-drone mesh cover the thinnest sections of a tank’s armor, providing some level of increased protection. A more extreme version of these measures involves covering the entire tank—except for the gun barrel—with what can only be described as a kind of bunker or shed, resembling a turtle shell. These modified T-62, T-72, and T-80 tanks are informally referred to as “Turtle Tanks” in the West. These “Turtles” appear to be improvised modifications made by troops in the field rather than a standardized practice, based on images showing their haphazard nature. Another type of cage consists of what appears to be a series of metal rods resembling a porcupine’s quills, covering the entire tank. Some of these‘porcupine’tanks are also equipped with barbed wire.

These countermeasures are reminiscent of the improvised armor that M4 “Sherman” tank crews began applying to their tanks in Europe and the Pacific to better counter the more powerful guns of the “Tiger” tank mentioned earlier. Like the tanks in Ukraine, wooden planks and metal sheets were used in an attempt to improve the survivability of the tank crews. In a repeat of history, the improvised armor failed to adequately protect the M4 ‘Shermans’ or the T-72s in Ukraine from anti-tank weapons on most occasions.

Russian cage armor, like that used in the "Sherman" case, has several drawbacks. The first is that these shields increase the tank’s profile, making it a larger target for enemy units, such as artillery and airstrikes. The second disadvantage is that the new protective measures obstruct the tank crew’s line of sight and, in the case of the ‘Turtle’, prevent the turret from rotating, reducing situational awareness. This was a problem faced by the Germans with their late-war ‘Sturmgeschütz’assault guns.

Furthermore, the cages can become death traps, trapping the crews inside their tanks if hit—the worst nightmare for any tanker, aside from their tank catching fire. This problem is exacerbated if the tank is hit near the ammunition compartment. There is evidence that these measures impair vehicle performance, as Patton predicted nearly eighty years ago.

That said, the effectiveness of the cages remains unclear, as even the well-armored “Turtles” have fallen victim to attacks by FPV drones and other Ukrainian weapon systems. Furthermore, the precision of FPV drones—which are controlled via a camera that acts as the drone’s “eyes”—allows skilled operators to bypass the cages. Another problem that has arisen is that these additions are too thin to stop more powerful explosives such as artillery or anti-tank mines dropped by drones. Another issue for the Russians is that Ukrainian forces have adapted their tactics to render cages useless, as losses of caged tanks continue to increase. Despite these limitations, cages continue to be used by Ukrainian and Russian forces, the latter with new additions, likely due to crews trying to find some sort of protection.

Electronic warfare systems

Another defensive measure has been the installation of jammers on tanks to disable drones. This measure has become increasingly common as the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza drag on, with militaries around the world stepping up development of anti-drone jammers—systems that force drones to either land or crash by cutting the link between the drone and its operator. In the days following the emergence of the first FPV drones, Russian tanks began to appear equipped with anti-drone jammers in their turrets to neutralize UAVs.  

These systems have been found to be efficient and cost-effective for neutralizing drones when used in conjunction with other weapon systems. Improved radars have been developed to detect small FPV drones. Systems that can be worn by infantrymen on their vests or carried in backpacks are already being produced, and tanks are likely to receive similar upgrades in the coming years.

Jammers, however, much like anti-drone cages, cannot guarantee protection against drone attacks, as this depends on the jammer’s effectiveness in disabling the drone, radio signals, distance, and terrain—all of which can affect jamming. More importantly, FPV operators are developing ways to bypass drone jammers, meaning that the system alone cannot guarantee success.

Israel plans to incorporate improved jammers into the latest version of the Merkava tank, the MK 5. The IDF has also developed counter-jamming systems to counter Hamas’s GPS jamming technologies. Some of the makeshift cages are equipped with jammers and electronic systems designed to counter drones, including the previously mentioned “Turtles.”

Active Protection System (APS)

These systems are designed to neutralize drones by destroying them with projectiles rather than disabling them. The best-known systems are the Rafael“Trophy”and the“Bullfrog,”developed by Allen Control Systems. The “Trophy” fires small projectiles to neutralize the threat, while the “Bullfrog” is an autocannon. These systems are designed to destroy drones and projectiles intended to destroy UAVs.

Active Protection Systems (APS) have been in use since the advent of modern anti-tank missiles. Recent reports indicate that APS systems such as the “Trophy” have been integrated into “Merkava” tanks deployed in operations in the Gaza Strip. The IDF’s modernization efforts to counter Hamas drones include upgrades to “Trophy” systems designed to neutralize targets approaching from above—the angle of attack typically used by FPV drones.

Another APS system is the existing “Bushmaster” chain gun, which is already in use with the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. “Bushmasters” are deployed on military vehicles such as armored personnel carriers (APCs) for defense, as well as on lighter armored vehicles. More importantly, the US has already incorporated the ‘Bushmaster’ into the Mobile-Low, Slow Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (M-LIDS). These systems are currently being used by Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

Infantry

Another, less revolutionary defense against drones is the infantry. Infantrymen have long served as the primary defense for tanks against ambushes involving weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) or hidden enemies, particularly in urban areas. When it comes to drones, the situation is no different. Ukrainian forces have developed new weapons for their infantry to counter drones. The most B a new type of anti-drone round, chambered for the 5.56mm cartridge used by NATO and Ukrainian rifles. These rounds burst upon firing, creating a shotgun-like effect that destroys the drone. The idea is for a soldier to be able to simply swap out the magazine in his or her rifle, rather than having to carry a second weapon to counter drones.

Infantry has proven to be a valuable asset for tanks, particularly in urban combat in places such as Gaza, where rooftops, rubble, and buildings provide multiple locations from which to ambush vehicles using a variety of weapons. Another development is the introduction of anti-drone capabilities to infantry units; the most B the Israeli-made SMASH 2000L fire control system. These systems have proven effective in detecting drones, allowing IDF troops in Gaza to engage them. Crucially, the SMASH 2000L can be attached to most existing rifles, including the US M4A1, making it a cost-effective solution. The US has already begun testing the system in some of its units, with the US Marines already starting to integrate the attachment into their rifles.

Another weapon that infantry troops are equipped with is the anti-drone rifle, which is similar to a jammer; it resembles a bizarre, futuristic rifle that sends signals to the drone it is aimed at to force it to land by interrupting the connection between the operator and the drone.

Despite these measures, infantry remains highly vulnerable to FPV drones, as evidenced by the many videos average social average Russian soldiers in trenches, foxholes, and even inside buildings, hidden from view. As mentioned earlier, FPV technology enables greater accuracy, and these drones can enter buildings and strike targets that tanks or airstrikes cannot reach without causing massive collateral damage. FPV drones have become a predator capable of striking infantry no matter where they are hiding or even while on the move. Without drone jammers, netting, or anti-drone munitions, infantry units are easy targets for drones and other threats on the modern battlefield.

What's next?

The effectiveness of drones in the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza against some of the most advanced militaries has shocked many. Modernization efforts have begun across major Western militaries to prepare for countering UAV threats. Ukraine has continued to enhance its drone capabilities, including the development of a series of ground-based drones called “Termite,” capable of laying mines, conducting reconnaissance operations, and even mounting a cannon to engage enemies. In Israel, the IDF has increased the use of drones in operations in Gaza in conjunction with tanks and infantry.

The U.S. has begun equipping its M1 Abrams tanks withBullfrog systemsto protect against drones. Trophy systems have also been added to European vehicles for protection. Russia has also incorporated the Arena M-APS to counter Ukrainian drones. In Europe, Sweden’s Saab has begun developing systems such as theLocke, which is similar to the Bullfrog. Another development is the‘Nimbrix’counter-UAS missile. In Spain, INDRA has invested in counter-UAS capabilities. Furthermore, the modernization of ‘Trophy’ systems has continued as Rafael draws lessons from the Gaza war to improve its system.

In addition to countermeasures, the integration of drones into military units has accelerated, with training programs beginning to incorporate first-person view (FPV) systems with other weapon systems in both the United States and Europe. To gain an advantage in drone warfare over potential adversaries, the use of FPV systems is on the rise, and training centers are being established in Europe to train troops in the use of new drones. In the United States, the Marine Corps and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have begun integrating drone teams into their units. At the same time, counter-drone units are being deployed to combat units to counter any drone threat that may arise.

For tanks, the challenge posed by drones will not disappear; instead, it will only grow in severity and scale. Ukraine and Russia have avoided as much as possible sending tanks to the front lines near areas where FPVs are suspected, relegating the tank from its role as the spearhead to that of a support weapon. Efforts to reinforce tank armor are likely to continue. In the future, protective cages around tanks may become more standardized and sophisticated; electronic and active protection systems (APS) will feature more prominently in new and upgraded tank models. Israel has already secured agreements with South Korea to modernize its K2 tanks with “Trophy” systems.

Ammunition similar to the anti-drone rounds developed by Ukraine is likely to be adopted by NATO infantry squads, with trials of the new rounds already underway in the United States. In the future, American and European manufacturers may produce similar equipment.

Another future possibility lies in the development of laser-based systems to neutralize drones, an area in which the United States and other countries are investing increasing amounts of resources. In 2025, Israel unveiled the“Iron Beam”system, which is expected to be a cheaper and more efficient alternative to the famous “Iron Dome,” and is also developing a mobile version of the system for vehicles, though it is unclear whether it will be incorporated into tanks. In the US, the Enduring High Energy Laser (E-HEL) is being tested to improve drone defenses. Handheld energy weapons are also being developed by countries such as India. In the future, some of these systems could be integrated into tanks.  

Conclusions

The war in Ukraine has forever changed the way tanks are used in combat. Tanks will no longer be involved in large-scale conventional battles like those of World War II or the Gulf War, in which main battle tanks (MBTs) charged into battle as the spearhead. Instead, tanks will face battles of attrition against small, deadly enemies they cannot see—enemies against whom their advanced armor is useless. This has forced tank crews and the military to adapt to new threats.

Based on the experience of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, countermeasures involve a combination of improvised defenses by local forces and new technologies. The events in these conflicts have led major military and defense industries to adapt to the cheaper and deadly threats that have emerged. Although significant progress has been made in protecting tanks against this new threat, the reality is that a 100% effective solution to protect them from drones is not yet in sight. Furthermore, every measure has its drawbacks. However, we can conclude that in future conflicts, drones and anti-drone technology will become more common on battlefields around the world, with new advances continuing to reshape the battlefield.